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VOLUME 49 1972 NUMBER 2
HOMICIDES UNDER THE COLORADO
CRIMINAL CODE
By JOSEPH R. QUINN*
INTRODUCTION
O N July 1, 1972, the Colorado Criminal Code became effec-
tive. Many significant and long-needed reforms have been
accomplished by this legislation. To cite a few examples, de-
ferred prosecutions are now available as a dispositional tool
in all cases,1 an accused generally must be tried within 6 months
from the entry of a not guilty plea, 2 the complex problems of
multiple prosecutions and double jeopardy have been codified
by statute,3 and a bifurcated trial for class 1 felonies has been
established.4
However, a broad-scale statutory revision which abandons
many long-accepted concepts of the criminal law is bound to
create problems of interpretation, at least until such time as
judicial construction resolves the competing alternatives. Never-
theless, the inevitability of conflicts in interpretation only in-
creases the need for statutory coherency in definition. Since
the Criminal Code expressly recognizes as two of its basic pur-
poses the adequate definition of the act and mental state con-
stituting each offense, and the concomitant warning to all per-
sons of the nature of the prohibited conduct and its penalties, 5
it is proper to question whether the Code has achieved these
purposes in its treatment of criminal homicides.
Much has been written over the years with respect to
the mental element in crime and the problem of defining
criminal culpability in a manner reflective of the real differ-
*Attorney at Law, Denver, Colorado; A.B., St. Peter's College, 1957;
LL.B., Rutgers Law School, 1961.
1 Ch. 44, § 1, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39-7-401 (1973)).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-505 (Supp. 1971).
3 Id. §§ 40-1-402 to -404.
4 Ch. 44, § 1, [19721 Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39-11-103 (1973)).
5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-102(1) (Supp. 1971).
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ences in moral turpitude for criminal acts.' The purpose of this
article is not to add to the academic discussion of these issues.
Rather, the purpose is to analyze, within the definitional con-
fines established by the Criminal Code, the essential elements
of culpability for the various types of criminal homicides and
to delineate the salient problems and changes created by this
statute.
I. FIRST DEGREE MURDER
At common law, murder was defined as the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice prepense or aforethought.-
There were no degrees of murder at common law, and the
factor of malice was the essential ingredient distinguishing
murder from other types of criminal homicide." Malice in-
cluded something more than an intent to kill or endanger a
human life; it was a condition of mind manifesting wickedness,
depravity and malignancy.' The concept of "aforethought" sig-
nified the formation in and by the mind of the intent to do
the evil act in advance of the act itself, and connoted the
notions of thought, reflection, design, and purpose. 10 Thus,
"malice aforethought" included implicitly the concepts of pre-
meditation and deliberation."
In 1861, the Colorado legislature enacted into statute the
crime of murder, classified murder into two degrees, and
adopted much of the then existing common law pertaining to
it. 12 Under Colorado law, murder in the first degree was the
unlawful killing of a human being with express malice afore-
thought."3 Express malice was defined as the "deliberate in-
6 E.g., G. WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME (1965); Perkins, A
Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARv. L. REV. 905 (1939); Perkins, A Re-
Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537 (1934); Prevezer,
The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Mur-
der, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 624 (1957); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of
the Law of Homicide: I & II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 1261 (1937).
7 F. WHARTON, THE LAW OF HOMICiDE § 2 (3d ed. 1907).
8 Id.
9Id. § 81.
lo Id. § 82.
11Id.; see, e.g., Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 436 (1872). At common law, pre-
meditation meant to plan, contrive, or scheme beforehand. F. WHARTON,
supra note 7, § 114. Deliberation meant that the manner of the homicide
was determined after examination and reflection, that is, that the con-
sequences, chances, and means were weighed, carefully considered, and
estimated. Id., § 112.
12 Section 18, [1861] Colo. Sess. Laws 292. The murder statute was ex-
panded in 1883 to encompass specific acts of homicide which were
deemed murder in the first degree. Section 20, [1883] Colo. Sess. Laws
150.
13 Section 18, [1883] Colo. Sess. Laws 149 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-1 (1963)); Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 525, 22 P.2d 1109 (1933).
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tention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature
which is manifested by external circumstances capable of
proof." 4 By statute, murder in the first degree encompassed
those homicides "perpetrated by a deliberate and premeditated
killing;" those homicides perpetrated by an "act greatly dan-
gerous to the lives of others and indicating a depraved mind,
regardless of human life," and those killings perpetrated from
a "deliberate and premeditated design, unlawfully and mali-
ciously, to effect the death of a person other than the one who
is killed."'15 In the case of certain acts, such as a homicide per-
petrated by means of poison, lying in wait, torture, or in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate certain felonies, proof of
express malice aforethought was not necessary. Stated in another
fashion, the nature of the acts themselves constituted conclu-
sive proof of express malice aforethought.10
Under section 40-3-102 (1) of the Criminal Code, first degree
murder is a class 1 felony and a person is guilty thereof if
he acts in any of the four following ways:
(a) With premeditated intent to cause the death of a person
other than himself, he causes the death of that person or of an-
other person; or
(b) Acting either alone or with one or more persons, he com-
mits or attempts to commit arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping,
rape, or any sexual offense prohibited by sections 40-3-402, 40-
3-403, or 40-3-404, and in the course of or in furtherance of that
crime that he is committing or attempting to commit, or of im-
mediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of
the participants, is caused; or
(c) By perjury or subornation of perjury he procures the con-
viction and execution of any innocent person; or
(d) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life, he intentionally engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to a person other than him-
self, and thereby causes the death of another.
17
14 Section 19, [1861] Colo. Sess. Laws 292 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-2 (1963)).
1"Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)).
11; E.g., Early v. People, 142 Colo. 463, 352 P.2d 112 (1960); Dickens v.
People, 67 Colo. 409, 186 P. 277 (1919); Ehrhardt v. People, 51 Colo. 205,
117 P. 164 (1911) ; Andrews v. People, 33 Colo. 193, 79 P. 1031 (1905).
17 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102(1) (Supp. 1971). As capital punish-
ment has been held to be unconstitutional, there will be no more execu-
tions. Furman v. Georgia, 40 U.S.L.W. 4923 (U.S. June 27, 1972). Conse-
quently, crimes under part (c) of this statute are now an impossibility.
In subsections (a) and (d) the statute expressly recognizes the
principle of transferred intent. Under this principle, the offender is
guilty of first degree murder even if the perzon killed is not the person
the offender intended to kill, so long as the offender otherwise had the
mental state which characterizes murder under the statute. See Hen-
wood v. People, 54 Colo. 188, 129 P. 1010 (1913); Ryan v. People, 50
Colo. 99, 114 P. 306 (,1911); 1 R. ANDERSoN, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 193 (1957).
1972
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In the case of class 1 felonies, provision is made for a
separate trial on the issue of penalty before the same jury after
a guilty verdict is returned.18 At the penalty trial, the jury is
authorized to return a verdict of death or life imprisonment,
or a verdict recommending leniency, in which case the court
may impose a sentence of 15 years to life. Recently, in Furman
v. Georgia,19 the United States Supreme Court declared capital
punishment unconstitutional. The practical and immediate ef-
fect of this decision is to render nugatory that portion of the
Criminal Code making death an alternative penalty for first
degree murder. Consequently, the penalties for first degree
murder are now either life imprisonment, or, in the case where
leniency is indicated, imprisonment for a period of 15 years to
life.
The bifurcated trial section of the Criminal Code was en-
acted primarily to alleviate the dilemma inherent in capital
cases where the jury passes on the issue of culpability and
punishment in the same proceeding. It has long been recognized
that so long as capital punishment can be imposed, the accused
should have the opportunity of testifying about facts in miti-
gation in an effort to save his life without running the risk
of simultaneously incriminating himself on the issue of guilt.
With the judicial abolition of capital punishment, however, the
primary reason for the bifurcated trial ceases to exist, and the
issue of penalty (i.e., life imprisonment or leniency justifying
a 15 year to life sentence) can just as effectively be resolved
in a unitary proceeding. However, the only provision in the
Criminal Code which provides for a leniency verdict in the
case of first degree murder is the bifurcated trial provision.
The general penalty section of the Criminal Code provides
alternative penalties of death or life imprisonment for class 1
felonies. Therefore, until such time as the Criminal Code is
amended, the bifurcated trial on penalty should probably be
utilized in the case of a conviction for first degree murder so
as not to deprive the accused of his right to have the jury
determine the propriety of a leniency verdict. If the legislature
desires to amend the statute and do away with the bifurcated
trial entirely because of the abolition of capital punishment, it
can do so by providing for a unitary proceeding on guilt and
penalty, the alternatives of penalty being life imprisonment or
leniency.
18 Ch. 44, § 1, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39-11-103 (1973)).
1940 U.S.L.W. 4923 (U.S. June 27, 1972).
VOL. 49
COLORADO HOMICIDES
A. Premeditated Intent to Cause Death
Since the concept of express malice encompasses such over-
lapping ingredients as premeditation, deliberation, depravity of
mind, and intent to kill, the Criminal Code follows the example
of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code and elimin-
ates malice from the definition of murder.20 However, the
Criminal Code, contrary to the Model Penal Code, retains the
concepts of premeditation and intent, and makes premeditation
unique to the crime of first degree murder.21 The Colorado
Criminal Code defines premeditation as "a design formed to
do something at any time before it is done.' 22 Additionally,
under the Criminal Code, "[a] person acts intentionally with
respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute . . .
when his conscious object is to cause that result, or engage in
that conduct, or when his actions are such as to give rise to
a substantial certainty that such results will be produced.1
2 3
Thus, murder in the first degree under section 40-3-102(1) (a)
requires two distinct elements of mental culpability: (a) there
must be a premeditation to perform the act causing death; (b)
there must be an intent to cause the death of a person killed
or another person.
The legislature obviously intended the concept of pre-
meditation to be a crucial element in distinguishing that form
of first degree murder requiring "premeditated intent to cause
death" from second degree murder. This difference is made
clear because one form of second degree murder is defined
as causing the death of a person intentionally, but without
premeditation..2 4 With such a legislative distinction, it cannot
reasonably be argued that the use of the word "premeditated"
in the definition of first degree murder was merely superfluous
and unnecessary to its definition.
The major source of difficulty in the Criminal Code's
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) provides as follows:
[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(a) It is committed purposely or knowingly; or
(b) It is committed recklessly under circumstances mani-
festing extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such
recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is en-
gaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt
to commit, or flight after committing robbery, rape by force
or intimidation, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious
escape.
21 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102 (a) (Supp. 1971).
22 Id. § 40-3-101 (1) (c).
23 Id. § 40-1-601(6).
24 Id. § 40-3-103 (1) (a).
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treatment of first degree murder is the retention of the con-
cepts of both premeditation and intent. The Model Penal Code
several years ago recognized the unwieldy nature of such con-
cepts and attempted to dispel their obscurity by rationalizing
the culpability requirements in criminal law under the con-
cepts of knowledge and purpose.2" The Colorado Criminal Code,
however, retains premeditation and intent, and then defines
intent by employing part of the Model Penal Code's definition
of knowledge and part of its definition of purpose.26 As a result,
the Criminal Code fails to classify degrees of mental culpability
on the basis of clearly distinguishable psychological states.
Justice Cardozo in 1928 recognized the false psychology
upon which the legal distinction between premeditation and
intent is predicated:
I think the distinction is much too vague to be continued in
our law. There can be no intent unless there is a choice, yet by
the hypothesis, the choice without more is enough to justify the
inference that the intent was . . .premeditated. The presence
of a sudden impulse is said to mark the dividing line, but how can
an impulse be anything but sudden when the time for its for-
25 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) provides as
follows:
(2) Kinds of culpability defined.
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element
of an offense when:
(1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct
of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(2) if the element involves the attendant circumstances,
he knows of the existence of such circumstances.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material ele-
ment of an offense when:
(1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct
or the attendant circumstances, he knows that his conduct is
of that nature or he knows of the existence of such circum-
stances; and
(2) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he
knows that his conduct will necessarily cause such a result
6 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-601(6) (Supp. 1971), extracts the "con-
scious object" language from the Model Penal Code's definition of pur-
posely, and the "knowledge of results" language, with some variation,
from the Model Penal Code's definition of knowingly. See note 25 supra.
After having transposed much of the Model Penal Code's meaning of
knowledge and purpose to the Criminal Code's concept of intent, the
Criminal Code then employs the concept of knowledge under separate
definition. Thus, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-601(7) (Supp. 1971)
provides:
A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when
he is aware, or reasonably should be aware, that his conduct is
of that nature or that the circumstance exists.
This definition is almost identical to the Model Penal Code's definition
of knowledge in § 2.02(2) (b). See note 25 supra.
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mation is measured by the lapse of seconds? Yet the decisions
are to the effect that seconds may be enough. What is meant, as
I understand it, is that the impulse must be the product of an
emotion or passion so swift and overmastering as to sweep the
mind from its moorings. A metaphor, however, is, to say the
least, a shifting test whereby to measure degrees of guilt that
mean the difference between life and death. I think the students
of the mind should make it clear to the lawmakers that the
statute is framed along the lines of a defective and unreal
psychology.27
Because these definitions do not reflect actual differing states
of mind, it becomes impossible to apply the statutes with any
degree of precision. A close analysis of the language makes this
clear. Under the Criminal Code's general definition of intention,
intention in the case of murder would be the conscious object
to cause death or the conscious object to engage in an act of
killing, or acting with substantial certainty that death will be
produced..2'- The very minimum requirement of culpability for
an intentional act is "the performance of conduct involving a
voluntary act."'1 A voluntary act, by statutory definition, is "an
act performed consciously as a result of effort or determina-
tion. ' '3 1 It is well established in psychology that consciousness
implies a state of awareness. 3 ' Under the Criminal Code, second
degree murder is an intentional killing, thereby requiring that
the actor be aware of his object or purpose in acting.32 In
differentiating between second and first degree murder, it is
necessary to distinguish between taking a life while aware that
one is so doing (second degree murder) and taking a life as a
result of "a design formed to do something at any time before
it is done ' 3 3 (first degree murder).
Apparently, if there is a difference between first and sec-
ond degree murder, it is a result of added time and planning in
the case of first degree murder. However, prior Colorado case
law specifically rejects such a distinction. In the much cited
case of Van Houton v. People, the court stated:
Time, however, is not essential if there was a design and
determination to kill formed in the mind of the defendant previ-
ous to or at the time the mortal wound was given. It matters
27 B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LIrERATURE 97-99 (1931).
28 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-601(6) (Supp. 1971).
2" Id. § 40-1-602.
30 Id. § 40-1-601(2) (emphasis added).
31 E.g., H. ENGLISH & A. ENGLISH, A COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF PSYCHO-
LOGICAL AND PSYCHOANALYTICAL TERMS 58 (1958); 1 R. GOLDENSON, THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR: PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY AND MEN-
TAL HEALTH 250-53 (1970); cf. Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879).
32 See p. 154 infra.
33 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-101 (1) (c) (Supp. 1971).
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not how short the interval, if it was sufficient for one thought to
follow another, and the defendant actually deliberated and pre-
meditated upon such design before firing the fatal shot, this was
sufficient to raise the crime to the highest grade known to law.
34
Clearly, if one has time to be aware of the consequences of
an action there has been time for "one thought to follow an-
other." Thus, if one has the requisite mental culpability for
second degree murder, one also has the requisite mental cul-
pability for first degree murder.
Viewing the problem in the terms of the statute itself, it
is possible to argue that acting with a conscious object to cause
a result (the definition of intention) involves an awareness
which at least implicitly includes a prior design to act (the
definition of premeditation). And so, in the case of first degree
murder, it can be argued that voluntarily acting with a con-
scious object or purpose to cause death involves, by psycho-
logical necessity, a prior design to act in a manner calculated to
cause death, to the very extent that one is conscious or aware
of his object or purpose. Thus, under such an argument, any
difference between a killing accompanied by a prior design to
cause death (premeditation), and a killing accompanied by a
conscious object to cause death (intention), would be so vague
and obscure that a person of ordinary intelligence could not
know with fair assurance the nature of the distinction.
The legislative choice of such an unwieldy concept as "pre-
meditated intent" and the legislative selection of premeditation
as the crucial element in distinguishing one form of first degree
murder from second degree murder raises some serious ques-
tions of construction. It has been held that a statute which
forbids "the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application violates the first essential of due
process of law."'35 For such a statute virtually "licenses the
jury to create its own standard in each case," and no more
proof is required for a conviction under one statute than under
the other.3 6 Additionally, equal protection of law requires that
a statutory classification be based on differences which are real
34 Van Houton v. People, 22 Colo. 53, 66, 43 P. 137 (1895).
35 See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Connally v. Gen-
eral Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); People v. Vinnolla, 494
P.2d 826 (Colo. 1972); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 280, 450 P.2d 1013
(1969); Fehringer v. People, 59 Colo. 3, 147 P. 361 (1915).
36 See cases cited note 35 supra. See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242,
263 (1937); Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Duplicative Stat-
utes Setting, 42 COLO. L. REv. 455 (1971).
VOL. 49
COLORADO HOMICIDES
in fact and reasonably related to the legitimate statutory pur-
poseY.3  Thus, where two separate statutes with unequal penal-
ties proscribe what ostensibly might be different acts, but the
statutes offer no intelligent standards for distinguishing the
acts proscribed, then equal protection is violated.38 The prob-
lems of statutory construction inherent in such concepts as
"premeditated intent" and "intent without premeditation" could
have been avoided by a more carefully selected basis for dis-
tinguishing between different degrees of criminal culpability.
3 9
B. Felony-Murder
At common law, an accidental or unintentional homicide
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a felony
was murder. 40 The rule was rationalized on the basis of a
fiction: the malice necessary to make the killing murder could
37E.g., Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171 Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970). See also
Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23, 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Chavez, 77
N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456 (1966); State v. Pirkey, 203 Ore. 697, 281 P.2d 698
(1955).
38 See cases cited note 37 supra. Even where certain conduct fits within
two different statutory proscriptions, which carry different penalties but
set forth distinct legal elements for the statutory offenses, one body of
law would require that the accused be proscuted under the less severe
statute. State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969); State v.
Collins, 55 Wash. 2d 469, 348 P.2d 214 (1960); Comment, Prosecutorial
Discretion in the Duplicative Statutes Setting, 42 COLO. L. REV. 155
(1971). However, the Colorado Supreme Court recently indicated in
dicta that the prosecutor has discretion in such a situation to proceed
under either statute. People v. James, 497 P.2d 1256 (Colo. 1972). In
the James case, however, the Court found that the statutes in question
(forgery and unlawful use of credit device) related to two different
kinds of criminal conduct, and the classifications were not unintelligible.
39 Perhaps some degree of definitional consistency and coherency can be
salvaged from the Criminal Code by construing "premeditation" in a
manner calculated to accomplish what the legislature intended but did
not quite achieve - to establish legally qualitative distinctions between
first and second degree murder reflective of the real differences in
moral turpitude for homicidal acts. The Criminal Code not only states
that it shall be construed in such manner as to define adequately the
act and mental state which constitutes each offense, but also expressly
sanctions the use of case law as an interpretive aid in the construction
of its provisions. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-104(3) (Supp. 1971).
It is a fact that in some cases judicial construction of the traditional
concepts of homicide (such as premeditation, deliberation, wilfulness,
malice) has resulted in practically interpreting them out of existence.
Prior case law, while not furnishing an ideal solution by any means,
affords a less shaky basis for delineatirig the mental culpability require-
ments of first degree murder than does the literal application of the
Criminal Code. In the case of premeditated intent, construction might
be sought in the former culpability requirement of first degree murder,
express malice aforethought. Thus, "premeditated intent" might be con-
strued to mean a design to engage in the act of killing, calmly or
sedately formed prior to the act itself, accompanied by a consciously
evil desire or object to bring about death. See F. WHARTON, supra note
7, §§ 81, 82. While this construction of premeditation virtually rein-
states much of the admittedly elusive language of the common law, it is
at least somewhat more intelligible than the literal definition of pre-
meditated intent in the Criminal Code. Certainly, murder should be
defined by something other than the statutory tautologies presently
inherent in the Criminal Code.
40 F. WHARTON, supra note 7, § 92.
1972
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be constructively imputed from the malice incident to the per-
petration of the initial felony. 41 One possible explanation of this
doctrine is that at early common law, practically all felonies
were punishable by death, so it made little difference whether
the accused was hanged for the initial felony or for the death
accidentally resulting from the felony.
42
Prior to the adoption of the Criminal Code, Colorado's felony-
murder statute proscribed as first degree murder all killing
"committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, mayhem or burglary. '43 Although the ma-
jority of states have similar statutes, courts in several jurisdic-
tions have imposed various qualifications on the felony-murder
rule in an effort to limit its application.
44
There are two basic conditions precedent to the application
of the felony-murder rule under the Criminal Code. Initially,
there must be an actual commission or attempt to commit one
of the designated felonies -arson, robbery, burglary, kidnap-
ping, rape, gross sexual imposition, deviate sexual intercourse
by force or its equivalent, or deviate sexual intercourse by im-
position. Secondly, the statute requires that, after the attempt
or commission of the designated felony has commenced, the
death of another be caused in the course of or in furtherance
of the designated felony.
Under the plain meaning of the statute, an accidental
homicide committed in the course of conduct which is clearly
preparatory in nature would not be within the ambit of the
41 Id. See also Frady v. People, 96 Colo. 43, 40 P.2d 606 (1934); Andrews
v. People, 33 Colo. 193, 69 P. 1031 (1905).
4 2 Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472, 476, (1958).
43 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-2 (1963)).
44 Some of the judicially created limitations are as follows: (1) The feloni-
ous act must be dangerous to life. People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199
N.W. 373 (1924); State v. Diebold, 152 Wash. 68, 277 P. 394 (1929).
(2) The homicide must be the natural and probable consequence of the
felonious act. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735
(1901). (3) Death must be proximately caused. Burton v. State, 122
Tex. Crim. 363, 55 S.W.2d 813 (1933). (4) The felony must be malum
in se. People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924). (5) The
act must be a common law felony. State v. Burrell, 120 N.J.L. 277,
199 A. 18 (1938); Commonwealth v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 89 A. 968 (1914).
(6) The period during which the felony is in the process of commission
must be narrowly construed. State v. Taylor, 173 La. 1010, 139 So. 463
(1932); Huggins v. State, 149 Miss. 280, 115 So. 213 (1928); People v.
Smith, 232 N.Y. 239, 133 N.E. 574 (1921); State v. Marwig, 227 N.Y. 382,
125 N.E. 535 (1919); State v. Diebold, 152 Wash. 68, 277 P. 394 (1929).
(7) The underlying felony must be independent of the homicide. State v.
Severns, 158 Kan. 453, 148 P.2d 488 (1944); State v. Fisher, 120 Kan.
226, 243 P. 291 (1926); State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552 (1878); People v.
Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927); People v. Huther, 184 N.Y. 237,
77 N.E. 6 (1906).
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felony-murder rule. Although such conduct might arguably be
construed to be in furtherance of the criminal episode itself,
conduct in the form of preparation has traditionally been con-
sidered as falling short of the criminal attempt.4 5 However, the
Criminal Code's definition of attempt is sufficiently broad to
encompass conduct which formerly fell within the area of non-
criminal preparation. The definition of attempt, which is simi-
lar to the Model Penal Code's definition of attempt, is inten-
tional conduct "constituting a substantial step towards the
commission of an offense. ' '4 6 A substantial step is further de-
fined by the Colorado Criminal Code as "conduct, whether act,
omission, or possession, which is strongly corroborative of the
firmness of the actor's intent to complete the commission of
the offense. '47 While the Criminal Code fails to specifically
characterize the type of conduct which does or does not con-
stitute a substantial step, the Model Penal Code furnishes some
illustrative definitions which might arguably be within the
Criminal Code's general definition of attempt. The Model Penal
Code provides that the following conduct, if strongly corrobora-
tive of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not, as a matter of
law, be held insufficient to constitute a substantial step:
(a) lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated
victim of the crime;
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of
the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission;
(c) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission
of the crime;
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which
it is contemplated that the crime will be committed;
(e) possession of materials to be employed in the commission
of the crime, which are specifically designed for such unlawful
use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under
the circumstances;
(f) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be em-
ployed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place con-
templated for its commission, where such possession, collection
or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the
circumstances;
(g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constitut-
ing an element of the crime.48
Thus, a person who is armed with a deadly weapon and
45 E.g., Lewis v. People, 124 Colo. 62, 235 P.2d 348 (1951); People v. Mur-
ray, 14 Cal. 159 (1859); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 162 Pa. Super. 526, 58
A. 375 (1948); Regina v. Cheeseman, 9 Cox Crim. Cas. 100 (Crim. App.
1862).
46 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-101 (Supp. 1971). See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
4 7 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-101 (Supp. 1971).
48 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
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is driving to the scene of a robbery and kills another in a
motor vehicle accident en route, arguably falls within the
definition of attempted robbery. Since an attempt under the
Colorado Criminal Code includes possessory conduct,49 and the
possession of a deadly weapon is corroborative of the actor's
intent to complete the offense,10 a court could hold that such
conduct under the circumstances is sufficient to constitute at-
tempted robbery and thereby render the actor liable for first
degree murder under the felony-murder rule.
The Colorado Criminal Code expressly broadens the scope
of the felony-murder rule to include immediate flight from
the scene of the crime.' In this respect, the statute follows the
holding of Whitman v. People,'52 which upheld the defendant's
conviction for first degree murder under the former felony-
murder statute for the death of an occupant of a motor vehicle
with which the defendant collided while fleeing from the scene
of a robbery. However, the precise scope of the phrase "im-
mediate flight" will undoubtedly require judicial construction.
The death of one of the participants in the underlying
felony is expressly taken out of the felony-murder rule under
the Criminal Code.53 In this respect, the Criminal Code nulli-
fies the case of Robbins v. People,'54 which upheld Robbins'
felony-murder conviction for his accidental killing of a co-felon
during the course of a robbery. Under the Criminal Code,
whether the participant be killed by the victim of the robbery,
the police, or some third party, the co-participants are not
criminally responsible for his death. The rationale for this limi-
tation lies in the fact that the killing of the participant was jus-
tifiable under the circumstances. It would be irrational to im-
pute a legally justifiable homicide to a participating felon and,
by reason of such imputation, change the character of the act
from one of justifiable homicide to one of criminal culpability.-
5
However, if the participant himself intentionally, recklessly,
or negligently causes the death of a co-participant during the
felony or immediate flight therefrom, then ostensibly he could
49 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-101 (1) (Supp. 1971).
so Id.
51Id. § 40-3-102(1) (b).
52 161 Colo. 110, 420 P.2d 416 (1966).
53COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102(1) (b) (Supp. 1971).
.4 142 Colo. 254, 350 P.2d 818 (1960).
55 See Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others,
105 U. PA. L. REv. 50 (1956).
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be held to the appropriate degree of criminal liability inde-
pendent of the felony-murder statute.5 6
One of the most perplexing problems in the felony-mur-
der area is not expressly resolved by the Criminal Code. The
problem is whether or not a participant in a crime can be
held criminally responsible under the felony-murder doctrine
for the death of a third party effected by a nonparticipant.
Certainly in the case where the participant uses the body of
an innocent person as a shield in order to escape from the
scene of the crime, and the innocent person is killed by police
bullets, the participant, even independent of the felony-murder
rule, would be liable for first degree murder by virtue of the
criminal culpability demonstrated in the use of the body of
the innocent person.5 7 But in the case where the participants
of a robbery are fleeing from the scene of the crime and a
policeman or the victim of the robbery shoots at their fleeing
automobile and accidentally kills an innocent bystander, the
question of whether the participants are criminally liable for
first degree murder under the felony-murder doctrine is not
so easily answered. The Criminal Code merely states that a
person commits the crime of first degree murder if, "in the
course of or in furtherance of the crime . . . or of immediate
flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of the
participants, is caused.15 8 But the Criminal Code contains no
definition of causation. The causality relationship between con-
duct and result in criminal law has been analyzed from many
perspectives -proximate cause, direct cause, substantial cause,
efficient cause, and so forth. '9 The Model Penal Code under-
takes a fresh approach to the issue of causation by establishing
a "but-for" test, with the qualification that in offenses requiring
5 Thus, the participant could possibly be prosecuted for any of the follow-
ing: first degree murder, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102 (Supp.
1971), on the ground that he had the "premeditated intent to cause
death" or he intentionally engaged in an act which created a grave risk
of death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life; second degree murder, id. § 40-3-103, on the
ground that he caused the death intentionally or with intent to cause
serious bodily injury; manslaughter, id. § 40-3-104, on the ground that
he caused the death recklessly, or perhaps in the exceptional situation,
he caused the death intentionally upon heat of passion; criminally negli-
gent homicide, id. § 40-3-105, on the ground that he caused the death
by criminal negligence; and finally for vehicular homicide, id. § 40-3-
106, if he proximately caused the death while driving under the influ-
ence or in a reckless manner.
57 See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934); Taylor v.
State, 40 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900).
58 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102(1) (b) (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
5 See R. ANDERSON, supra note 17, § 195; F. WHARTON, supra note 7, §§
27-39; Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 589 (1970).
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purpose or knowledge with respect to a particular result, crim-
inal culpability is generally established only when the actual
result was within the purpose or contemplation of the actor.6 0
Since the Colorado Criminal Code expressly sanctions the
use of case law as an interpretive aid in the construction of
its provisions,61 an answer to the problem of a participant's
responsibility for the death of a third party effected by a
nonparticipant might be found at common law. At common law
the felony-murder rule was used to establish the mens rea of
murder. The rule imputed to all the perpetrators of the felony
the malice required for murder, once it was established that
a death was criminally caused by one of the perpetrators in
furtherance of the felony.62 But the felony-murder rule was
not a rule of imputed causation. At common law the felony-
murder rule required a direct causal connection between the
perpetration of the felony and the ensuing homicide.6 3 Mere
temporal coincidence of the felony and the death of another
was insufficient to establish felony-murder liability.64 The ra-
tionale of the common law was elucidated in the early case of
Commonwealth v. Campbell:
No person can be held guilty of homicide unless the act is either
actually or constructively his, and it cannot be his act in either
sense unless committed by his own hand or by someone acting
in concert with him or in furtherance of a common object or
purpose. Certainly that cannot be said to be an act of a party
in any just sense, or on any sound legal principle, which is not
only not done by him, or anyone with whom he is associated or
connected in a common enterprise, or in attempting to accomplish
the same end, but is committed by a person who is his direct and
immediate adversary, and who is, at the moment when the al-
leged criminal act is done, actually engaged in opposing and re-
sisting him and his confederates and abettors in the accomplish-
ment of the unlawful object for which they are united.
65
Several jurisdictions passing on the issue have followed
the common law rule that the act of killing must be by the
felon or his confederate. 66 As one court recently stated, "[A]
60MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
6 1 
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-104(3) (Supp. 1971).
62 Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U.
PA. L. REv. 50, 59 (1956).
63 Perkins, The Law of Homicide, 36 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 391, 404 (1946);
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863); Rex v.
Plummer, 84 Eng. Rep. 1103 (K.B. 1700). See also the discussion in Com-
monwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 372 (1958).
6 4 Perkins, supra note 63.
65 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863).
66 Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); State v.
Garner, 238 La. 563, 115 So. 2d 855 (1959); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349
Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308 (1965); Podolski v. People, 332 Mich. 508, 52
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distinction based on the person killed . . . would make the de-
fendant's criminal liability turn upon the marksmanship of
victims and policemen," and a "rule of law cannot reasonably
be based on such a fortuitous circumstance. '"67 Since the Colo-
rado legislature saw fit to retain the felony-murder rule, it
should have delineated the scope of the rule by either defining
the concept of causation or articulating within the felony-murder
statute the bounds of its applicability.
One final change effected by the Criminal Code is the
establishment of an affirmative defense to the charge of felony-
murder. The Criminal Code provides that if the defendant pre-
sents some credible evidence on his affirmative defense, "then
the guilt of the defendant must be established beyond a reason-
able doubt as to the issues underlying the affirmative defense
as well as all other elements of the offense. '68 The six factors
on which the defendant must present some credible evidence
to raise the affirmative defense are as follows: (1) that he "was
not the only participant in the underlying crime;" and (2)
that he "did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit,
request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission
thereof;" and (3) that he "was not armed with a deadly wea-
pon;" and (4) that he "had no reasonable ground to believe
that any other participant was armed with such a weapon
or instrument;" and (5) that he "did not engage in or intend
to engage in and had no reasonable ground to believe that any
other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to re-
sult in death or serious bodily injury;" and (6) that he "en-
deavored to disengage himself from the commission of the
underlying crime or flight therefrom immediately upon having
reasonable grounds to believe that another participant [was]
armed with a deadly weapon, instrument, article, or substance
or intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or
serious bodily injury.'"69 The affirmative defense section seems
to be predicated on the assumption that the death of the vic-
tim was caused by one of the participants in the felony itself.
One might reasonably argue from the thrust of this section
that the legislature intended to restrict the application of the
felony-murder rule to deaths directly caused by one of the
N.W.2d 201 (1952); People v. Wood, 9 App. Div. 443, 195 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1955).
67 People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 780, 402 P.2d 130, 132, 614 Cal. Rptr.
442, 444 (1965).
6 8 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-507 (Supp. 1971).
G9 Id. § 40-3-102(2).
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participants in the felony itself, as opposed to a nonparticipant.
Judicial construction will undoubtedly be required to resolve
the scope of the felony-murder rule under the statute.
C. Murder by Extreme Indifference to Human Life
At common law, the requisite of malice for murder in-
cluded not only an intent to kill or endanger a particular per-
son, but also "every case where there is a wickedness of dis-
position, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences,
and a mind regardless of social duty, although no particular
person may be intended to be injured. '70 The former Colorado
murder statute recognized this principle by proscribing as first
degree murder death resulting from an act "greatly dangerous
to the lives of others and indicating a depraved mind, regardless
of human life."' 71 Colorado case law restricted the application
of this section to those acts evincing "universal malice," as
opposed to acts directed at the person actually killed:
Every act that results in the death of a person is greatly dan-
gerous to the life of such pelson, but the statute intended that
there should be an act which shows the accused to have had a
depraved mind, regardless of human life, and is intended to in-
clude those cases where a person has no deliberate intention to
kill any particular individual. In other words, when a person
kills another by an act which is greatly dangerous to the lives
of others, and which shows a depraved mind regardless of human
life, he is guilty of murder in the first degree, not because he has
atrociously murdered a particular individual, but because his act
has evinced universal malice, a malice against mankind in
general.
We think the Legislature, in this clause, intended to
raise to the high grade of murder in the first degree those homi-
cides which are the result of what is called "universal malice."
By universal malice, we do not mean a malicious purpose to
take the life of all persons. It is that depravity of the human
heart, which determines to take life upon slight or insufficient
provocation, without knowing or caring who may be the victim.
72
The Criminal Code attempts to codify this concept of uni-
versal malice by providing in section 40-3-102 (1) (d) that "a
person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if
[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life, he intentionally engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to a person other than himself,
and thereby causes the death of another."
73
70 F. WHARTON, supra note 7, § 90.
71 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)).
72 Longinotti v. People, 46 Colo. 173, 176, 180, 102 P. 165, 166, 168 (1909).
73 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102(1) (d) (Supp. 1971).
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There are two essential elements of culpability under this
section: (1) the actor must intentionally perform an act creat-
ing a substantial homicidal risk; and (2) the act itself must
be performed under circumstances manifesting extreme indif-
ference to human life. The intent requisite for culpability under
this section does not require a conscious object to cause death,
or a premeditated intent to cause death. That type of mental
culpability is an ingredient of murder under section 41-3-102(1)
(a). Considering the Criminal Code's general definition of in-
tent,7 4 the intent contemplated in subsection (1) (d) is either
of the following: (1) the actor's conscious object is to engage
in that particular conduct; or (2) his actions are such as to
give rise to a substantial certainty that death will result from
them. The latter definition of intentional conduct constitutes
a virtual imputation of intent to the actor regardless of whether
or not the fatal results of his conduct are within his conscious
object or purpose, and regardless of whether or not he actually
intends to engage in death-causing conduct. This imputation of
intent requires that the actions create such a risk-endangering
situation that the results are almost certain to follow from the
act, regardless of the purpose or specific intent of the actor
himself. In other words, the act speaks for itself. In this respect,
intent becomes a form of aggravated recklessness. Under the
Criminal Code one acts recklessly when he is aware or reason-
ably should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk and
consciously disregards the risk in a manner amounting to will-
ful and wanton conduct.
75
But murder in the first degree under this subsection re-
quires, in addition to intentionally engaging in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death, that the act itself must be per-
formed "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life." It has been argued that the ad-
jective "extreme" is misplaced because there are no degrees
of indifference to a particular result. In other words, "to speak
of extreme indifference is pointless, because indifference itself
is the ultimate extremity. ' ' 71 Also, it might be argued that
when one intentionally engages in conduct which creates a great
risk of death to another, he thereby acts under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
Under such an argument, the "extreme indifference" require-
4 Id. §40-1-601 (6).
75 Id. §40-1-601 (8).
76 G. WILLIAMS, supra note 6.
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ment would add nothing to the culpability requirement of first
degree murder. However, the legislature obviously did not
intend to proscribe as first degree murder any and all acts
creating substantial homicidal risks to others where the actor's
conscious object is to engage in the act but he is indifferent to
the result, or where the actor's conduct gives rise to a high
probability of death but death is not intended. If such were
the legislative intent, then this particular form of first degree
murder would be almost impossible to distinguish from man-
slaughter, which is defined as recklessly causing the death
of another person.
77
The further requirement that the conduct itself be per-
formed "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life" seems to reflect the legislative
judgment that certain types of criminal conduct resulting in
death are qualitatively distinct from a consciously performed
act resulting in an unintended death and an act performed in
conscious disregard of a substantial and an unjustifiable risk
of death. Although the basis for this distinction is extremely
difficult to verbalize, it would seem that the additional require-
ment of extreme indifference to life assimilates that type of
conscious indifference to consequences which approaches, but
does not quite meet, purposeful and knowing conduct.75 Ex-
amples of the proscribed conduct would include shooting into
a crowd or an occupied house or an occupied automobile, in
disregard of any and all consequences.71 Section 40-3-102 (d)
thus reflects, and somewhat broadens, the common law prin-
ciple of universal malice and the former statutory proscription
cast in terms of "a depraved heart regardless of human life.'" 0
II. SECOND DEGREE MURDER
Under prior Colorado law, second degree murder was the
unlawful killing of a human being without premeditation or
deliberation but with implied malice." Malice was implied
when there was no considerable provocation for the killing,
or where the circumstances of the killing showed an aban-
77 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-104(1) (a) (Supp. 1971).
7 8 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 and Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
7' Wechsler & Michael, supra note 6, at 709-13, 720-22, 742-51.
80 Id.; Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-2-3(1) (1963)).
81 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)). See, e.g., Hervey v. People, 495 P.2d 204 (Colo.
1972); Watkins v. People, 158 Colo. 485, 408 P.2d 425 (1965); Becksted v.
People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189 (1956); Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563,
9 P. 853 (1885).
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doned and malignant heart on the part of the slayer.8 2 In the
context of second degree murder, "abandoned" meant throw-
ing off all self-restraint and pursuing a lawless and evil course
with utter disregard to the consequences;83 "malignant" was
defined as governed by malice, not necessarily towards a par-
ticular individual, but under circumstances showing an utter
disregard for human life proceeding from a heart devoid of
social duty and fatally bent on mischief.84 The distinguishing
elements between first and second degree murder were found
in the concepts of premeditation and deliberation, or specific
intent to kill.85 Murder in the second degree was not a specific
intent crime and accordingly did not require a specific intent
to kill.8" For example, the unjustified shooting at another with
a gun would not, standing alone, constitute murder in the
first degree, although the act would be sufficient to imply
malice for second degree murder. 87 In crimes of general intent,
a person was presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his acts.8 8 Thus, a person of sound mind who
did not intend to kill would be responsible, nevertheless, for
second degree murder so long as he intended to perform the
physical act resulting in death and the act itself was not other-
wise legally justified.
The Criminal Code substantially changes the previously
existing definition of second degree murder by providing as
follows in section 40-3-103:
(1) A person commits the crime of murder in the second
degree if: (a) He causes the death of a person intentionally,
but without premeditation; or (b) With intent to cause serious
bodily injury to a person other than himself, he causes the death
of that person or of another person.8S
82 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)).
83 McAndrews v. People, 71 Colo. 542, 553, 208 P. 486, 490 (1922).
84 Id.
85 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)). See, e.g., Hervey v. People, 495 P.2d 204 (Colo.
1972); Watkins v. People, 158 Colo. 485, 408 P.2d 425 (1965); Becksted v.
People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189 (1956); Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563,
9 P. 853 (1885).
86 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)).
87 Id.
ss E.g., Keller v. People, 153 Colo. 590, 387 P.2d 421 (1963); R. ANDERSON,
supra note 17, §§ 60-61.
S' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-103 (Supp. 1971). Second degree murder,
a class 2 felony, carrying a sentence of not less than 10 nor more
than 50 years, is a lesser included offense of those types of first degree
murder requiring "'premeditated intent to cause death" and intentional
conduct "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life." Id. § 40-1-508(5) (c) provides:
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The dilemma created by the Criminal Code's underlying
assumption that one can act intentionally but without a prior
design to act (premeditation) has been discussed within the
context of first degree murder. But even assuming arguendo
that one can act intentionally but without premeditation, the
Criminal Code creates a significant definitional change in sec-
ond degree murder by requiring as an essential element of
culpability the specific intent to cause death or to cause serious
bodily injury. Thus, within the context of the Criminal Code's
definition of intent,"" second degree murder requires or e of the
following mental states: (1) a conscious object to cau death
or serious bodily injury; (2) a conscious object to ei. _ge in
death-causing conduct or seriously-injuring conduct; (3) sub-
stantial certainty that death or serious bodily injury will re-
sult from one's conduct. While it might be suggested that the
legislature did not really intend second degree murder to be
a crime of specific intent, the controlling fact is that the plain
meaning of the words "intentionally" and "with intent" refute
such suggestion.'
A literal reading of subsection (1) (a) of the second degree
murder statute 92 indicates that, contrary to prior Colorado
law, the principle of transferred intent is not recognized in
the case of second degree murder.'3 In both the case of first
degree murder'4 and second degree murder under subsection
(1) (b),' the actor who possesses the culpable mental state
and causes death by his conduct is criminally responsible even
when the person killed is someone other than the intended
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an
offense charged in the indictment or information. An offense
is so included when:
(c) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect
that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person,
property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suf-
fices to establish its commission.
OId. § 40-1-601(6).
91 Specific intent is present when from the circumstances the offender
must have subjectively desired the prohibited result. Where, however,
a specific intent is not made an ingredient of a statutory offense, it is
not necessary to prove such specific intent in order to justify a con-
viction. In such case (general intent), the commission of the act will-
fully and knowingly is sufficient. (emphasis added) 22 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 32 (1961), cited in Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 219, 402 P.2d
79, 80 (1965). As the specific mens rea of second degree murder has
been made a statutory element of the offense, it is clearly a crime of
sepecific intent. In contrast, the Colorado rape statute, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40-3-401 (Supp. 1971), which has no mens rea specified, is a
crime of general intent.
92 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-103 (Supp. 1971).
113 See discussion, note 17 supra.
114 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102(1) (a) (d) (Supp. 1971).
0J5 Id. § 40-3-103 (1) (b).
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victim. But for second degree murder, under subsection (1) (a),96
the person killed ostensibly must be the person whom the actor
intended to kill. It would appear that this statutory shortcoming
is an oversight in drafting and might conceivably be corrected
by the construction of this subsection in pari materia with
subsection (1) (b) of the second degree murder statute,9" and
section 40-3-102(1), which defines first degree murder
8
The most perplexing problem under the Criminal Code
in the case of second degree murder concerns the concept of
diminished responsibility. In the case of second degree murder,
section 40-3-102 (2) provides that "diminished responsibility due
to lack of mental capacity is not a defense to murder in the
second degree." '9  Under the principle of diminished responsi-
bility, evidence of an impaired mental condition, short of legal
insanity, traditionally has been admissible in order to negate
the specific intent requirements for a particular crime.100 Since
under prior Colorado law second degree murder was not a
crime of specific intent, the principle was not applicable. 10
The dilemma created by the subsection on diminished respon-
sibility is that it negates the very definition of second degree
murder.
02
Second degree murder by statutory definition requires a
specific intent to either cause death or to cause serious bodily
injury. If the provision on diminished responsibility is con-
strued as descriptive of the offense of second degree murder,
then second degree murder requires no intent at all, and the
statutory definition of the crime itself is illusory. Such a con-
struction produces the absurd and invalid result of second
degree murder requiring only the causation of another's death
without intention or any mens rea at all.
The Supreme Court of the United States has refused to
give effect to the "inexplicably contradictory commands in
96 Id. § 40-3-103 (1) (a).
97 Id. § 40-3-103(1) (b).
98 Id. § 40-3-102(1).
99 Id. § 40-3-103 (2).
'
0 0
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-1 (Supp. 1967), amending COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 39-8-1 (1963); COLO. R. CaM. P. 11(f); Watkins v. People,
158 Colo. 485, 408 P.2d 425 (1965); McPhee v. People, 105 Colo. 539, 100
P.2d 148 (1940); Brennan v. People, 37 Colo. 256, 87 P. 79 (1906).
101 E.g., Watkins v. People, 158 Colo. 485, 408 P.2d 425 ('1965).
102 The Criminal Code, however, in the general section on responsibility,
sanctions the admissibility of evidence of an impaired mental condition,
or intoxication, as bearing on the capacity of the accused tx form the
requisite specific intent required for a particular offense. COLO. Ixv.
STAT. ANN. § 40-1-903 (Supp. 1971). By negating the culpability re-
quirements of second degree murder, § 40-3-103 (1) (b) runs afoul of the
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statutes ordaining criminal penalties."'10 3 As Justice Douglas
stated in United States v. Cardiff: "Words which are vague
and fluid . . .may be as much of a trap for the innocent as
the ancient law of Caligula.'- 0 4 When the statutory definition
of murder in the second degree is juxtaposed with the pro-
vision relating to diminished responsibility, the definition of
second degree murder fails to make sense. For the statute in
one breath requires that death or serious bodily injury be
caused intentionally, and in the next breath, it mandates that
the inability to form the requisite specific intent is not a de-
fense. If the statutory definition of second degree murder is
to be salvaged, then it would seem that the subsection relat-
ing to diminished responsibility must be nullified.
III. MANSLAUGHTER
Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Code, manslaughter
was divided by statute into voluntary and involuntary man-
slaughter.105 The Criminal Code abolishes this distinction and
broadens the statutory definition of manslaughter and includes
both what was formerly known as voluntary manslaughter
and other homicides not previously defined by Colorado sta-
tute. Section 40-3-104(1) of the Criminal Code provides as
follows:
(1) A person commits the crime of manslaugther if:
(a) He recklessly causes the death of another person; or
(b) He intentionally causes or aids another person to com-
mit suicide; or
(c) With intent to cause the death of a person other than
himself, he causes the death of that person, or of an-
other person, under circumstances where the act causing
the death was performed, without premeditation, upon a
sudden heat of passion caused by a serious and highly pro-
voking act, affecting the person killing sufficiently to excite
an irresistible passion in a reasonable person; but if between
the provocation and the killing there is an interval sufficient
for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing
is murder.
0 6
basic constitutional requirement that the prosecution must prove "every
material element of every charge (100 percent of the total crime) by
evidence sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt." People v. District
Ct., 165 Colo. 253, 265, 439 P.2d 741, 747 (1965). As the Colorado Su-
preme Court emphasized in People v. District Ct., "mental capacity to
commit a crime is a material part of total guilt for there can be no
crime without the means rea." Id.
lo3 Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
104 344 U.S. 174 (1952).
105 Ch. 25, §§ 710-11, [1883] Colo. Sess. Laws 150 (now COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40-2-4 (1963)).
1
0 6 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-104 (Supp. 1971).
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Manslaughter is a class 4 felony carrying a penalty of 1 to
10 years.107
A. Recklessly Causing Death
Under the Criminal Code, the gist of reckless conduct
consists of a state of awareness and conscious disregard of a
high risk situation amounting to a willful and wanton deviation
from reasonable care. 08 "Wilful and wanton [conduct] . .
means conduct purposefully committed which the person knew
or reasonably should have known was dangerous to another's
person or property, and which he performed without regard
to consequences .... "10' Thus, recklessness "resembles acting
knowingly in that a state of awareness is involved but the
awareness is of risk, that is of probability rather than certainty;
the matter is contingent from the actor's point of view."' 10
The recklessness required for manslaughter was formerly
encompassed within the concept of criminal negligence, which
was an essential culpability requirement for the misdemeanor
of involuntary manslaughter under prior Colorado law."' As
the Colorado Supreme Court recognized in Trujillo v. People,
112
the degree of negligence necessary to sustain a charge of in-
voluntary manslaughter was identical to the degree of negli-
gence necessary to support a claim under the guest statute.
The meaning of willful and wanton under the guest cases is
virtually identical to the definition of recklessness under the
Criminal Code.113 The net effect, therefore, of subsection (1) (a)
of the manslaughter statute is to encompass within its felony
provisions the same conduct that was formerly proscribed as
involuntary manslaughter, a misdemeanor.
B. Causing or Aiding Suicide
At common law suicide was a felony, and a person who
was present at the suicide and assisted in its commission was
107 Id. § 40-3-104(2).
lo8 Id. § 40-1-601 (8).
109 Id.
l0 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Since
recklessness involves a lesser degree of culpability than an intentional
killing, manslaughter under § 1 (a) of 40-2-104 qualifies as a lesser in-
cluded offense of murder under the Criminal Code. See COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40-1-508(5)(c) (Supp. 1971).
111Trujillo v. People, 133 Colo. 186, 292 P.2d 980 (1956).
112 Id.
13 E.g., Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1038 (1954). See gen-
erally Comment, Recent Construction of the Colorado Guest Statute, 33
U. COLO. L. REV. 374 (1961). See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-104(1)
(a) (Supp. 1971).
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guilty of murder.114 However, one who instigated the suicide
and was absent at the time of the suicide was an accessory
before the act and escaped punishment under the artificial
rule of common law that an accessory could not be tried until
the principal was convicted.1 1 5 Although some states proscribe
suicide as a crime, a strong opinion exists that "this is not an
area in which the penal law can be effective and that its in-
trusion on such tragedies is an abuse. 1 1 1 The Colorado Criminal
Code does not make suicide itself a crime.
The causing or aiding of suicide was not previously pro-
scribed in Colorado by statute. However, such conduct involves
behavior which the criminal law can reasonably be expected
to proscribe. Although at least one state has held that aiding
suicide is not a crime upon the ground that suicide itself is
noncriminal,' 1 7 most states treat the conduct as manslaughter
or a separate crime of comparable severity.' i8 Subsection (1) (b)
of the manslaughter statute treats with equal gravity "the
intentional causing" and "the intentional aiding" of another
to commit suicide. It would seem that if a person by force,
duress, or fraud causes the suicide, it might reasonably be
punished as murder. The Model Penal Code takes this ap-
proach, reasoning that "flagrant murders may be perpetrated
by deliberately forcing or coercing self-destruction."
' 1 9
C. Killing in Heat of Passion
Subsection (1) (c) of the manslaughter statute essentially
reenacts in less awkward language the former statutory defi-
nition of voluntary manslaughter. Under prior Colorado law,
voluntary manslaughter was the intentional killing of another
in heat of passion caused by a serious and highly provoking
injury inflicted upon the slayer sufficient to excite an irresist-
ible passion in a reasonable person.1'2" By case law it was not
essential that the injury inflicted on the slayer be a physical
114See Annot., 13 A.L.R. 1259 (1921); Annot., 92 A.L.R. 1180 (1934).
115 Id.
116 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
117Aven v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 478, 277 S.W. 1080 (1925); Sanders v.
State, 54 Tex. Crim. 101, 112 S.W. 68 (1908); Grace v. State, 44 Tex.
Crim. 193, 69 S.W. 529 (1902).
118 Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N.E. 505 (1903); Commonwealth v.
Hicks, 118 Ky. 637, 82 S.W. 265 (1904); People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187,
178 N.W. 690 (1920); Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872).
119 MODEL PFNAL CODE § 201.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
120 Ch. 25, § 711, [1883] Colo. Sess. Laws 150 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40-2-5, 6 (1963)).
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injury;' 21 nor was it necessary that the provocation immediately
precede the act of killing.12 " Although the issue of "cooling
time" was technically one of law,'123: the issue was traditionally
resolved in favor of the defendant by submitting voluntary man-
slaughter to the jury upon any evidence, however unreason-
able or slight, which tended to reduce the homicide to man-
slaughter.
124
The Criminal Code has expressly retained the concept of
the hypothetical reasonable person in determining the suffi-
ciency of the provocation. It has been critically argued that
"to require . . . that the provocation be enough to make a
reasonable man do as the defendant did is patently absurd;
the reasonable man quite plainly does not kill."'1 25 A more
flexible standard, in terms of allowing the jury to differentiate
between the special factors in the actor's situation which relate
to his mental state, would have been to adopt the Model Penal
Code's approach of determining the reasonableness of his ac-
tions "from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation
under the circumstances as he believes them to be."'112  Prior
Colorado case law, however, particularly within the context
of self-defense, furnishes support for the proposition that the
actor has the right to act upon appearances, even if they are
false; 127 and his culpability in highly provoking circumstances
is not determined strictly on the basis of the hypothetical rea-
sonable person. 128 In other words, the actor can be mistaken
in his belief and even arguably inappropriate in his actions,
so long as his belief and actions are reasonable under the facts
as they appeared to him at the time.
The Criminal Code's retention of the concept of "irresistible
passion" is also unfortunate. If a passion is in fact irresistible,
even to a reasonable person, then how can the act itself meet
the minimum requirement of criminal culpability - voluntari-
121 See Ferrin v. People 164 Colo. 130, 433 P.2d 108 (1967); Baker v. People,
114 Colo. 50, 160 P.2d 983 (1945).
122 Ferrin v. People, 164 Colo. 130, 433 P.2d 108 (1967).
123 Wickham v. People, 41 Colo. 345, 93 P. 478 (1907).
124 E.g., Ferrin v. People, 164 Colo. 130, 433 P.2d 108 (1967); Read v. People,
119 Colo. 506, 205 P.2d 233 (1949).
125 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). See also
Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 Chmv. L. REV. 740,
742.
126 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
127 E.g., LaVoie v. People, 155 Colo. 551, 395 P.2d 1001 (1964); Young v.
People, 47 Colo. 352, 107 P. 274 (1910).
128 Vigil v. People, 143 Colo. 328, 353 P.2d 82 (1960).
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ness?129 Additionally, it can be argued that if in fact the pas-
sion is irresistible to a reasonable person, and was caused by a
threat or use of physical force by the victim, then no criminal
liability for manslaughter attaches to the killing. For under the
Criminal Code's definition of duress in section 40-1-808, it is
expressly provided:
A person may not be convicted of an offense, other than a
class 1 felony, based upon conduct in which he engaged because
of the use or threatened use of unlawful force upon him or upon
another person, which force or threatened use thereof a reason-
able person in his situation would have been unable to resist.130
The alternatives of outcome in such a case appear to be first
degree murder or acquittal. Employing the rule of strict con-
struction of criminal statutes to the benefit of the accused, " 1
it would seem that where the killing was the result of a threat
or use of force by the victim upon the slayer, sufficient to
render the provocation reasonably irresistible, then the killing
is noncriminal. This patent inconsistency between the culpa-
bility requirements of manslaughter on the one hand and the
concepts of voluntariness and duress on the other should be
resolved by legislative amendment.
IV. CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
Section 40-3-105 of the Criminal Code provides that a per-
son can commit the misdemeanor of criminally negligent homi-
cide in either of two ways: (a) causing death by conduct
amounting to criminal negligence; (b) intentionally causing
death "in the good faith but unreasonable belief that one or
more grounds for justification exist."
132
A. Death by Criminal Negligence
Under prior Colorado law, criminal negligence consisted of
that wilful and wanton conduct presently encompassed within
the concept of recklessness under the Criminal Code; 133 conduct
which fell short of wilful and wanton was not criminal negli-
gence. Thus, the former misdemeanor of involuntary man-
slaughter required criminal negligence consisting of wilful and
wanton conduct,13 4 and that form of conduct is now punishable
129 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-602 (Supp. 1971).
1301d. § 40-1-808.
131 E.g., O'Brien v. People, 118 Colo. 58, 192 P.2d 428 (1948); People v.
Mooney, 87 Colo. 567, 290 P. 271 (1930); Sheely v. People, 54 Colo. 136,
129 P. 201 (1912); Robinson v. People, 23 Colo. 123, 46 P. 676 (1896).
132 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-105 (Supp. 1971).




as manslaughter under the Criminal Code.13 5 For purposes of
a prosecution for criminally negligent homicide under subsec-
tion 40-3-105(1) (a), criminal negligence consists in the failure
to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk.136
The essential difference between recklessness and criminal
negligence is that "the reckless actor 'consciously disregards' a
substantial and unjustifiable risk created by his conduct while
the negligent actor merely 'should be aware' of the danger he
creates.' 13 7 The effect, therefore, of the statutory definition in
subsection (1) (a) of criminally negligent homicide is to pro-
scribe conduct amounting to inadvertence, when that inad-
vertence causes death. The definition of criminal negligence
also requires that the risk "be of such a nature and degree
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the reasonable standard of care .... ,"'3 The rationale
of this requirement has been explained as follows:
[J]ustice is sufficiently safeguarded by insisting on substan-
tial culpability or deviation; that these items preclude the proper
condemnation of inadvertent risk creation unless "the significance
of the circumstances of fact would be apparent to one who shares
the community's general sense of right and wrong. . . ." They
also serve . . . to convict conduct which is inadvertent as to
risk only because the actor is insensitive to the interests and
claims of other persons in society.139
It can be anticipated that prosecutions for criminally neg-
ligent homicide will frequently be utilized in traffic deaths where
the negligent driving of the defendant falls short of either
recklessness or vehicular homicide.
The Criminal Code expressly sanctions the consideration
of state statutes and municipal ordinances regulating the de-
fendant's conduct on the issue of criminal negligence.140 How-
ever, a violation of a statute or ordinance would not neces-
sarily constitute prima facie evidence of criminal negligence.
For example, a technical or minor violation of a traffic or-
dinance which results in death would probably not in itself
amount to the gross deviation from reasonable care necessary
for criminal negligence.
Since the Criminal Code fails to define causation,' 4 ' it is
135 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-104(1) (a) (Supp. 1971).
136Id. § 40-3-105(1) (a).
137 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
138 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-601(9) (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
139 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
140 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-601(9) (Supp. 1971).
141 See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
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arguable that for criminal liability the negligent conduct must
be the sole proximate cause of the death.142 At any rate, the
causal requirement should at least be the proximate cause
requirement of civil liability.
143
B. Death by Unreasonable Belief in Justification
The second type of criminally negligent homicide under
the Criminal Code consists of intentionally causing "the death
of a person in the good faith but unreasonable belief that one
or more grounds for justification exist.' 1 4 4 The statutory law
of justification under the Criminal Code generally attempts to
formulate justifications for the use of physical force that might
otherwise be unlawful. In the case of certain custodial rela-
tionships (such as parent, guardian, or warden) ,'1 4 5 and in the
case of a peace officer effecting an arrest or preventing an es-
cape, 146 the extent of physical force which lawfully can be
employed is now expressly delineated by statute.
Colorado did not previously distinguish between the use
of force in defense of person on the one hand and property on
the other. Nor was any situational distinction made between
deadly physical force and nondeadly physical force. The issue
of self-defense was resolved within the standards of "the rea-
sonableness of the fear" and "the necessity of the force.'
147
Under the Criminal Code, "[d]eadly physical force may be
used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force
is inadequate," and he reasonably believes that he or another
person is in imminent danger of being killed or receiving great
bodily harm.14 Certain criminal acts - such as the threatened or
actual use of force by a burglar against an occupant, kidnapping,
robbery, rape, deviate sexual intercourse, and certain assaults
- justify the use of deadly physical force if a lesser degree of
force reasonably appears to be inadequate.
1 49 Reasonable non-
142 See Goodell v. People, 137 Colo. 507, 227 P.2d 279 (1958).
143 In a civil case where there are concurrent causes, and the defendant's
conduct was a proximate cause but not the most immediate cause, the
defendant is liable so long as his conduct concurred with other causes.
See Moore v. Standard Paint & Glass Co., 145 Colo. 151, 358 P.2d 33
(1960); Barlow v. North Sterling Irrig. Dist., 85 Colo. 488, 277 P. 469
(1929); Ryan Gulch Res. Co. v. Swartz, 82 Colo. 225, 263 P. 728 (1928);
Colorado Mort. & Inv. Co. v. Giacomini, 55 Colo. 540, 136 P. 1039 (1913).
1
44 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-105(1) (b) (Supp. 1971).
145 Id. § 40-1-803 (1) (2).
146 Id. § 40-1-807.
147 Sections 28-30, [1861] Colo. Sess. Laws 294 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40-2-13 to -15 (1963)).
148 Ch. 46, § 1, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-1-804 (Supp. 1971).
149 Id. § 40-1-804(2) (c).
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deadly physical force may be employed in defense of premises or
property. 150
The effect of subsection (1) (b) of the criminally negli-
gent homicide section is to render the actor criminally liable
for causing death intentionally if the actor subjectively acts in
good faith but by objective standards is unreasonable in his
belief concerning justification. Since the statute does not re-
quire the actor to be criminally negligent in his belief (i.e., a
gross deviation from reasonable care), it appears that ordinary
negligence in belief will result in criminal liability. Of course,
the actor still has the right to act upon appearances, even if the
appearances are false;151 so long as his belief in justification
is reasonable under the facts as they appeared, he can be mis-
taken without being criminally culpable. In the case where
the actor reasonably and correctly believes that property or
premises only are being threatened, with no danger to human
life, and nevertheless proceeds to use deadly physical force
against the perpetrator, his culpability under the Criminal Code
could be greater than that of criminally negligent homicide.
The deliberate use of deadly force in such a case is hardly
the "good faith" contemplated by the definition of criminally
negligent homicide, and the act could be prosecuted as murder.
V. VEmcuLR HOMICIDE
Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Code, causing death
by the operation of a motor vehicle was expressly proscribed
in two separate sections of Colorado statutory law. The prior
law provided that any person who proximately caused the
death of another by operating a motor vehicle in a reckless
manner was guilty of a felony punishable by 1 to 14 years.
152
Reckless conduct meant either wilful or wanton conduct.
153
Additionally, any person who, while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or exhilarating or stupifying drugs, caused
the death of another by operating a motor vehicle in a reckless,
negligent, or careless manner or with a wilful or reckless dis-
regard of human life, was guilty of a felony.
54
150 Id. §§ 40-1-805, 806.
151 See note 127 supra.
152 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-155 (Supp. 1965).
153 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-31 (1963); Martin v. People, 495 P.2d 537
(Colo. 1972).
154 Ch. 95, § 1, [1923] Colo. Sess. Laws 256 (now CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §
49-2-10 (1963)). Section 40-3-106 of the Criminal Code repeals CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-10 (1963) but does not affect CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-5-155 (Supp. 1965). Under the Criminal Code vehicular
homicide is a class 4 felony punishable by 1 to 10 years. COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3-106, 40-1-105 (Supp. 1971).
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Prosecutions under the prior vehicular homicide statute
frequently involved issues relating to the technical sufficiency
of the charge. Thus, in Espinoza v. People,155 an information
phrased in the disjunctive- that the defendant while under
the influence caused death by operating a motor vehicle in
a reckless, careless, and negligent manner or with reckless and
wanton disregard of human life- was held defective. And in
Goodell v. People,156 in which the information alleged that the
defendant caused death while under the influence and by
operating a motor vehicle in a reckless, negligent, and careless
manner and with a reckless and wanton disregard of human
life, the supreme court held that the conjunctive charge re-
quired proof of the higher form of negligence- recklessness.
In Goodell,157 the court recognized that a valid prosecution
could be predicated upon simple negligence plus intoxication
if it were so pleaded.
Section 40-3-106 of the Criminal Code should remove much
of the confusion surrounding the technical nature of the plead-
ing. It provides that vehicular homicide can be committed in
either of two ways: (1) if a person operates a motor vehicle
in a reckless manner and such conduct is the proximate cause
of the death of another; (2) if a person operates a motor ve-
hicle while under the influence of any drug or intoxicant and
such conduct is the proximate cause of death.158 The Criminal
Code's definition of recklessness is applicable to prosecutions
for vehicular homicide. 15 9 As both sections are cast in terms
of "proximate cause," Colorado case law holding that the de-
fendant's conduct must be the sole proximate cause of the ac-
cident would appear to be applicable to the new statute.
160
By case law a person is under the influence when his capacity
to operate a motor vehicle is impaired even in the slightest.'
6
The new statute does not define a motor vehicle, but this can
be cured by either judicial construction or a legislative addi-
tion adopting the present definition stated elsewhere in the
statutes.
162
155 142 Colo. 96, 349 P.2d 689 (1960).
156 137 Colo. 507, 327 P.2d 279 (1958).
157 Id.
158 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-106 (Supp. 1971).
159 Id. § 40-1-601(8).
160 Goodell v. People, 137 Colo. 507, 327 P.2d 279 (1958).
161 Rinehart v. People, 105 Colo. 123, 95 P.2d 10 (1939).
162 COLa. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-1 (Supp. 1969), formerly Ch. 122, § 1,
[1931] Colo. Sess. Laws 485, provides:




The psychological element in homicide is complex. A per-
son may intend to kill another and proceed to kill for a myriad
of reasons: self-preservation, revenge engendered by great
provocation, or selfish financial gain. In each case, the intent
is the same, but the act in its totality is radically different.
Because of the complexity and finality of the act, and the
severity of penalties attaching to unjustified killings, the need
for coherency of definition is compelling. Coherency of defini-
tion for criminal acts provides the pubic with intelligible pro-
scriptions and a forewarning of penalty; and equally important,
it enhances the evenhanded application of the law.
Unfortunately, the Criminal Code's treatment of homicides,
in several instances, lacks coherency of definition. The over-
lapping and, at times, the inconsistency with respect to basic
concepts of criminal culpability can only foster an unhealthy
ambivalence in all stages of the criminal process. The Criminal
Code will undoubtedly burden an already overburdened appel-
late court with issues of definition and scope which could have
been resolved at the legislative stages.
itself, or of being moved, from place to place upon wheels
or endless tracks; but such term shall not mean or include
any farm tractor or any implement of husbandry designed pri-
marily or exclusively for use and used in agriculture opera-
tions, or any device moved by muscular power, or moved ex-
clusively over stationary rails or tracks or designed to move
primarily through the air.
(2) "Motor vehicle," any self-propelled vehicle which is
designed primarily for travel on the public highways and
which is generally and commonly used to transport persons
and property over the public highways.

Low INCOME LABORERS AS LEGAL
CLIENTS: USE PATTERNS AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD LAWYERS*
By ROBERT PAUL HALLAUER**
Lawyers everywhere should be alarmed by what Robert
Paul Hallauer has to say in this article. He has found in his
study of low income black laborers in a Shreveport, Louisiana,
union, a chasm of misunderstanding, lack of communication,
distrust, and the belief that lawyers overcharge poor clients.
Be not lulled by his modest assertions to be cautious in gen-
eralizing from data based on 502 interviews to the whole of the
American lower classes. Such cautions are of course required of
the behavioral scientist, but, having read the following pages,
one must suspect that the attitudes of the near-poor who were
met by Robert Paul Hallauer far transcend "Arklatex." The
American lawyer should be moved by a concern for the disad-
vantaged among his countrymen who, because of deeply in-
grained distrust of professionals, and because of the real risk of
catastrophic legal costs, are frequently inhibited, or actually pr-
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INTRODUCTION
F three of every four people who use lawyers agree with the
statement that "lawyers charge too much," and if over half
agree that "lawyers can't be trusted," there exists a prima
facie case for improvement of legal services - at least for
the sample group. If 28 percent of the problems experienced
by the sample group result in legal fees which the clients can-
not afford, and if 25 percent of the group believes that one-
half hour of mere consultation with a lawyer will cost over
$25, then, clearly, economic obstacles lie between the clients
and their full use of legal services. Finally, if half the group
believes it is hard to find a lawyer when one is needed, and
that even when found, a lawyer will be likely to reject them as
clients, then reasonably, some are not bringing their problems
to lawyers because of hostility and distrust. These and similar
conclusions are reached after an extensive American Bar
Foundation study of low income union laborers as legal clients
in Shreveport, Louisiana, in 1970. These findings inevitably
raise the question of how many of America's low and moderate
income earners regard lawyers with economic fear and straight-
forward distrust.
The reasons for such attitudes are not difficult to im-
agine. For many, going to a lawyer is not a routine or familiar
activity. For the near-poor, seeking out legal services opens the
door to catastrophic costs - similiar to visiting a specialized
medical clinic for diagnosis of an unknown but potentially dan-
gerous disease. Catastrophic legal expenses, like catastrophic
medical expenses, are to be avoided except when in absolute
extremis because the legal client (patient) has no reasonable
notion of how to assess the fairness of the fee. At best, he can
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provide himself with only a rough estimate of whether he has
received his money's worth.
Distrust may not be simply a question of high cost or fear
of high cost. When one is put in the hands of a licensed pro-
fessional for the purpose of solving a grave problem, often
by manipulations behind closed doors, one fears not only the
monetary costs, but also the loss of control over the normal life
that dependence brings. The legal problem, which had become
an aspect, however painful, of the client's own life, becomes
at some point the object of the ministrations of others, who
proceed at their own pace and according to their own rules.
What often begins as a personal, economic, or marital problem
typically threatens to become the subject of formal public
ritual in court, a prospect that is not only threatening to the
client, but also depersonalizing inasmuch as he is merely
"represented."
This potential loss of psychological control over events
can be seen in two ways. First, the prospective client must
confront the social gulf between himself as a low income,
working class person and the middle class professional working
out of an imposing office in a foreign milieu. The client thus
faces a situation containing a natural element of intimidation.
It is the sort of situation one might be tempted to put off unless
the need for a lawyer becomes unavoidable - for example,
formal proceedings have forced a defensive response. Other-
wise, status and class differences discourage either seeing the
problem as legal or seeking the assistance of a lawyer.
Second, the prospective client frequently is unsure that his
problem is specifically a legal one; he will have to go to a
lawyer to find out. There may be a real difference between
the individual's moral evaluation of a dispute and society's
formal authoritative evaluation of it. He may doubt whether
his problem is in fact capable (or deserving) of resolution
through formal legal processes. Perhaps the problem can be
solved short of formal adjudication, but the client cannot know
this until he sees the lawyer; as well, lawyers inevitably imply
the threat of formal processes. These doubts magnify the psy-
chological threshold which must be crossed by the potential
client before he is likely to see a lawyer about his problem.
The psychological costs of escalating to formal procedures may
be as prohibitive for many clients as the anticipated economic
costs.'
See Mayhew & Reiss, The Social Organization of Legal Contacts, 34 Am.
Soc. REv. 309, 311 (1969). The authors observe:
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It is true that some legal procedures, such as traffic tickets,
mortgages or leases, and for some, divorce and minor criminal
proceedings, become familiar and routinized even for those
whose lives and occupations are remote from lawyers and
courts. But for many, contact with the law represents a cata-
strophe - great or small - in which one's loss of economic con-
trol is accompanied by loss of psychological control over the
situation, despite its formally "professional" nature.
The following material reports the results of a study of
the legal experiences and attitudes of one low income group
of laborers. Members of Shreveport, Louisiana, Local 229 of
the Laborer's International of North America were interviewed
by an American Bar Foundation Research team.2 Of the then
583 union members, 502 responded to a long questionnaire
schedule3 in interviews of approximately half an hour. 4 Re-
spondents were asked questions to elicit material on how and
whether they had used lawyers in the past, what they under-
stood their lawyers to have done, what they thought of the
lawyers' services, and what they regarded as a legal situation.
As well, they gave basic demographic data about themselves.
Previous studies of this type [the social organization of legal con-
tacts] have regularly shown a strong relation between income and
the use of professional legal services. Differences by income are
then attributed to the fact that the poor cannot afford legal rep-
resentation, that they are unaware of legal problems and serv-
vices, and that they distrust attorneys.... This view can be de-
scribed as a "resources" theory of legal representation. Those
who have resources such as income, and to a lesser extent other
resources such as education, confidence, and social connections,
are more likely to perceive the need for, afford, and gain access
to legal services. Resources, therefore, account for the distribu-
tion of the use of lawyers in the population.
To any such "resources" theory of legal representation must
be added a distinct psychological dimension. Not only do money
and social structure determine legal contact or the lack of it, but
subjective inhibitions as well. Such inhibition arises out of an
ethos which has not integrated legal services. In this ethos is
a tension between a view of the legal system as upholding the
established order, and the legal system as a mechanism for prob-
lem-solving.
See also F. MARKS, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR: A CRITICAL AN-
ALYSIS 10 (1971); Marks observes:
Our data pertaining to problem indentification by the poor and
their modes of relating problems to the legal system suggest
that a fundamental outlook is involved - an ethos born of pov-
erty, isolation, and past nonuse of legal services. This ethos
directly affects the poor's putative use of the legal system....
[T]he view of the legal process held by the poor is narrow and
rigid.
2 Interviews were conducted almost exclusively in the union hall. Fifteen
of the 502 were call-back interviews conducted in the homes of the
interviewees.
3 See app., p. 218 infra, for complete questionnaire schedule.
4 Interviewers - Shreveport residents - were paid and trained by the
American Bar Foundation research team in charge of the project. This
five-member team kept two of its number in the field with inter-
viewers at all times, assuring close supervision of all interviewing.
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The study was made because this particular union was about
to begin a program of prepaid legal services funded in part out
of union dues. The material presented here, which will event-
ually be part of a larger study,5 is taken from the first bat-
tery of interviews, administered before the prepaid legal serv-
ices program went into effect. Briefly, Local 229's membership
is unskilled, of low income (generally just above the poverty
line6), and almost exclusively construction workers. All but
eight of the interviewees were black.
7
Regardless of inferences to be drawn from this study, the
findings may not necessarily apply to the American population
at large." On the other hand, one should not conclude that
this study is only about southern low income black men work-
5 See note * supra.
6 It is not clear how "poverty level" should be defined in the United
States. The Social Security Administration based their definition on the
Consumer Price Index, and determined that $3,555 per year for a family
of four in urban areas was the poverty level. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1970, Table 498. But the
yearly income guide for eligibility for the OEO Legal Services program
is not identical to this definition of the poverty level In Shreveport, for
example, the figure for legal aid was $3,800. The families of the mem-
bers of Local 229 averaged about four, and the family incomes were
just below an average of $4,500 annually.
7 Extensive demographic data are set out in section I. A. infra.
8 It was noted above that the population studied here was homogeneous
with respect to certain characteristics, for which there was no formal
control in the study. It is believed that socioeconomic remoteness from
lawyers characterizes many of America's near-poor, of which the present
population is a sample.
The homogeneity of the group studied here also presents some
advantages from the point of view of analysis. With respect to certain
characteristics, such as education, previous legal experience, age, income,
and marital status, one is able to observe relationships to legal attitudes
and use better than one would if the population were heterogeneous.
For example, if the low education of the oldest members of the group
seems to account for a given attitude, one is not troubled by the poten-
tially powerful intervening influence of such variables as occupation,
race, and sex (which in this study were constants or, in the case of
race, a near-constant). Having some major variables automatically
controlled should lead to more precision in analyzing relationships among
the major variables.
It should also be noted that imbedded in the method of this study are
certain limitations that are more or less inevitable. The interviews
attemped to bridge a social and psychological gap between research
social scientists on the one hand and working class respondents on the
other. Even with such "correctives" as the utilization of interviewers
whose socioeconomic status was more similar to the respondents, one
must still recognize that the survey was designed by mainly middle-
class white, northern professionals for administration to a group of
mainly black construction workers in a southern city. There are going
to be aspects of the respondents' lives that will be missed or misin-




ing in the construction trades. It is hoped that the data here
represent to some degree that large number of Americans
who, by virtue of their socioeconomic status, life style, educa-
tion, and occupation are distant from lawyers: those who do not
routinely see lawyers, or desire to, or know very much about
them, regardless of their ability to hire them. Some expectations,
often supported by past studies, provided a series of basic hy-
potheses which suggest how such a lawyer-distant group might
feel about the use of legal services. First, the ownership of real
property exposes one to legal experience. Mayhew and Reiss
found that "[tihe best predictors of contact with attorneys are
family income and property ownership . . . ." Like the group
in the Mayhew and Reiss study, our sample is differentiated by
income and includes a substantial proportion of home and
vehicle owners. The legal profession is, according to Mayhew
and Reiss, "[o] rganized to serve property and a few other prob-
lems, notably divorces and accidents, [and] the legal profes-
sion provides little professional representation and advice in
relation to a broad panoply of problems surrounding such daily
matters as the citizens' relation to merchants or public author-
ity."' 0 One hypothesis might be that workers having the high-
est incomes and the most extensive involvement in the property
cycle would have more frequent recourse to legal services.
Second, it can be suggested that it is not so much income
and property, as such, which bring the clients into contact with
lawyers, but rather the problems that a group identifies as
legally known and settled matters. To a large extent, com-
munity views about what constitutes a legal need or problem
will circumscribe the views of individuals; this increases as
the community is economically or otherwise disadvantaged.
Arguably, the poor and near-poor are least willing and cap-
able of approaching lawyers on matters other than those which
"everyone knows" are legal, i.e., the most traditional matters.
These are frequently property matters. The view that the
poor and near-poor tend to define their legal problems as the
9 Mayhew & Reiss, supra note 1, at 311.
10M. at 317. These authors hypothesized that the higher the incomes the
greater the proportion of matters relating to property among the low
income population's legal problems. This was accounted for in large
part by real estate-related problems. The present study's findings are
consistent with the view that contact increases with involvement in real
estate matters. But the present study did not find, as did Mayhew and
Reiss, that contact with lawyers increased directly with income. This
may be explained by the homogeneity of the population in our study,
either with regard to race or income. The population studied by May-
hew and Reiss included both blacks and whites, and both affluent and
poor respondents. For the relationship between real estate and legal
experience in the present study, see Tables 9, 13, and 14, infra.
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most traditional and settled ones, and that this confines their
use of legal services, is presented by F.R. Marks:
[T]he kinds of problems defined by the poor as legal and hence
the kinds of legal services requested by the poor were highly
traditional [in the OEO Legal Services Program]. Recognized,
settled legal remedies were sought. The frontiers of "new prop-
erty," of discrimination law, of housing and landlord-tenant
law, of welfare entitlement- the core items of the law reform
conception of the OEO Legal Services Program-were es-
chewed. There was little attempt to define these things as "legal
problems."'"
Felt legal need and legal demands may be severely structured
by economic status. Evidence of this should be discernible in
the group studied here, which, although "near-poor," was dif-
ferentiated economically and with regard to property. Gen-
erally, we expected this group to use the law in a "traditional"
way.
Third, in a group differentiated by education and age, one
would normally expect the young and the educated, rather
than an older, uneducated subgroup, to shed their doubts about
crossing color and class lines and overcome psychological or
cultural obstacles to seeking legal services. They should be less
distrustful of lawyers unless and until experience teaches them
otherwise. It is possible that their legal experiences are less
stressful and inhibiting.
Fourth, a substantial portion of this group might be ex-
pected to have a low level of "legal awareness" -an inability
to identify situations in which a lawyer could be helpful in his
normal professional capacity.' 2 Unfamiliarity with legal mat-
ters, lack of education, and lack of training in verbal skills
might all contribute to low legal awareness. One would expect
this group to have a generally low level of understanding of
what lawyers do and poor ability to define a "legal" situation.
A low level of legal awareness or sophistication, should it exist,
would help to explain why low income clients seem to approach
lawyers more frequently in the most traditional and settled
legal areas which "everybody knows" are legal.
The present study seeks to examine these hypotheses be-
cause they point to fundamental legal needs that are widely
11 F. MARKS, supra note 1, at 9.
12 See J. CARLIN, J. HowARD & S. MESSENGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE POOR
61-63 (1967). One cannot infer that legal awareness leads to increased
use of lawyers. Legal awareness encompasses less than "legal com-
petence." Legal competence includes both awareness and assertiveness.
Assertiveness is related to what we have called here the "threshold"
problem, which is distinct from knowledge about what lawyers can, in
principle, do. Legal competence is close to "legal sophistication," dis-
cussed in the conclusion, p. 213 infra.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
believed to remain unmet among low income people. If it
emerges that the poor or near-poor cannot make full use of the
legal system beyond the most traditional areas of adjudication,
such as the area of real property, if cultural and psychological
inhibitions magnify economic disincentives for seeing lawyers,
and if the work of lawyers and courts remains misunderstood
or unknown, the legal profession must face the accusation that
its trade has been unable or unwilling to bridge major com-
munication gaps, perhaps for reasons of discrimination and class
bias. The data which follow should help to clarify how far
these legal needs may'remain unmet for low income persons.
I. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF LOCAL 229
A. Basic Demography
As noted earlier, the group was limited to blacks (with
eight exceptions) and males. All 502 respondents were members
of a single union and all but a handful were construction labor-
ers. They were all southerners, living in or near Shreveport,
Louisiana, in the "Arklatex" region which also includes the
cities of Texarkana and Marshall, Texas. Although we do not
have data on geographic migration within this group, the re-
spondents rarely told us they were from another part of the
country, so the group can be regarded as fundamentally
homogeneous.
While generally homogeneous, the sample group was meas-
urably differentiated in certain categories enabling us to de-
velop some meaningful heterogeneous correlations. Heterogen-
eity was found in the factors of age, education, marital status,
income, home ownership, number of dependents, vehicle own-
ership, and savings practices.
The members of Local 229 were middle-aged to old, having
a median and a mean age close to 50. As Table 1 shows, only
7 percent of the respondents were under 30, only 23 percent
were under 40, while almost 20 percent were over 60.






60 and over 19
N=499
13 For this and all other tables which were derived from machine-tablu-
lated contingency tables, a Chi Square statistic was calculated. Accept-
able significance levels for this study were placed at .050 and smaller.
Where tables are based on a-Chi Square above .050, this is indicated in
a textual note accompanying the table.
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Our sample had little formal education. About one-fourth
of the group had less than 3 years. Dropping out of school
showed high incidence from the fourth through sixth grade, so
that well over half the group completed less than 6 years of
school.










Most of the group were married and families were often
large. The number of dependents living in the household,
including children not yet grown, was also high.
TABLE 3 Percent of Respondents Having Children and
Dependents
Number of Percent of Number of Percent of
Children Respondents Dependents Respondents
None 13 None 10
1 13 1 40
2 12 2 10
3 13 3 10
4 10 4 9
5 and over 29 5 and over 21
N=499 N=499
The members of Local 229 had generally low incomes. The
term "just above poverty level" has been used in this study,
but observe that some members of the group are certainly be-
low that level. Because of the irregular and seasonal nature
of construction labor, "adequate" income in one year may fall
below the poverty level the next. In many families income was
supplemented from other sources. Of the married respondents,
39 percent had wives who worked at least part-time and some
of the respondents held additional jobs, or derived income from
farming.
TABLE 4 Percent of Respondents in Each of Five Income Groups
(1969 Incomes)
Income Group Income Group
(Respondent (Total Family
Only) Percent Income) Percent
Under $3000 26 Under $3000 23
$3000-$3900 21 $3000-$3900 17
$4000-$4900 26 $4000-$4900 22
5000-$5900 17 $5000-$5900 18
6000 and over 10 $6000 and over 20
N=450 N=466
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Two additional factors affected the respondents' economic level.
First, the occupation of this group requires travel to job sites
that are constantly being shifted. Owning a car or truck is a
near-necessity because many of the respondents live over 25
miles from their jobs. Second, with advancing age, the ability
of a construction laborer to get a long-term assignment declines
since he is no longer recognized as able to lift heavy objects
or work extended hours. As noted above, Local 229 is a rela-
tively old group, and income fell off with advancing age as
indicated in Table 5, infra.
A clear demographic picture appears for home ownership,
vehicle ownership, and savings practices. Sixty-one percent
of the group owned their own homes, 33 percent rented, and
6 percent had some other arrangement (such as living with
parents or relatives). Eighty-four percent owned at least one
motor vehicle; over half of the vehicle owners had more than
one. Finally, 39 percent of the respondents had a savings
account.
B. Demographic Correlations
Among the above basic demographic factors, certain sig-
nificant correlations should be mentioned here. As will be
seen later, the relationships between age, education, and income
factors may offer clues to attitudinal differentiation between
sample subgroups. As was noted above, the high incomes are
enjoyed by the middle-aged respondents.






60 and over 3549
N=465
In addition, there was a relationship between education
and age, older respondents tending to be considerably less
educated. In fact, education and age were so closely related
that they can be used interchangeably, and at some points in
this study they have been. This is particularly true for the
younger, more educated group, which as sections II and III will
show, had distinct use patterns and attitudes toward lawyers.
The average education of each group is shown in Table 6.
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Table 6 Average Education for Five Age Groups
Average Number





60 and over 3.9
N=498
There is also a strong possibility that older, low income,
poorly educated respondents form a distinct group with regard
to legal use patterns and attitudes. Table 7 indicates the extent
to which income differs according to both education and age.
TABLE..7 Average Family Income for Respondents by Age and
Education
Education 9 or
Age 0-3 Years 4-8 Years More Years
Under 30 - $4625 $4533
30-39 $4650 4757 5566
40-49 4589 4708 5679
50-59 3685 4278 4608
60 and over 3403 3641 -
N=102 N=262 N=100
Homeownership varied with martial status. Those married
and living with their spouses accounted for almost all of the
homeowners (93 percent). Among the single respondents, 42
percent rented their homes, while 49 percent had some "other"
arrangement, neither owning nor renting, leaving only 9 per-
cent as homeowners. Respondents who had been divorced,
separated, or widowed tended to rent their homes. Because of
this marital status-homeownership relationship, homeownership
was related to having a working spouse in the family. This
should not be surprising -although we do not know whether
the wife's working enabled the family to own its home, or the
contracting of a mortgage required her to work. The high in-
come respondents accounted for no more of the homeowners
than the low income respondents, nor did homeownership relate
to having a savings account. Consequently, the observer should
resist the temptation to presuppose a kind of "middle class"
syndrome of substanital homeowners, high earners, and savers.
The homes were frequently very humble.
One additional point should be made before use and non-
use of lawyers is examined. Age will be a fundamental vari-
able when activity over a lifetime is the object of study. As
time passes, events affecting the respondent accumulate. These
include demographic characteristics that are normally acquired
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in any population, such as marriages, divorces, children, and
major purchases. Naturally, these events will also include
legal occurences, so that as the years pass, more legal experi-
ence is likely to have accumulated for a respondent - including
the increased likelihood of a single traumatic "bad" legal ex-
perience - and he may have formed attitudes substantially on
the basis of this increased and accumulated experience. Thus,
age is used as a control variable in parts of this study. The
reader is asked to remain aware of the potential operation of
age as a specifically "cumulative" demographic variable. For
any measure in which the passage of time increases the proba-
bility of some event, age will be an inevitable "explanatory"
factor.
II. USERS AND NONUSERS OF LEGAL SERVICES
Among the main purposes of this study was the investiga-
tion of possible psychological and economic obstacles to the
use of legal services. A clue to such obstacles may lie in demo-
graphic differences between users and nonusers. Only 54 per-
cent of the members of Local 229 had ever been to a lawyer.14
Typically - 263 instances - the client had gone to a private
lawyer; 15 only three respondents had taken a problem to legal
aid, six had gone to a public defender, and one had sought the
aid of the prosecutor. In most cases, 63 percent, the individual
had taken only one problem to the private lawyer. Twenty-
seven percent had taken two problems, and 10 percent had taken
three or more problems to a lawyer. Rarely did an individual
use more than one lawyer for the same problem. Five percent
of the respondents said they had been to more than one lawyer
with their first problem. Nine percent of those with two prob-
lems had gone to more than one lawyer with their second prob-
lem. In general those who used lawyers did not have occasion
to be advised or represented frequently; instances of multiple
use were the exception. Of the 54 percent of the respondents
who had used lawyers, over half had been to one lawyer once
with one problem.
The remaining 46 percent had never been to a lawyer. This
is an important fact about this group, and conceivably, about
low income populations in general. The hypothesis that low in-
come persons stay away from lawyers in great numbers is
14 They were asked, "Have you ever taken a problem to a private lawyer
or a free legal service, such as legal aid, the public defender, or the city,
state, or federal prosecutor?" See app., question 1, infra.
15 They were asked, "How many problems have you taken to: (a) a
private lawyer? ...... . ... .. [actual number], (b) legal aid? ............ , (c) public
defender? ............ , (d) prosecutor? ....... .... . . See app., question 2, infra.
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supported when legal experience (defined as ever having been
to a lawyer) is controlled by age.







60 and over 66
N=499
Age alone does not account for legal experience except in the
sense that the older respondents tend to have accumulated more
legal experience. There appears to be some leveling off after
middle age, but it should be remembered that repeated legal
experience would not increase the raw percentage of those hav-
ing ever gone to a lawyer.
There was no direct relationship between income and legal
experience, whether individual income or family income was
used as a measure. Education, however, did have a bearing on
legal experience; those with 12 years or more of schooling had
far less legal experience than the other respondents. This re-
lationship was produced by the youthfulness of the more edu-
cated respondents, and controlling for age caused the relation-
ship between education and experience to disappear for those
over 30.
The under-30 group forms a subset of the sample whose
education is much higher than the group average, but whose
legal experience is low. There were only eight under-30 in-
dividuals educated beyond the eighth grade who had any legal
experience. Unfortunately this subset is small, making it dif-
ficult to draw inferences. One would reasonably expect its use
patterns and attitudes to differ markedly from other groups.
Nevertheless it should be pointed out that this group will
become larger as the educational level of the whole union
local improves.
Three demographic variables did relate to use and nonuse
of lawyers services. One was residence, defined as owning one's
own home, renting, or having some other arrangement. Home-
owners used lawyers more frequently and renters used them
less frequently than the group as a whole. Those with other
arrangements used lawyers far less than homeowners or rent-













This is consistent with the hypothesis that the legal experi-
ences would tend to cluster about such traditional matters as
property, of which homeownership is a major instance. The
homeowners would tend to be exposed to disputes in such areas
as mortgages, title transfer, and succession, while renters would
be exposed to far fewer of these kinds of cases. As will be
seen, about 30 percent of the legal problems of the entire
sample can be related to home ownership.
Similarly, ownership of a motor vehicle tends to expose
one to legal experience, and to structure the kind of legal
experience. Of those without motor vehicles, 38 percent had
been to a lawyer, while 55 percent of those with one vehicle
had been, and for those with two or more vehicles, the propor-
tion rose to 62 percent.
A third demographic category related to use of lawyers
might also be linked, although more tenuously, with our "prop-
erty matters" hypothesis. Those who had a savings account
tended to have legal experience: 65 percent of those with sav-
ings accounts had seen a lawyer, 35 percent had not. Although
we cannot support it with data herein, having a savings account
can be evidence of involvement in property matters. The ac-
cumulation of savings often signals significant purchases, such
as autos, farms, furniture, or homes, and thereby the saver
becomes involved in property-related problems. Some of these
may lead to litigation. The individual is brought into contact
with that area in which low income people tend to find their
legal problems. Conversely, not having a savings account may
indicate lack of interest in acquiring property, or inability to
marshal the economic resources to do so. As a result, lack of a
savings account indicates lesser involvement in what are typical
litigation-breeding activities for the near-poor.
Again, there is no evidence for a general "middle-class life
style" among these clients to account for the degree of their
legal involvement. One could argue that either those closest
to or most distant from the middle class are likely to cross
swords with legal opponents and require thereby the services
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of lawyers - the former because of their involvement in prop-
erty matters, the latter because of their economic or social
instability. That is not the point here, and we have no evidence
for a general middle-class life style. Home ownership, for
example, does not seem to relate to income. Use of lawyers
seems to relate to specific behavior, activities, or events.
Nonuse of lawyers appears as mechanistic as use of law-
yers; it seems unrelated to any general socioeconomic level.
Renting his home, for example, gives the individual one less
reason to ever see a lawyer; riding the bus exempts him from
a whole series of additional legal disputes. Because his in-
come is low, he is excluded from many areas where he will
face litigation, and from even more where he would initiate it.
Least of all will he venture into remote or unsettled areas of
the law (such as consumer protection, landlord-tenant, or racial
discrimination). He is not likely to have the time, money, or
psychological motivation to expose himself to risk in an alien
context.
In sum, the demographic background data tells us that for
these low income workers certain activities seem likely to in-
volve the individual in legal disputes, including primarily those
which surround or are associated with the purchase of a home,
the ownership of a motor vehicle, and, conceivably, the estab-
lishment of savings account. As the next section will show, the
types of problems these clients had when they went to lawyers
in fact do reflect those demographic peculiarities which expose
some groups to more litigation than others. We cannot explain
with any precision why 46 percent of the members of Local 229
have never been to a lawyer. There are probably strong cul-
tural and psychological disincentives, possibly related to the
ambiguities of America's disintegrating race-caste system. At
this point we can only note that this 46 percent has generally
been avoiding matters of property and the less settled matters
that sometimes come before the law, and has succeeded thereby
in avoiding legal experience altogether.
In addition to the 46 percent who have never seen a lawyer,
fully 55 individuals - or about 10 percent of the entire sample
- had been able to identify a legal situation, realizing that a
lawyer's services were called for, but still found themselves
unable to make the first contact and seek a lawyer's help.
16
16 After the question: "Have you ever had a problem you thought at the
time a lawyer might be able to help you with, but you didn't go to a
lawyer?", the respondents were asked the further probe: "Haven't you
ever thought of using a lawyer's services, but didn't?" The respondents
who answered affirmatively were asked for details of the problem.
See app., question 5, infra.
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As well, another example of nonuse is shown in that fully
52 individuals- again about 10 percent of the entire sample -
had been to a lawyer at some time in the past with a problem,
but, finding themselves in a subsequent legal situation, had
been unable to cross the threshold of contacting a lawyer a
second time.
III. USE PATTERNS
A. The Contact Threshold
A most vital question in this study is how the clients got in
touch with the lawyers. In any study that takes as its starting
base the potential prevalence of negative attitudes toward law-
yers and massive nonuse of their services, the legal problem
as first encountered by the client presents a crucial threshold.
This threshold involves the behavior of "lawyer-seeking," the
problem of lawyer proximity, and the question of whether the
client will be able to initiate the contact with a lawyer.
Of every 10 members of Local 229, at least one, by his own
account, was unwilling or unable to cross that threshold, i.e.,
he was one of the 55 individuals having a legal problem but
never seeing a lawyer. But this is only a superficial statement
of the problem. Almost 20 percent of those with legal experi-
ence had, at one time or another, a subsequent legal problem
which they decided not to take to a lawyer.17 An unknown
number of others had very possibly forgotten, or decided not to
mention to our interviewers, that they had a legal problem
which they had decided not to take to a lawyer. This would
seem an especially strong possibility in such sensitive areas as
potential divorce actions, estate settlement, paternity disputes,
or criminal proceedings. If there were respondents who were
unwilling to talk about certain sensitive, painful, or personal
problems, they may have been reluctant to discuss them with
lawyers for the same reason, or with those whom they might
approach in order to find a lawyer. Finally, one major obstacle,
in addition to those just mentioned, might be the difficulties
in getting in touch with a lawyer. All these indications show
that the structure and setting of legal contacts require investi-
gation as a precondition or threshold of legal use patterns.
The respondents were asked who was their "most important
contact" for each problem they took to a lawyer18 Named most
1tAll the respondents were asked, "Have you ever had a problem you
thought at the time a lawyer might be able to help you with, but you
didn't go to a lawyer?" See app., question 5, infra.
18 The respondents were asked, "We are interested in how you happened
to go to this lawyer. How did you find out about him?" See app., ques-
tion 13, infra.
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often was a "friend or relative." The distribution in Table 10
points to what can be described as a "lay referral system."
TABLE 10 Most Important Contact for Finding a Lawyer (All
Problems Mentioned)
Contact Percent
Friend or relative 52
Family lawyer or previously known 14
Recommended by other party 8
Community reputation 4










Clearly the mechanism of contact with lawyers is informal and
mediated through primary groups, especially the family. To
the extent that formal economic and legal institutions provide
contact with the lawyer, they are fragmented into individual
referrals such as lawyers, unions, and businesses, and account
for only about 5 percent of the total contacts. In the absence
of any structured mechanism of contact (such as lawyer refer-
ral services), it appears that contact is almost random; that
is, the lawyer one goes to is the one known to the family, or
recently retained by one's friends. Approaching a particular
lawyer is seldom done through rational choice or formal ad-
ministration. When attitudes toward lawyers are examined in
the following section, it will be worth considering whether the
frequent negative attitudes toward lawyers might be an out-
come of the unstructured, ambiguous, and possibly random or
irrational mechanism of contact.
This pattern of legal contact is consistent with previous
findings about the communications networks within which low
income clients must operate in dealing with professionals. For
example, in their study of the OEO Legal Services Program,
which aimed at providing free legal services to the poor, Fisher
and Ivie observed that "informal channels of communication
are the most important source of information about free legal
service. A substantial proportion of the clients at each program
found out about free legal service from a friend, relative,
neighbor, or coworker -generally another poor person."'1 The
19 K. FIsHIE & C. IVIE, FRANCHISING JUSTIcE: THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OP-




authors learned that relatively few clients found out about the
programs through the mass media, advertising leaflets, phone
listings, or seeing the office itself.20 Although the authors did
not believe physical distance operated as a prohibitive barrier
to the use of free legal services, this study deals with the prob-
lems of approaching a private lawyer and paying out of one's
pocket. The possible influence of physical remoteness should be
considered, together with the supposed absence of any merchan-
dising of lawyers' services.
B.F. Christensen has observed that:
Urbanization also affects the individual's ability to find the
help he needs to solve his problems and pursue his remedies.
In the first place, the lawyers who practice in the cities are not
usually where the people are. Much of the urban population
growth in recent years has taken place in the areas contiguous
to the central cities. Thus, many people of moderate means live
in neighborhoods and communities that, although integral parts
of the urban complex, are somewhat dispersed geographically.
The lawyers, on the other hand, tend to be concentrated in the
city centers. 2
1
Lawyers, who typically have offices in the business section of
the city, are not visible to the public, Christensen argues, and
"[a] s a consequence, people with problems calling for legal
services may simply fail to think of lawyers as possible sources
of help. ' 22 This urban concentration which physically removes
the client from the lawyer may account for the saliency of in-
formal mechanisms of contact, and perhaps for some of the
reluctance to use lawyers at all.
Lawyers' self-imposed restrictions on advertising, in con-
trast to the sophisticated promotion used for distribution of
goods and nonprofessional services, may also serve to separate
lawyer and client. If so, low income, poorly educated clients
would seem to be particularly vulnerable. Christensen argues
that:
Another factor affecting the use of lawyers by people of
moderate means is the pervasive effect of modern advertising
and marketing techniques. Today's consumer has become condi-
tioned to techniques that offer him goods and services in the
most accessible, convenient, and attractive manner. They come to
him, pre-mixed, pre-cooked, pre-packaged, and easy to acquire.
To expect people to pursue a completely self-reliant course in
Their findings parallel those of the present study. Apparently clergy
were an important source for Local 229, but our questionnaire was so
structured that they were placed in the "other" category of contacts.
2 0 Id.
21 B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 133 (1971).
22 Id.
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seeking out and securing the services of lawyers regardless of
the obstacles is surely to expect too much.
23
It appears, therefore, that when the members of Local 229
relied upon informally acquired knowledge of lawyers and law
practice - a typical and workable approach in other contexts -
they used an inefficient method for low income clients in an
urban setting. The group studied here faced at least a double
handicap when they had to contact a lawyer: the lawyers'
offices were frequently some distance from their neighborhoods,
and the "packaging" of lawyers' services was geared toward
their commercial customers downtown rather than the low
income consumer.
B. Defining a "Legal" Problem
One of the most important elements in lawyer-client con-
tact is the potential client's consciousness that his problem is in
fact legal. A client unfamiliar with the law and with the pro-
fessional services of lawyers is especially vulnerable to doubts
about whether his problem is "legal" or not; this would account
for the tendency to see a lawyer only about the most traditional
and settled matters. Similarly, it should not be surprising that
a person with indistinct and ambiguous notions about the defi-
nition of a legal problem would not see a lawyer until and un-
less the problem had become serious or even desperate. Am-
biguity about legal definitions would frustrate "preventive law"
as a way of dealing with problems before they become des-
perate. Even where the problem, is clear, a low income client
would not always want to approach a lawyer to assert himself.
For example, it is generally conceded that negligent driving is
"legal" situation, but many of the accused prefer to forfeit bail,
or represent themselves, rather than seek out and hire a lawyer.
Besides having the ability and willingness to define a problem
as legal, the potential client must perceive the lawyer as being
helpful to him. At some point, awareness of these factors may
lead to assertiveness.
Thus it was considered worthwhile to develop some measure
of what are perceived legal situations, in the opinions of the
members of Local 229, and to measure the members' beliefs
about the relative helpfulness of lawyers and others. The re-
spondents were asked 15 legal "definition" questions in which
they were to identify whether a lawyer or someone else would
be of help.2 4 Some of the questions described traditional legal
23 Id. at 134.




situations, others described situations only possibly legal, or not
plausibly legal at all. Table 11 shows the clients' definitions
of legal situations. It is ranged from those situations judged
"most legal" (as indicated by the combined percentages of the
first two columns), to those judged "least legal" (combined
percentages of the last two columns).
TABLE 11 Respondents' Estimates of a Lawyer or Someone Else
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The respondents' perceptions of situations in which a lawyer
might be helpful were consistent with conventional common
sense wisdom. The respondents appear to be traditional in their
views of what might be a legal problem. As a result they do
not define racial discrimination in hiring as the sort of situation
in which a lawyer would be particularly helpful. A lawyer or
government official, by contrast, would perceive job discrimina-
tion as highly legal. Similarly, the hypothetical situation of the
child being suspended from school for his haircut is likely to be
recognized as potentially legal mainly by middle class parents,
or by those who have in some way broken out of traditional
views of lawyers' services. The present group seemed to feel
that a lawyer would be of little more help in the haircut situa-
tion than if a person had lost his wallet.
Generally, legal experience had a minor effect on the tend-
ency to define the foregoing situations as legal. Those with
experience were slightly more likely to percive a lawyer as
helpful than those without. But on one measurement, the racial
discrimination question, legal experience made a considerable
difference as seen in Table 12. The influence of legal experience
in identifying lawyers as helpful on the racial discrimination
question cannot be accounted for by direct experience with that
type of problem, for none of the respondents had ever taken a
problem of job or housing discrimination to a lawyer. Thirty-
one respondents did, however, say that they had encountered
job or housing discrimination. Possibly those with legal ex-
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perience in some other area became convinced in the course of
their encounters with lawyers that, in principle at least, a
lawyer would be helpful for discrimination problems. Never-
theless, 34 percent said that a lawyer would be of no help at
all in a racial discrimination situation- a situation which in
many more legally aware populations has acquired a highly
visible "legal" status.
Racial discrimination can be viewed as a legal issue on its
way to becoming recognized and "traditional." Consequently
it is a good measure of the legal awareness and sophistication
of a group of potential clients. The more readily the group
recognizes a racial discrimination problem as legally soluble,
the greater that group's potential departure from a purely tra-
ditional view of the law. But this potential varies with the
larger community in which the group finds itself. It might be
argued that in a southern community such a problem is farther
from legitimate legal status than in a northern community
because racial segregation has been formally recognized there
more recently, and for some members of the community, re-
mains legitimate. If that is true, the distance between the old
view of how the law can be used and the new view just emerg-
ing will be greater. Any view of evolving legal awareness must
take into account the existing norms, and the receptivity to
change, of the surrounding community.
TABLE 12 Respondents' Estimates of a Lawyer or Someone Else
as Helpful in a Racial Discrimination Situation
PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS SAYING:
Only a Lawyer Lawyer Would Someone Else Lawyer Would
Can Help Be No Help Most Helpful Be No Help
Respondents 33 27 9 27
with experience (Don't know, 5%)
Respondents 23 24 10 39
without experience (Don't know, 4%)
All 28 26 9 32
respondents (Don't know, 5%)
These clients seemed to have a fairly accurate estimate of the
sorts of situations in which a lawyer normally is useful, and
they defined a wide variety of situations as at least potentially
legal.2 5 Many were even willing to imagine a lawyer as being
of use in fairly far-fetched situations (admittedly, to some
extent, the respondents may have been led to do this by the
train of thought in this legally oriented survey). The situations
defined as legal did, in general, tend toward the familiar, tradi-
25 To a great extent the "legal" element in the situation was defined by
the other party. In adversary situtations (which accounted for about
63% of the legal experience), the other party went to the lawyer first
36% of the time.
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tional, and relatively settled, and the sensitive issue of racial
discrimination was shied away from as nonlegal by a substantial
proportion of the respondents. The number of "don't know"
responses to the legal definition questions was relatively low,
indicating that these clients did not generally regard themselves
as baffled by legal matters. Experience increased the tendency
to answer that a lawyer would be of help in all but the most
unconventional "legal" situations, especially the racial discrimi-
nation question, but had no impact on the tendency to answer
"don't know." From these questions it appears that the respond-
ents as consumers, homeowners, or clients of government agen-
cies perceived themselves as willing to approach a lawyer, but
that for most of the group there was little readiness to break
new legal ground.
C. Types of Legal Problems
The kinds of problems brought to lawyers by the clients in
our sample are presented in Table 13, which shows 407 problems
from 273 clients conveniently broken down into eight types.
TABLE 13 Frequencies and Percentages of Eight Types of Legal
Problems
Type of Problema Number Percent
Real estate 106 26
Domestic relations 63 15
Criminal charges 58 14
Workmen's Compensation 50 12
Noncriminal traffic problems 44 11
Successions and wills 30 7




aReal estate problems included sales, inter vivos transfers,
and clearing title. Domestic relations problems included di-
vorce, separation, custody, support, and adoption. Criminal
charges included drunk driving, auto accident cases with crimi-
nal charges, and other felonies and misdemeanors. Workmen's
Compensation problems were those involving injury on the
job. Noncriminal traffic problems included accidents and
traffic misdeameanors. Successions and will problems included
succession involving personal and real property, and making a
will. Credit and financing problems included defective mer-
chandise, fraudulent advertising and sales, deceptive credit
practices, deceptive loan practices, debt problems, reposses-
sion, and bankruptcy. Other problems were Unemployment
Compensation, tax problems, personal injury excluding Work-
men's Compensation, and problems whose descriptions were
too vague to catagorize.
Real estate problems, the most frequently presented, were found
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among older married individuals with families. These respond-
ents were usually homeowners and their incomes were higher
than the group as a whole. They tended to have savings ac-
counts, and to own a car or truck more often than the others.
Many of them owned two or more vehicles. There was no sig-
nificant relationship found between education and having real
estate problems.
For the other problems the demographic relationships were
less clear. Domestic relations problems were found among
clients of all age groups. There is some possibility that domestic
relations problems may be negatively correlated with education,
but the significance is questionable. Domestic relations prob-
lems were not related to income, saving behavior, or ownership
of motor vehicles. Criminal charges seemed to affect the clients
without regard to their demographic characteristics. Home-
owners and savers, high and low income individuals, were
vulnerable to this type of problem. For workmen's compensa-
tion problems, some patterns did emerge. Those with incomes
under $3,000 per year seemed particularly vulnerable. But their
low incomes may have reflected the circumstance-especially
serious injury on the job-which resulted in low income. Traffic
problems without accompanying criminal charges were experi-
enced by the better-educated members of Local 229, and by
those with savings accounts. Naturally, traffic problems were
usually brought to lawyers by those with at least one vehicle
and especially by multiple vehicle owners. This type of prob-
lem was also disproportionately frequent among divorced indi-
viduals. Education and age were not related to the occurrence
of traffic problems. Successions and wills were not related to
any of the demographic measures we used here. Credit and
financing problems were associated with having higher incomes.
Problems falling into the "other" category-which includes re-
sponses too vague to classify-were not associated with any
demographic characteristics.
Table 14 summarizes these data by noting the demographic
groups who experienced certain problems in disproportionate
number. There seems little that is surprising in the results.
Some findings are not easily explained. Why, for example, do
traffic problems occur disproportionately among the better edu-
cated respondents? Why do individuals under 30 manage to
avoid criminal charges more effectively than those aged 30 to
50? Our data do not allow us a ready answer to these ques-
tions.
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Criminal charges Middle age groups (30-50)
Workmen's Compensation Lowest income group (under $3,000)
Married




Successions and wills None
Credit and financing Higher individual incomes
Other None
Most of the associations are intutively reasonable. Higher
individual incomes would seem capable of leading the unwary
individual into credit and financing problems, leading, in turn,
to the necessity of seeing a lawyer. Those who save enough to
purchase one or more vehicles become vulnerable to traffic
problems. Possibly, those who have been divorced are psycho-
logically more vulnerable to traffic accidents or violations; or,
alternatively, they started going to a lawyer with a domestic re-
lations problem and continued the practice for traffic problems.
Generally, an examination of problem types reinforces the
argument in section II: legal experience arises more or less
automatically from one's place in the social system and the
property cycle. The association between real estate problems
and individuals who own vehicles, keep saving accounts, have
high family incomes, etc., among members of Local 229 supports
what has been said about the traditional, settled, and conven-
tional use of the law. Involvement in the property cycle seems
to be the single most important mechanism accounting for legal
experience and identifying the individuals who most frequently
have problems. Given that the members of Local 229 go to
lawyers reluctantly, and given that their access to lawyers is
unstructured, the regularities of legal behavior that we have
found thus far are highly predictable.
D. Lawyer-Client Contact Patterns
The 273 clients almost always consulted with private law-
yers as has been discussed. All but a handful of the 407 legal
problems were taken to private lawyers who were found by the
respondent himself rather than to a lawyer selected by a formal
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intermediary agency. None of the respondents reported taking
more than one problem to nonprivate lawyers, but 67 respond-
ents had taken a second problem to their private lawyers, and
27 had taken three or more problems. The legal repeaters
appeared to be no different in age, education, or any other attri-
bute from nonrepeaters. The contacts used in getting in touch
with a lawyer did not differ much between the two groups.
Further, there is no significant evidence that the use patterns
of "legal repeaters" were different from nonrepeaters. Detailed
descriptions of the second problem, which inquired into con-
tacts, actions taken by the lawyer, and method of payment were
all very similar to the descriptions of the first problem.
An important measure of the success of these clients' legal
experiences would be whether at a given time they felt they
knew a lawyer to whom they could, if necessary, take a prob-
lem. Of course the client would not "know a lawyer he could
go to" if he had decided the services were unsatisfactory. But
when asked, 80 percent of the clients said they would go back
to the same lawyer. And when asked whether they remembered
the lawyer's name, 78 percent answered affirmatively and gave
the name. Thus, it appears that those with legal experience
feel they know a lawyer to whom they could go.
For those without experience the situation is different.
These respondents were asked, "Do you know a lawyer you
could go to if you needed one?" Of these, 33 percent answered
affirmatively and gave the name of a lawyer. Another 9 per-
cent answered affirmatively but were unable to give a name.
Another 7 percent were not asked by the interviewer to give a
name. Of those without experience, 51 percent said they did not
know a lawyer. Clearly, having had a problem which was dealt
with by a lawyer, helped to arrange a system of legal contact
for these clients. Having had legal experience helps to solve
one of the "threshold" problems of access to legal services.
The problems reported by these clients had occurred over
a period of up to 49 years. Over half the clients had taken their
first legal problem to a lawyer within the last 10 years, and
18 percent had taken their first legal problem to a lawyer with-
in the 12 months prior to the survey.
The clients usually saw just one lawyer about their prob-
lems. Ninety-five percent reported seeing one lawyer about the
first problem mentioned. The lawyers virtually always took the
clients' cases; only 3 percent of the respondents reported refusal
to take their first problem, but 9 percent reported refusal to take
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their second problem. This raises the question of whether some
of the clients may be legal "repeaters," whose characteristics
differ from those who brought only one, or no problems, to
lawyers. Legal repeaters, by definition, are those who return
to a lawyer with a second or subsequent problem. Sixty-six of
the 273 clients were "legal repeaters."
E. User Awareness of Lawyer's Activities
The client's perception of what the lawyer did gives some
idea about the nature of lawyer use, and the extent to which
the legal experience itself was understood by the client. When
asked a series of questions about whether or not he knew the
lawyer had done a specific thing regarding his case, the client
usually felt he knew. Asking the client what the lawyer did
yields a notion of what legal activities were visible to the par-
ticular client. The answers to these questions also give us some
idea of the client's awareness of legal processes.
TABLE 15 a What the Lawyer Did as Seen by the Clients: Per-
centage Distribution of the Answers to the Question,
"Did the Lawyer . . .?"
Ye
Did he talk to you 85
about your problem
and give you advice
about its solution?
Did he write 38
any letters?
Did he prepare any 36
legal papers, other
than a letter, such
as a contract, a
will or lease?
In order to settle the 42
matter or to move
things along, did he
meet with the other
person or the person's
lawyer or talk with
them on the phone?
Did he go to 36
court for you?
Did he appear before 9
some other govern-
ment official who
had the power to
decide this case?
Did he spend any 31
time looking at the







































Beyond talking to 43 39 14 49 35 8
you, did he investi- N=229 N=65
gate any facts
himself?
Did he refer you 3 97 0 8 92 0
to someone else? N=227 N=64
Did he tell you he 3 97 0 2 98 0
couldn't help you N=228 N=65
because your problem
wasn't a legal one?
Did he do 2 96 3 6 94 0
anything else? N=227 N=65
aIn this table, the first line of numbers in the "Yes-No-
Don't Know" columns is the percentage of respondents answer-
ing. The "N" for each question is the total number of respond-
ents asked the question.
bPercentages do not always total 100 because, up to the
question "did he refer you to someone else," 3.5 percent of the
responses were coded "doesn't apply," where the lawyer did
not take the case. The last three questions were coded "yes" or
"no" for all respondents.
Not surprisingly, the clients were aware of when the lawyer
had done something visible which involved the client, such as
giving various kinds of advice, making referrals, or going to
court. The lawyer had given 83 percent of the respondents
advice. Regarding this question, it is possible that the "no"
answers reflected the client's view that the advice was not
helpful-that the lawyer didn't "really" advise-even though
from the lawyer's point of view some attempt at giving advice
may have been made. Giving advice was the most frequently
perceived and reported activity of the lawyers.
Investigating additional facts for the client and contacting
the other party's lawyer were also seen as frequent services.
A large number of clients-between one-third and one-half-
reported that their lawyers had written letters, prepared legal
papers, or had gone to court for them. The lawyers very seldom-
ly referred the problem to someone else, or said the problem was
not a legal one. (These activities might, from the client's point
of view, fall under the heading of "giving advice," particularly
if the problem was in the distant past.) Nor did the clients fre-
quently report that the lawyer did anything additional that had
not been mentioned in the series of questions.
Some of the lawyer's activities were necessarily carried on
out of sight of the client, and the client would not have first-
hand knowledge whether the lawyer had checked over the rele-
vant laws or investigated additional facts. He would have to
recall what the lawyer had told him was being done, or make
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inferences on the basis of the overall situation. When this is
considered, it is surprising how infrequent were "don't know"
responses. The activities about which the clients admitted the
least knowledge of their lawyers' activities were checking over
laws, contacting the other person's lawyer, writing letters, in-
vestigating additional facts, and appearing before a government
office or agency.
Clients approaching lawyers for a second problem tended
to answer "don't know" to the same questions and in similar
proportions as clients who took problems to a lawyer for the
first time, or only once. The clients bringing a second problem
more frequently answered "don't know" to the question about
writing letters, and less frequently to the question about
whether the lawyer had investigated additional facts. Having
had one legal experience did not increase the clients' percep-
tions that they knew what the lawyers' activities were. If the
clients were intimidated by the mystery and authority of law-
yers and courts, it follows that the lawyers' activities would be
viewed as mystique rather than a series of law-related jobs.
One legal experience did not noticeably reduce the level of
mystery, nor did it improve communication sufficiently to raise
the client's level of awareness of perceptions of the lawyer's
activities.
These clients had, by their own account, an idea of what
the lawyers were doing in a visible way, and they were often
willing to deduce what their lawyers must have done in in-
stances in which they would not have been witnesses to the
lawyers' activities. Experience with one legal problem did not
predispose the clients to perceive more clearly what the lawyers
were doing when they brought their second problem. If for this
group, going to a lawyer presented an authoritarian relationship
with elements of intimidation, paternalism, and obscure ritual,
then there is no reason to expect one legal experience to yield
greater awareness or sophistication on the next contact. Per-
haps, after multiple legal contacts, experience will break down
the distance and mystery, but we have no evidence that two
visits to a lawyer, under present circumstances, accomplished
any more dissipation of the mystique than did one visit.
F. Fees & Fee Payment Patterns
Legal services costs to these clients covered a wide range.
In viewing the cost arrays below, note that most of the clients
believed that lawyers charge too much. This problem will be
1972
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discussed in the next section. The severity of that judgment
becomes clear when it is observed that 11 percent-one in
nine- of all the legal problems were solved free of charge
Table 16 shows the fees charged for legal problems. Dollar
fees were determined for 341 of the 407 problems. Some fees
were still pending, were not remembered by the respondents,
or had been a percentage of the award. Where dollar fees were
found, they were placed in ranges.
TABLE 16 Number and Percent of Legal Problems for Each
Range of Fees Charged
Amount Charged Number of Problems Percent




76- $100 32 8
101-$200 48 12
201-$300 35 9
Over $300 31 8
Contingency fee 12 3
Other and undetermined 47 12
N=400
Contingency fees were infrequent. The reason for this can be
found by examining the types of problems brought to lawyers,
and the reluctance with which they were brought. In general,
these clients only brought problems defensively, that is, when
forced by circumstances to do so. They initiated few suits or
other actions upon which a contingency fee would normally be
based. The only partial exception was the workmen's compen-
sation category.
To some extent, the distribution of fees shown above may
have made it more difficult for the clients to cross the initial
threshold of legal experience. These fees can be catastrophic
for a low income laborer. The threshold problem is also re-
flected in the distribution shown in the table, for there were
few contingency fees, and the frequency of "no charge" often
reflects a charity concern, or paternalism. It is thus a paradox
that the client may experience low costs and a kind of charity,
or high costs which he cannot afford. Further, it is unlikely
that he can be confident about which result he should expect un-
til he had contacted a lawyer. This ambiguity must be resolvd
before the low income client will willingly bring his problem to
a lawyer. The uncertain-cost threshold would seem an espe-
cially powerful obstruction to any operation of preventive law,
when early consultation with a lawyer might forestall a later
problem of catastrophic proportions.
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The level of the fee charged generally represents the nature
of the services the lawyer provided. If the lawyer had to go to
court to solve the client's problem the fee was as likely to
exceed $100 as to be below it. Only 6 percent of the problems
going to court did not involve a fee. If the lawyer's job in-
volved preparing papers, the fee was likely to be under $100,
but again only 6 percent of such problems were taken care of
free. If the lawyer gave advice only, the client would fre-
quently not be charged.
Some types of problems were more expensive to solve than
others. Table 17 shows the cost breakdown according to prob-
lem type.
TABLE 17 Average Fee for Each of Eight Types of Legal Prob-
lems
Type of Problem Average Fee
Criminal charges $239
Workmen's Compensation 228
Successions and wills 208
Noncriminal traffic 173






Criminal charges were the most expensive. Real estate prob-
lems were the least expensive, and it is tempting to believe that
this may account for their relative frequency. It should be re-
membered that in instances of criminal charges, the client's
options are at a minimum. Presumably the individual would
be willing to pay a considerable amount to stay out of jail,
or to have charges reduced, or the sentence suspended. If the
lawyer can keep the client out of jail he is then in a good
position to charge a higher fee. The workmen's compensation
problems, unlike the others, were paid for on the basis of a
contingency fee. The fees therefore reflect the size of the
clients' awards to some extent. We do not have data on the rate
at which the contingency fees were charged, but an even larger
average figure than $228 would not have been surprising. The
low fees for real estate problems reflect the tendency for clients
to get advice about titles, transfers, mortgages, and the like,
as well as to draw up documents, search titles, and perform
other more substantial services. The element of simple advice,
for which the fee is normally low, is probably most prominent
in this type of problem.
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Usually the fees were paid out of the client's paycheck
or pocket cash. A few dipped into their savings or borrowed
money. Forty percent of the clients were either not charged
a fee, had cases still pending, or had not yet arranged payment.
Table 18 shows the payment terms for which data are available.
TALE 18 Method of Payment Compared to Amount of Fee
(Percent of the Problems)
Payment Terms Where Payment Was Obtained
Fee Lump Sum Installments Cash Savings Loan Combination/Other
1-$25 90 10 84 7 9 -
26-$100 75 25 75 13 6 6
$101-$300 42 58 67 14 13 6
Over $300 44 56 38 25 13 25
N=244 N=226
The greater the fee, the more likely the client was to make
payment in installments. For fees beyond $100 there was no
apparent increasing installment trend. Another correlation with
increased fees was that the ability of the clients to pay in cash
declined, especially when the fee exceded $300. The need to dip
into one's savings increased with greater fees, but borrowing
the money for payment did not show a similar increase. If the
fee exceeded $300, one in four fees was paid by a combination
of cash, savings or loan, or in some other way.
These data on legal fees underscore the catastrophic possi-
bilities arising from a visit to a lawyer. Given that an individual
needs a lawyer, he cannot be sure that his savings will remain
intact, or that he will not have to further extend his credit.
Moreover, he runs a considerable risk of owing a fee in excess
of $25, so that his inability to pay out of pocket cash or his
recent paycheck will probably force him to pay in installments.
IV. Ar=r Es TowARD LAWYERS
This study approaches the clients' attitudes toward lawyers
and legal services in two ways. The first, and the one for which
we have the most precise measures, concerns perceptions of
legal costs. The clients felt that lawyers' fees were too high, and,
often that they could not afford them. Second, there was
throughout the sample a strong tendency to regard lawyers
negatively: to view them as hard to find, hard to communicate
with, and to believe that they could not be trusted.
A. Perceived Economic Barriers
The best measure of legal costs is the subjective feeling of
those who must pay the fees as to whether they can afford
them or not. Usually a client's judgment whether he can
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afford the lawyer's fee will include some estimate whether he
got his money's worth. We were able to learn the clients' views
about the fees for 173 problems brought to lawyers. For 28
percent of these problems, the clients felt they could not afford
the amount. Inability to afford the lawyer's fee was, as ex-
pected, greater among those who were charged more; ability to
afford the lawyer's fee, in the client's mind, seems to be a
function of both dollar amount and subjective evaluation of the
adequacy of the services.
TABLE 19 Percent Who Could Not Afford the Lawyer's Fee for







Ability to afford the lawyer's fee varied according to the
type of problem. To some extent this reflected the amount
charged for the particular type of problem. Table 20 shows the
percent who were unable to afford the fee for each type of
problem and the average fee charged for that same type.
TABLE 20 Percent of Clients Who Could Not Afford Lawyer's
Fee, and Average Fee for Each Problem Type
Percent Unable
Problem Type to Afford Fee Average Fee
Criminal charges 46 $239
Credit and financing 41 135
Domestic relations 34 126
Noncriminal traffic 33 173
Successions and wills 32 208
Real estate 11 36
Other 25 41
Workmen's Compensationa - 228
N=254
aIt was possible to obtain data for only one of the 50 work-
men's compensation problems, since many were pending or on
the basis of a contingency fee. Clients not charged a dollar
amount were not asked whether they could afford the fee.
Criminal charges were the most expensive form of legal ex-
perience as well as being the type of problem the clients were
least able to afford. Succession and will problems produced
fees that could not be afforded in about one-third of the cases.
Real estate problems, costing an average of $36 each to have
the lawyer solve, could be afforded in all but 11 percent of the
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cases. Unfortunately, we could not obtain data on the work-
men's compensation problem.
The clients were asked whether they agreed or disagreed
with the general statement, "Most of the time, lawyers charge
too much." Eighty-four percent agreed with the statement, 16
percent disagreed. A positively worded statement of this kind
has a built-in bias, and if plausible, would tend to elicit agree-
ment. Nevertheless, the strength of the positive response is
surprising, and the tendency to agree with the statement seems
to be logically linked to certain of the respondents' charac-
teristics.
To some extent the client's demographic background ac-
counted for his tendency to agree or disagree that lawyers
charge too much. Although the client's income, marital status,
and educational level did not relate to his holding or not holding
this opinion, his age did. For some of these demographic meas-
ures it made a difference whether the respondent had had legal
experience or not. The youngest group of respondents, those
under 30, agreed that "lawyers charge too much" less frequently
than those over 30. This remained true regardless of whether
they had ever been to a lawyer, as Table 21 shows. Since ex-
perience does not account for the tendency of the younger
respondents to be happier about the fees lawyers charge, there
is the possibility that the young are more open-minded; par-
ticularly, they are more willing to relate differently than their
elders to professionals or to a different socioeconomic status.
Those who had never taken a problem to a lawyer agreed
that "lawyers charge too much" in about the same proportions
as those with experience; actually going to a lawyer seemed
to have no impact on the consensus of Local 229 that lawyers
normally overcharge. This may be a common and ordinary
opinion that working class individuals hold of professionals
who sell services. Nor did the dollar amount the client was
charged have a significant effect on the tendency to hold the
view that lawyers charge too much. In fact, 91 percent of those
charged nothing at all still agreed that lawyers charge too much.
The clients' feelings that they could or could not afford the
fee did not affect their intention to go back to the same lawyer
again. It is possible, therefore, that inability to afford the fee
did not reflect upon the clients' perceptions of the adequacy of
the lawyers' services. Approximately 80 percent of the clients
said they would go back, regardless of whether they could
afford the lawyer's fee the last time.
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This may shed light on the low degree to which cost fac-
tors influence the selection of one's lawyer, especially since the
amount the lawyer charged did not affect a client's decision
to make use of his services in the future. In general, our data
indicate these clients gave no attention to cost factors when
they chose a lawyer; clients tended to go to the lawyers named
by their family and friends, or to lawyers with whom they
had dealt in the past. Evidently, not being able to afford the
fee did not induce the clients to "shop around" for legal services.
TABLE 21 Percent in Each Age Group Agreeing That "Most of
the Time, Lawyers Charge Too Much"
Age Experiencea No Experience Whole Group
Under 30 56 56 56
30-39 85 92 89
40-49 90 85 88
50-59 81 89 84
60 and over 85 82 84
N=248 N=204 N=452
aSignificant at the .08 level.
Two processes are apparently operating. In one, operating
among those with legal experience, the client goes to a lawyer
and is frequently charged more than he feels he can afford.
Nevertheless he expresses willingness and intention to go back
to the same lawyer again. In this process, where "shopping
around" and changing lawyers would be economically rational
responses to unsatisfactory service, the client prefers to stay with
the lawyer he knows, who knows him, or who has previously
served his friends and family. The "lay referral system" prob-
ably restricts the contact system between client and lawyer,
with the result that the client feels he does not get his money's
worth. Conversely, he does have access to a lawyer in a pur-
portedly nonthreatening way: a lift over the psychological
threshold is provided by the "lay referral system."
In a second process, experience strengthens the client's
suspicion that "lawyers charge too much." This tendency was
only found among the clients over 30, and it has been sug-
gested that the "'open-mindedness of youth" may be operating
here. It is also possible that the passage of time, and the ac-
cumulation of experience (both first-hand and second-hand)
may inexorably compel more negative attitudes toward lawyers.
Thus, in examining the cilents' attitudes toward lawyers, we
have two hypotheses about accumulating negativism: first, there
may be a real generational difference between the attitudes of
those now under 30 who have been exposed to anti-establish-
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ment ideas about race and status. Second, the passage of time
may teach a kind of cynicism or fatalism about lawyers both
through personal experience and through the experience of one's
family and friends. Generally the data indicate that the struc-
ture of contact and the psychological obstacles to changing
lawyers go farther toward explaining which lawyer a client
goes to, and whether he goes back, than does experience or the
demographic characteristics of the clients. This view will be
examined below in the section on perceived psychological bar-
riers when attitudes that are not cost-related will be examined.
One final measure of attitude toward legal cost needs men-
tion. The respondents were asked how much, in their view, it
actually would cost just to talk to a lawyer for a half-hour about
some problem. Thirteen percent thought it would cost nothing.
But 62 percent thought such a consultation would cost more
than $10. The respondents were then asked how much they
thought it should cost to talk to a lawyer for the same amount
of time. Like most consumers, these respondents felt that cost
should be less. Most felt it should be less than $10; and 21
percent felt it should cost nothing. Table 22 compares the
ranges of fees the respondents thought it would cost for a half-
hour consultation to the ranges they chose to describe how much
it should cost. Clearly, these clients wanted lawyers' fees to be
lower: there was widespread fear that the fees would be higher
than the clients thought they should be. It is surprising, though,
that only 21 percent felt lawyers should charge nothing for a
half-hour consultation when this is in fact the practice of about
half the Shreveport lawyers. The economic reservation with
which these clients regard lawyers is also indicated in that only
13 percent believed they would be charged nothing for such a
consultation. The clients are clearly more pessimistic than the
facts warrant. But at the same time, most of them are not con-
vinced that a half-hour's consultation ought to be free. The
clients' views of what legal costs were appropriate, while mildly
critical, were fundamentally conservative.
In summary, both the clients and potential clients among
the members of Local 229 had clear and distinct ideas about
legal costs. Generally these ideas, whether stated abstractly
("lawyers charge too much") or concretely in terms of their
own experiences, were negative toward the existing level of
legal fees. The union members were willing to define legal
situations and admit that in many hypothetical instances pre-
sented to them a lawyer would be of help, indeed, that only a
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TABLE 22 Ranges of Fees Lawyers Would Charge Compared to
Fees They Should Charge for a Half-Hour Consul-
tation
Percent of Percent of
Respondents Saying Respondents Saying
Lawyer Would Lawyer Should
Range Charge in Range Charge in Range
No charge 13 21
1-57 16
6- 10 14 21
11- 15 11 14
16-$20 8 7




Over $50 10 2
N=499 N=498
lawyer would be of help. Yet to these clients the lawyers' fees
were higher than they should have been. Concurrently, the
clients did not shop around or change lawyers. The most rea-
sonable conclusion is that other alternatives were perceived as
closed. Because the lawyer charges too much, the client is un-
happy. But he either does not know how to go about finding
another lawyer, or he does not feel strongly enough about the
high cost to initiate a search for an alternative. Both disincen-
tives were probably operating. Finding another lawyer would
mean leaving the relative psychological safety and security of
a family lawyer known by name. It could also mean ceasing
to act on the recommendation of a friend or clergyman, known
by name to the lawyer. Formalized legal referrals were ex-
tremely rare in this group as shown by the above data about
lawyer contact. The clients may, of course, have known about
alternative methods of contacting lawyers (some, like the tele-
phone book, are obvious), but approaching an unknown lawyer
means the client faces the unfamiliar task of initiating contact,
which for many clients would have meant operating entirely
outside the lay referral system. To initiate such contact the
client would have to cross social barriers of class, color, and
education, and run the risk of being sent away embarrassed,
or even exploited. This threshold, in his view, means being
plunged into a whole series of unfamiliar and threatening situ-
ations.
B. Perceived Psychological Barriers
Although cost is a major obstacle to adequate legal services
from the point of view of the members of Local 229, it appeared
to affect the clients' actions very little. Problems of funda-
mental psychological distance were at least as important, and
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did affect future intentions. According to these respondents,
lawyers were hard to find, could not be trusted, would be likely
to reject a black laborer as a client, and were hard to under-
stand. A series of attitude questions in our interview schedule
revealed that the psychological distance discussed earlier not
only existed in the minds of the would-be clients, but, generally,
was not removed by having been a client.
1. Access
The first of these noncost attitude questions concerned the
problem of access and reflected indirectly upon the "lay re-
ferral system" discussed above. The respondents were asked
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that "it
is hard to find a lawyer when you need one." Forty-nine per-
cent agreed, 51 percent disagreed. Having had legal experience
might account for a large proportion of those who did not agree
it was hard to find a lawyer. This was not the case, however.
There was no significant difference between those with ex-
perience and those without experience on feelings that it was
hard to find a lawyer; something else must account for the
difficulty in finding a lawyer. Once again the psychological
threshold of venturing outside the familiar network of legal con-
tacts provided by one's family and friends remains the most
plausible explanation. Such a psychological threshold is neces-
sarily mediated through the background characteristics of the
clients. None of the demographic characteristics for which we
have data explains the general prevalence of the view that
lawyers are hard to find-that view is frequent in almost all
groups. But several significant variations among demographic
groups are worth attention.
First, the older the respondent, the more likely he was to
agree that "it is hard to find a lawyer when you need one."
Those under 30 were particularly unlikely to agree with the
statement. Legal experience made the younger individuals
(those under 40) even less likely to agree with the statement;
experience made little difference for the older group.
TABLE 23 Percent in Each Age Group Agreeing That "It's Hard
To Find a Lawyer When You Need One"
Age Experience No Experiencea Whole Group
Under 30 11 24 21
30-39 35 54 45
40-49 46 50 47
50-59 53 48 51
60 and over 62 63 62
N=252 N=212 N=464
aSignificant at the .07 level.
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Second, the more educated the client, the less trouble he ap-
parently felt it would be to find a lawyer. It seems that ex-
perience teaches the better educated (who are also generally
the younger respondents) that it is easy to find a lawyer. For
the least educated, experience strengthens the view that it is
hard to find a lawyer.
TABLE 24 Percent in Each Education Group Agreeing That "It's
Hard To Find a Lawyer When You Need One"
Number of School
Years Completed Experience No Experience Whole Group
12 and over 10 16 14
9-11 23 38 29
7-8 43 43 43
4-6 54 64 43
0-3 71 58 65
N=251 N=212 N=463
Third, an inspection of income levels indicated, not surprisingly,
that among respondents with experience, the view that lawyers
were hard to find was less frequent as total family income in-
creased. Beyond this, income accounted for few differences in
answers to this attitude question. Marital status did not affect
the answers to this question in any significant way.
Certain groups, with legal experience, were identified who
felt it was hard to find a lawyer. The existence of these groups
might be accounted for in two ways. First, there may have been
another difference between age groups. The young seemed to
respond to legal experience in a different way-going to a
lawyer caused them to feel that it was less difficult to find one.
Older respondents had experienced marked initial difficulties
(even failures) in going to a lawyer, and they were apparently
discouraged.
Alternatively, it is possible that those with the advantages
of education and income, together with youth, faced a less se-
vere "threshhold" problem by virtue of these advantages. The
more socially advantaged groups may have more easily gained
a feeling of competence and control over their lives than their
coworkers. Having this feeling, their legal experiences were
less stressful, and these clients came away from their legal ex-
periences with the feeling that they could deal with the world
of professionals. It is possible, however, that the passage of
time could erode that feeling of competence (confirming the
first explanation above), but our data do not answer this pos-
sibility.
The feeling that lawyers are hard to find underscores a
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serious problem of choosing and changing lawyers. A group of
potential clients who have trouble finding lawyers cannot ra-
tionally "shop around" for lawyers; nor can they easily "fire" a
lawyer with whom any degree of rapport has been established.
Believing that lawyers are hard to find locks the client into his
relationship with a lawyer once found and leads him to place
a higher value on having that particular lawyer. Obstacles in
the system of access significantly undermine the client's free-
dom of choice by inhibiting new choices. This is one important
dimension of Local 229's legal conservatism.
2. Distrust
Another measure of distance from lawyers is the individ-
ual's subjective feeling that lawyers constitute a class of people
who cannot be trusted. All the respondents were asked whether
they agreed or disagreed with the statement that "lawyers
usually can't be trusted," and 60 percent agreed. Legal experi-
ence made no significant difference in the tendency to agree or
disagree. The older the respondent, the more likely he was to
agree that lawyers cannot be trusted, but legal experience did
not significantly affect this relationship.
TABLE 25 Percent in Each Age Group Agreeing That "Lawyers






60 and over 69
N=441
The relationship between increasing age and increasing dis-
trust of lawyers is not surprising. Also we would expect the
more educated respondents to be less negative toward lawyers,
and this is in fact what emerges. But for education, unlike age,
having had legal experience does make a significant difference.
TABLE 26 Percent in Each Education Group Agreeing That
"Lawyers Usually Can't Be Trusted"
Number of
Years Completed Experience No Experiencea Whole Group
12 and over 44 30 34
9-11 52 55 53
7-8 56 60 58
4-6 61 67 63
0-3 79 60 71
N----241 N=199 N=440
aSignificant at the .06 level.
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What is most striking is the extent to which experience
teaches both the most educated and the least educated to in-
crease their distrust of lawyers, but apparently has an opposite
effect on the group in between. Possibly, the least educated
find dealing with professionals to be an alien and stressful
experience, while the most educated, being younger, are just
beginning to lose their "innocence" in a painful confrontation
with the legal world. It seems likely that both of the hypoth-
eses advanced above-the subjective competence felt by the
socially advantaged, and the generational differences-may be
operating here. The least educated may feel incompetent and
lost when confronting legal matters, but the better educated,
younger group is just beginning the process of learning the
negative attitudes held by their elders. It seems likely that
experience would hasten that learning.
It should be remembered that experience did not signifi-
cantly increase the tendency to believe that lawyers charge too
much. Also, the view that it is hard to find a lawyer was re-
duced with experience, but only for the younger and better
educated respondents. By contrast, distrust increased with ex-
perience, and this even occurred among the presumably open-
minded young, and among the more highly educated. Experi-
ence may help the young and better educated to learn how to
find a lawyer, but it does not dissipate distrust of lawyers. As
well, neither income nor marital status related significantly to
distrust of lawyers. For distrust, like most other measures of
negative attitudes toward lawyers, age and education were the
most important characteristics accounting for differences.
There was a significant relationship between the type of
problem the client had and the tendency to agree that lawyers
cannot be trusted. Table 27 shows the percent agreeing with
that statement, from the least distrustful to the most. Inter-
estingly, the category labeled "other" was actually the most
distrustful. This group, which includes those giving descrip-
tions of their legal problems which were too vague to classify,
may have been the most baffled by their contact with lawyers,
and this bafflement may have fostered distrust. Distrust was
especially strong among those with workmen's compensation
problems. We have already seen that these fees were among
the highest charged and were calculated on a contingency basis.
This method of charging may be the basis of the distrust re-
vealed here. Those with workmen's compensation problems
were frequently from the lowest income families. It is possible
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TABLE 27 Percent Agreeing That "Most of the Time, Lawyers
Can't Be Trusted," for Each Problem Type
Problem Type Percent Agreeing
Real Estate 41
Succession and will 43







that this group more than others felt that workmen's com-
pensation should be awarded to them through administrative
procedures as a matter of right, and that having to go to a
lawyer, and to pay him a substantial contingency fee, was an
unfair resolution of the problem.
The respondents with real estate, succession and will, and
credit and financing problems were least distrustful of lawyers.
These respondents also tended to be the most "substantial"
citizens in the sense that they were often homeowners and had
higher incomes. They had acquired property, had bank ac-
counts, and frequently had a working wife. It is likely that
these respondents regarded legal services as a more or less
normal aspect of acquiring property and making major pur-
chases. Unlike the lower income, less consumer-oriented re-
spondents (particularly those with workmen's compensation
problems), they did not seek a lawyer only in cases of accident
or catastrophe, and they would not consider going to a lawyer
a superfluous imposition.
3. Rejection and Discrimination
Another measure of distance from lawyers is the client's
feeling of rejection. The respondents were asked whether they
agreed or disagreed with the statement: "Most lawyers wouldn't
want a black laborer as a client. ' ' 2, Fifty-three percent agreed
and 47 percent disagreed. Somewhat surprisingly, having had
legal experience did not significantly affect this result. Young,
educated respondents seemed less aware of possible race or class
discrimination. Again, experience did not significantly affect
the responses. Responses to this question were income-related,
26 The question was asked differently depending on whether the respondent
was black or white. For white respondents, the question read, "Most
lawyers wouldn't want a laborer as a client." Since the Shreveport Bar
was almost entirely white it would not be possible to impute a racial
dimension to preceived rejection by lawyers for the white respondents
(of whom there were only eight). Otherwise, it is reasonable to regard
race as one element in distance from lawyers, and as part of any feel-
ings on the part of the potential clients that they might be rejected by
the lawyer.
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at least for those with very low incomes (under $3,000) who
had legal experience. Of this group, 70 percent felt that lawyers
would not want a black laborer as a client. By contrast, 68
percent of the highest income respondents ($6,000 and over)
without legal experience agreed with the statement, but this
percentage fell to 44 with legal experience. Legal experience
made the low income respondents feel more rejected by law-
yers; it made the high income respondents feel less rejected.
These results are probably due to the same property-related
phenomenon mentioned above.
4. Communication
A final measure of distance from lawyers is the respond-
ent's agreement or disagreement with the statement: "It is hard
to understand lawyers." Responses to this question not only
paralleled the other attitude question discussed above, they even
explained some of the respondent's intended future behavior.
TABLE 28 Percent in Age and Education Groups Agreeing That
"It Is Hard To Understand Lawyers"
Age Experiencea No Experience Whole Group
Under 30 44 33 36
30-39 71 68 69
40-49 74 79 76
50-59 82 84 83




Completed Experience No Experience Whole Group
12 and over 80 35 47
9-11 56 61 58
7-8 68 85 76
4-6 81 86 83
0-3 90 80 85
N=252 N=203 N=455
&Significant at the .10 level.
First, the relationship between age and agreement that it is hard
to understand lawyers indicated that those under 30 had con-
siderably less difficulty understanding lawyers. Having had
legal experience taught these young clients that understanding
lawyers was not as easy as they had thought. The same phe-
nomenon occurred among the more educated respondents: their
tendency to agree that lawyers are hard to understand increased
with experience. The older respondents were not affected by
experience in the same way as the least educated. The respond-
ents who were 60 years old and over agreed that it is hard to
understand lawyers, but agreed with less frequency if they had
legal experience. Conversely, those with the least education
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were led by experience to agree more frequently. Education
is apparently a handicap in understanding lawyers, aside from
age. This leads us to a baffling question when the youngest
and the best educated are observed. Why should legal experi-
ence give such difficulty to the best educated that it increases
their agreement with the statement from 35 percent to 80 per-
cent? It could be that the more educated respondents are actu-
ally making an attempt to understand the legal reasoning they
are exposed to, while the others are simply trusting the lawyer
to take care of matters. Note, however, that the best educated
individuals with legal experience are an extremely small group,
consisting of only 10 individuals.
5. Intent to Return
Did attitudes toward lawyers affect the intention to return
to the same lawyer again? For cost-related attitudes, as we
have seen, they did not. Neither the feeling that one could not
afford the fee he had been charged, nor the view that in general
lawyers charge too much, significantly affected the expressed
intent to return to the same lawyer again. But two other atti-
tude questions-those relating to distrust and to the difficulty
of understanding lawyers--did affect the clients' intentions.
TABLE 29 Percent of Clients Who Would Go Back to the Same
Lawyer Again, by Attitudes Toward Lawyers
Percent Who Would
Go Back to the Percent Who Would




be trusted" 76 24 100
Disagree 89 11 100
N=157
Agree that "it
is hard to under-
stand lawyers" 76 24 100
Disagree 96 4 100
N=162
The more distrustful the client feels-presumably as a result
of his bad experiences with lawyers-the less willing he is to
go back. Similarly, if he feels that it is hard to understand
lawyers, he is less likely to go back to the same lawyer. This
is not as surprising as is the willingness of many of those who
do not think lawyers can be trusted, and who feel that it is
hard to understand them, to go back to the same lawyer any-
way. Of those who held these negative attitudes about lawyers,
76 percent said they would go back. This resignation or fatalism
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suggests that the client does not regard himself as a free agent
exercising choice among the professionals who serve his needs.
The situation is similar to the relationship found earlier when
we examined the clients' attitudes toward legal costs. However
badly things might have gone for the client, however much he
may have felt he was "taken," he is still willing to return to
the same attorney. However much the lawyer may have
aroused feelings of distrust in him, or however much difficulty
he may have had in understanding the lawyer, he is likely to
return again in case of legal need.
The explanation for this willingness to return is not self-
evident from the present data. Three possible explanations
arise. First, there are difficulties of access. The informal and
narrowly circumscribed circle of contacts gives the client easy
access to only a few lawyers- perhaps to only the one whose
name he was able to get through his family, minister, or em-
ployer. The lay referral system is not likely to generate a list
of lawyers, complete with their specialties, from which the client
may then choose, one after another, until he finds the right law-
yer for himself. Second, there is the paternalistic tradition.
Serving the needs of low income clients has been somewhat
institutionalized as a charity function among lawyers. This
charity function may make it seem stressful for clients who have
been served by it to change lawyers, particularly if they feel
they "owe" their "family lawyer" a kind of loyalty in return
for reduced rates or free legal services in the past. Finally,
there is a lack of knowledge about how to approach a new
lawyer. Not only is contact normally informal, but it involves,
as was argued in the introduction, physical distance, social
distance, and the marketing and "packaging" practices of the
legal profession. The "commercial remoteness" of legal services
forces the consumer to break with his normal and learned
habits of purchase and recognition of a product if he is going
to "shop" for a lawyer. In this context the lawyers' marketing
practices probably appear to the most enterprising consumers
of legal services as an annoyance and an anachronism.
CONCLUSION
Before returning to our four initial hypotheses, some gen-
eral observations about Local 229's behavior and the legal pro-
fession are in order. Legal experience-the actual experience
of taking a problem to a lawyer at some time-did not improve
the legal awareness or sophistication of the sample group. Nor
did it reduce negative attitudes toward lawyers. Experience
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seldom accounted for any attitude, and no evidence was found
that it encouraged further experience. If contact with lawyers
did not breed contempt, it certainly did not preclude it. When
problems were brought to lawyers it was usually as a last re-
sort. Clients frequently felt the fees were more than they could
afford, and a majority felt that lawyers charge too much. Ex-
perience did not remove the feeling that they would not get
their money's worth. The negative feelings these clients had
about lawyers might be attributable to their failure to exercise
rational choice in a market for legal services that is based on
the professional standard of availability to all. Lawyers did,
after all, seldom turn away clients, and were frequently willing
to receive payment on an installment basis. They often per-
formed services without charge.
Rational free choice in the market for legal services is-for
this group at least-a fictitious concept. Bad experiences and
widespread distrust of lawyers did not produce any behavior,
such as changing lawyers, which a market model would postu-
late. The widely shared view that lawyers are hard to find
discouraged clients from changing lawyers, and it probably
locked some of them into relationships with lawyers which re-
sulted in unsatisfactory service. The main obstacle to real choice
among lawyers is probably the "lay referral system," which
stands in lieu of a rational referral system. A second obstacle
may be economic, because the potential client has learned the
cost of his problem could range up to several hundred dollars.
He has learned that his neighbors and fellow workers do not
trust lawyers. Therefore, it was not surprising to find that
many clients considered bringing problems to lawyers but de-
cided not to.
Generally, the data supported the four hypotheses proposed
in the Introduction. First, real property owners were in fact
exposed to more legal experience. Real estate matters were the
most frequent. They were also the cheapest to solve, and were
probably the least threatening. Some of the other problems
were actually real estate problems in disguise; for example,
divorce proceedings were sometimes initiated to clear up the
legal status of real estate. Real property problems were asso-
ciated with more favorable attitudes toward lawyers. Those
with real estate problems showed the least distrust, perhaps
because they paid the lowest fees, or because they often had
higher incomes. Even the most favored groups among these
clients were victims of the anarchic system of access. They too
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felt that lawyers were hard to find and that lawyers would fre-
quently reject them as clients. They too had to find out about
lawyers in a random and casual manner.
Second, the sample group tended to go to lawyers about
the most known and settled legal matters. This is an aspect of
the legal conservatism of this group. People with low incomes
which cannot readily be risked, and with little education and
experience in dealing with professionals, are not likely to define
as legally solvable more kinds of problems than they have been
forced to confront. This group took problems to lawyers as a
last resort and seldom ventured to utilize the law preventively.
It is true that the members of Local 229 did perceive them-
selves as having certain rights, which might in principle be
secured by vigorous and enterprising litigation, but this outlook
was relatively infrequent, and where present did not typically
result in approaching a lawyer.
Third, in the Introduction it was offered that in a group
that is differentiated by education and by age, one would
normally expect the best educated, youngest respondents to
overcome most easily the psychological or cultural obstacles to
seeing a lawyer. This did not occur: experience accumulated
with age and with certain property-related events in the indi-
dividuals' lives. The young and best educated were by far the
most "open-minded" and least distrustful of lawyers, at least
until they had legal experience. After that they tended to re-
semble the rest of the group. Experience tended to nullify any
positive attitudes toward lawyers.
Fourth, it was proposed that a substantial portion of the
sample group would have a low level of "legal awareness,"
defined as the ability to distinguish matters capable of formal
authoritative resolution from matters which cannot be so re-
solved; in other words, awareness of situations in which a law-
yer could, in principle, be useful in his normal professional
capacity. Generally, these respondents were neither baffled nor
ignorant; in fact, they were willing to grant that hypothetically
a lawyer might be useful in some unconventional "legal" situa-
tions presented to them by the interviewers. They frequently
regarded a lawyer as unhelpful in situations that sometimes do
result in litigation. One-fifth of the group, for example, felt a
lawyer would be of no help if a person were arrested for drunk
driving. This may reflect fatalism, cynicism, a feeling that those
arrested must be guilty, or real experiences with local justice.
It surely does not reflect an awareness of the full potential of
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lawyers, given that one has overcome the threshold problems
in finding one and paying his fee. The fee problem may be the
key here, for traffic matters cost an average of $173 in legal
fees, and criminal charges an average of $239. Who is to blame
a person of modest means for not using legal services aggres-
sively, when aggressiveness means going to a lawyer? At best,
a lawyer may be a lesser evil, and the widespread distrust of
lawyers in this group may have a very rational basis in the
experiences of some of its members.
One of the more depressing findings of this study is that
legal awareness did not improve with legal experience. We
have no evidence that having been to a lawyer made the group
more aware of what lawyers might be able to accomplish, or
inspired them to use the law in a preventive way. Experience
did increase the proportion who knew a lawyer they could go
to, but this represents only the most rudimentary form of
awareness. Obviously, going to a lawyer makes it more likely
that the access problem will lessen; it does not make one's use
of the law less conservative. All one has gained is a knowledge
of a name, and a modicum of recognition from the lawyer; one
has not gained the resources or the will to utilize the lawyer
rationally. "Rational" use, for the client, means risking once
again a catastrophic fee or reentering a situation of dependence
through paternalism or charity. Rational use might even mean
changing lawyers, once again opening up the client to the am-
biguities of the lay referral system. It is not surprising that
legal experience does not affect the legal conservatism of Local
229.
We have spoken of "legal awareness." This should be dis-
tinguished from "legal sophistication." Legal awareness has
been regarded as the ability to distinguish between those mat-
ters in which a lawyer could in principle be of help, and those
in which he could not. This definition makes no distinction
between those who utilize legal services in a traditional way
and those who desire to break new legal ground. It might be
well to propose that a new term, "legal sophistication," come
into currency. Legal sophistication includes not only the ele-
ments of "legal competence," which has been defined as one
part awareness and one part assertiveness, but also the further
dimension of "law reform." We may regard a person as legally
competent or legally aware if he knows what the law is in prin-
ciple capable of doing, and if he is willing to assert his rights
before the law. Only if he is willing to extend the frontiers
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of his rights through litigation can he be regarded as "legally
sophisticated." In order to move from legal awareness and
competence to sophistication, he would utilize legal services in
such areas as "new property," discrimination law, housing and
landlord-tenant law, and welfare entitlement. He would, in
other words, break out of the conservative legal use patterns
that afflict most clients, and the poor especially.
Only in one area, did we find the glimmer of a trend toward
legal sophistication. Those with experience felt that a lawyer
would be useful in the event of racial discrimination in finding
a job, more so than those without experience. This may indicate
that legal conservatism does not have as strong a grip on the
sample group as it otherwise appears. Recognition of one's
rights is a necessary step in legal awareness and sophistication,
and in this area the findings of the present study were not uni-
versally negative.
The findings of this study would be pessimistic were it not
that Local 229 has recently begun a program of prepaid legal
services which promises to change many of the most objection-
able features of the status quo. But to the extent that the ex-
periences of Local 229 apply also to other low income, poorly
educated groups, the findings remain discouraging. By any
measure of legal sophistication, the members of Local 229 were
fundamentally unsophisticated, holding the narrow and rigid
view of the legal process that their distance from lawyers en-
couraged. It is difficult to speculate on the potential for raising
the level of legal sophistication-we do not know what it would
take, in terms of new systems of legal access, to crack the shell
of legal conservatism. It is obvious that, at the least, remedial
measures are needed to remove the threshold psychological and
financial barriers which keep large numbers of the near-poor
from the initial lawyer contact. As well, consideration might
be given to discovering the problems underlying the deep feel-




H ello, I'm ....................................... . , an interview er for the Am eri-
can Bar Foundation. We are conducting a study of the legal insurance
*** The interview schedule is here presented exactly as it was used by the
American Bar Foundation research team and their interviewers. Spac-
ing for interviewee response has been compressed to save space. - Ed.
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plan which you, as a member of Local 229, are about to participate in.
In order for us to study the plan, it is necessary that we ask you the
following questions before the plan goes into effect. Your answers to
the questions will be kept by the Foundation in the utmost confidence.
Even the people who administer the plan will not be able to identify
your answers to personal questions with your name. No answer that you
give here will affect your coverage or the amount of insurance you will
receive.
Note to Interviewer:
Check here after you read this introductory statement to the
respondent ......................
Questionnaire
N am e : .............................................. ---------.... In terv iew C o d e N o ..----------------
A ddress: ----.------- .............------------------------- Interview er: --------------- ----------------
Tim e Begin: --------------------.---------- . .............. - - - -- - - D ate: -----------------........
1. Have you ever taken a problem to a private lawyer or a free legal
service, such as legal aid, the public defender, or the city, state, or
federal prosecutor?
Yes ................ Ask Q. 2 No ................ Skip Q. 2 and Q. 3 and go on to Q. 4.
[If "no," probe: "You mean you've never had the services of a
lawyer?"]
2. How many problems have you taken to:
a) a private lawyer? --------------- [actual number] b) legal aid? --.-----------
c) public defender? - - d) prosecutor? - -
[Do not use this answer as the maximum number of problems you
should ask the respondent about, because his memory may be jogged
as he proceeds through the questionnaire. The answer given here is
to give you the minimum number of problems you should probe for.]
[For those who answered that they had taken problems to a lawyer or
free legal service (that is, those who answered "yes" to Q. 1), we are inter-
ested in obtaining detailed information about each problem, starting
with the most recent and working backwards.]
Statement to Respondent: You told me that you've been to a lawyer
with problem(s). I'm going to ask you some questions about
each problem, starting with the last problem that you took to a lawyer.
3(A). (1) What was the last problem that you took to a lawyer?
[Give a brief description of the nature of the problem, pref-
erably in the respondent's own words.]
Standard probe:
i) Was this because of a disagreement or a problem with
another person?
Yes -------.-.. For non-criminal cases only, ask (2); other-
wise go on to (3)
No -------- Skip (2) and go on to (3)
(2) Did you or the other person go to a lawyer first?
Respondent ------------------ --- O ther Person ------------------------
(3) When was the first time you went to a lawyer with that
p r o b le m ? -------------------------------- --  .. ..........................
Standard probes:
i) H ow lon g ago w as th at? ------------------------------------------------------------
ii) Was it within the last 12 months? Yes ------------ No ----------
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(4) Did you go to only one lawyer for that problem?
Yes --------- Go on to (5) No ---------- Ask (A):
A. How many lawyers did you go to? - - - - - - - - --- - - - - -----......
(5) What finally happened to this problem?
Standard probes:
i) Do you still have this problem?
Yes -------- Go on to (6) No ------------ Ask Probe (ii)
ii) How was your problem solved?
(6) [Go through (6) through (15) for each lawyer the respond-
ent went to with this problem. Designate them L-1, L-2, etc.]
For this problem we want to know what things the lawyer
did for you. Please answer "yes" or "no" for each of the
following questions:
(a) Did he take the case?
Yes Go on to (b)
No -------- Ask: "Did he do anything?"
Yes ------- "What?"
No ------ ----[Skip to (j) and ask (j) and (k)]
(b) Did he talk to you about your problem and give you
advice about its solution?
Yes -------- No - ----------- Don't Know ...........
(c) Did he write any letters?
[This means all letters, whether to the respondent or
any third party.]
Yes -..--------- No ------------ Don't Know
(d) Did he prepare any legal papers, other than a letter,
such as a contract, a will, or lease?
Y es ------------ N o -- ------- D on't K now ------------
(e) In order to settle the matter or to move things along,
did he meet with the other person or the other person's
lawyer or talk with them on the phone?
Y es ----------- N o ------------ D on't K now ----------
(f) Did he go to court for you?
Y es ------------ N o ------------ D on't K now ------------
(g) Did he appear before some other government official
who had the power to decide this case?
Y es ............ N o ------------- D on't K now ----------
(h) Did he spend any time looking at the laws that deal
with your problem?
Y es ............. N o ----------- D on't K now -----------
(i) Beyond talking to you, did he investigate any facts
himself?
Y es ----------- N o ------------ D on't K now ------------
(j) Did he refer you to someone else?
[We want to know all other people-not just other
lawyers]
Yes ------------ Ask (j-1) No ............- Go on to (k)
Don't Know --------- Go on to (k)
(j -l ) W h o ? a ) ----------------------------------------------------..-------.............
b ) ... . ......... ...... ...... -.. .. .. .. .. .... . ..
[If a proper name is given ask (j-2) for
each:)
(j-2) W h o is th is p erson ? a) .................................................
b ) ------------ - -- ------------.-. -..  ...
(k) Did he tell you he couldn't help you because your prob-
lem wasn't a legal one?
Y es ........... N o ------------ D on't K now ------------
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(7) Did he do anything else?
Yes -------- Ask (a) No -------- Go on to (8)
Don't Know -------- Go on to (8)
(a) W hat did he do? ---------....-------------------------- ...................- - - - - - -
(8) How much did he charge you? --------------- [exact amount]
[Note: We want to know what the bill was - not how much
he paid.]
[If the case is still pending, ask (A):]
A. Do you know how much he will charge? ----------------------------
[If the fee given is a percentage of the recovery, record the
percentage, but also probe for a dollar amount for how much
the lawyer got and how much the respondent got.]
[If the fee is given as a percentage of the recovery, skip (9)
and (10) and go on to (11).]
(9) Did you feel you were able to afford this?
Y es ..........- N o ------------
(10) How did you pay the bill?
A. Did you pay it from:
............ a) regular paycheck? ............ b) savings?
------------ c) borrowed money?
------------ d ) oth er (sp ecify ) ----- ..............-.. .........................- .......
B. Did you pay the lawyer:
------------ a) in one lump sum? ------- b) by installments?
(11) W hat w as this law yer's nam e? ----------------------------- --------------
Don't Remember ------------
(12) Had you ever been to him before?
Y es ------------ N o ------------
(13) We are interested in how you happened to go to this lawyer.
How did you find out about him?
[Note: We want to know how he found out about this
lawyer the first time he went to him, so don't accept an
answer like "I went to him before." Probe to see how he
found out about him the first time.]
[Write down the respondent's exact words if possible. If he
should give you a proper name, ask: "Who is this person?"
When you have determined the relationship of his con-
tact(s), check the appropriate box(es).
If he mentions more than one contact, ask: "Which one was
most important in choosing the lawyer?" and circle the
appropriate box.]
------- a) knew the lawyer
------------ b) co worker
------------ c) union; Who? : What position?
----------- d) em ployer
------------ e) social worker
------------ f) friend or relative (other than co-worker)
------------ g) phone book
------------ h) lawyer reference plan of the Shreveport Bar
Association
-......... i) another lawyer [If you check this, ask (i-1) and
(i-2).]
----------- j) o the r (sp e c ify ) -- --------- ---------- ..... -----------------------------
[If the respondent has given more than one contact, and you
have not already determined the most important contact, ask:
"Which one was most important in choosing this lawyer?"
and circle the appropriate box above.]
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[If you have checked (i), "another lawyer," ask (i-1) and
(i-2). If (i) was not checked, go on to (14).]
(i-1) What was his name? - - - - - - - ----------.......... .
Don't Remember -........
(i-2) How did you find out about this lawyer?
[Remember: We want to know how he found out about
this lawyer the first time.
Write down the respondent's exact words if possible.
If he should give you a proper name, ask: "Who is this
person?" When you have determined the relationship
of his contact(s), check the appropriate box(es).
If he mentions more than one contact, ask: "Which
one was most important in choosing this lawyer?" and
circle the appropriate box.]
------- a) knew the lawyer
------------ b) co worker
------------ c) union; Who? - - ; What position?
-------.---- d) employer
------------ e) social worker
------------ f) friend or relative (other than co-worker)
------------ g) phone book
----------- h) lawyer reference plan of the Shreveport Bar
Association
------------ i) another lawyer
-j) o th e r (sp e c ify ) ----- --------------------------------------------------------........
[If the respondent has given more than one contact, and you
have not already determined the most important contact, ask:
"Which one was most important in choosing this lawyer?"
and circle the appropriate box above.]
(14) For this problem if you had to make the choice over again,
would you go to the same lawyer?
Yes ------------ Skip (15) and go on to (16) No ----------- Ask (15)
(15) Would you take this problem to a different lawyer?
Yes ------------ A sk (a) No ----------- A sk (b)
(a) Why would you take it to a different lawyer?
(b) Why not?
(16) Are there any other problems that you've taken to a lawyer
or a free legal service?
Yes ------------ Go on to 3(B)
No ------------ Probe to be sure you've exhausted their legal
problems: "You took no other problems to a lawyer?" If
their answer is still "no," go on to Q. 5.
3(B). (1) Think back to the problem you took to a lawyer or free
legal service just before the problem we've just discussed.
How long ago was that? ------------------------------- ... -- ---- -- ..........
Probe: Was it within the last 12 months?
Y es . No ---.......
(2) What was your problem at that time?
[Give a brief description of the nature of the problem, pref-
erably in the respondent's own words.]
Standard probe: i) Was this because of a disagreement or a
problem with another person?
Yes ----------- For non-criminal cases only, ask (3); otherwise go
on to (4) No ----------- Skip (3) and go on to (4)
(3) Did you or the other person go to a lawyer first?
Respondent ---------------------------.. . Other Person ..........................
(4) Did you go to only one lawyer for that problem?
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Yes ------------ Go on to (5)
No ------------ Ask(A): A. How many lawyers did you go to? .........
(5) What finally happened to this problem?
Standard probes: i) Do you still have this problem?
Yes ------------- Go on to (6) No -------- Ask Probe (ii)
ii) How was your problem solved?
(6) For this problem we want to know what things the lawyer
did for you. Please answer "yes" or "no" for each of the
following questions:
(a) Did he take the case?
Yes ----------- Go on to (b)
No ----..------ Ask: "Did he do anything?"
Yes ------------ "What?"
No ........... [Skip to (j) and ask (j) and (k)]
(b) Did he talk to you about your problem and give you
advice about its solution?
Y es -.--------- N o ------------ D on't K now ------------
(c) Did he write any letters?
[This means all letters, whether to the respondent or any
third party.]
Yes ------------ No- - - - -- Don't Know ............
(d) Did he prepare any legal papers, ocher than a letter,
such as a contract, a will, or a lease?
Yes ............ No ------------ Don't Know ------------
(e) In order to try to settle the matter or to move things
along, did he meet with the other person or the other
person's lawyer or talk with them on the phone?
Y es -.......... N o -.......... D on't Know ...........
(f) Did he go to court for you?
Yes ------------ No -------- Don't Know ------------
(g) Did he appear before some other government official
who had the power to decide this case?
Yes_ ------ - -- No -------- Don't Know ............
(h) Did he spend any time looking at the laws that deal
with your problem?
Yes- --.-- No ----------- Don't Know ------
(i) Beyond talking to you, did he investigate any facts
himself?
Yes ------------ No---------. Don't Know ------------
(j) Did he refer you to someone else?
[We want to know all other people- not just other
lawyers]
Yes - ----------- Ask (j-l) No ------------ Go on to (k)
Don't Know ----------- Go on to (k)
(j-l) Who? a) --
[If a proper name is given ask (j -2) for
each:]
j-2) W ho is this person? a) ................................................
b ) ................................................
(k) Did he tell you he couldn't help you because your
problem wasn't a legal one?
Yes ----------- No ....... -.. Don't Know ............
(7) Did he do anything else?
Yes ------------ Ask (a) No ----------- Go on to (8)
Don't Know ------------ Go on to (8)
(a) W hat did he do? --------------------------------------------------------------------
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(8) How much did he charge you? ---------------- [exact amount.]
[Note: we want to know what the bill was - not how much
he paid.]
[If the case is still pending, ask(A):]
A. "Do you know how much he will charge?" -- -
[If the fee given is a percentage of the recovery, record the
percentage, but also probe for a dollar amount for how
much the lawyer got and how much the respondent got.]
[If the fee is given as a percentage of the recovery, skip (9)
and (10) and go on to (11).]
(9) Did you feel you were able to afford this?
Y es ------------ N o ---------
(10) How did you pay the bill?
A. Did you pay it from:
------------ a) regular paycheck?
------------ b) savings?
----------- c) borrowed money?
........... d) other (specify)
B. Did you pay the lawyer:
------------ a) in one lump sum? ........... b) by installments?
(11) What was this lawyer's name? --
Don't Remember ----
(12) Had you ever been to him before?
Y es -.......... N o .. ........
(13) We are interested in how you happened to go to this lawyer.
How did you find out about him?
[Note: We want to know how he found out about this
lawyer the first time he went to him, so don't accept an
answer like "I went to him before." Probe to see how he
found out about him the first time.]
[Write down the respondent's exact words if possible. If he
should give you a proper name, ask: "Who is this person?"
When you have determined the relationship of his con-
tact(s), check the appropriate box(es).
If he mentions more than one contact, ask: "Which one was
most important in choosing this lawyer?" and circle the
appropriate box.]
[If you have already gone through the contacts for this
lawyer on another problem, do not go through them again.
Skip to (14).]
------------ a) knew the lawyer
------..---- b) co worker
....... c) union; W ho? ; W hat position? - -----------
----..------ d) em ployer
......... e) social worker
------------ f) friend or relative (other than co-worker)
------------ g) phone book
------------ h) lawyer reference plan of the Shreveport Bar
Association
------------ i) another lawyer [If you check this, ask (i-1) and
(i-2).]
------------ j) other (specify)
[If the respondent has given more than one contact, and you
have not already determined the most important contact,
ask: "Which one was most important in choosing this law-
yer?" and circle the appropriate box above.]
[If you have checked (i), "another lawyer," ask (i-1) and (i-2).
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If (i) was not checked, go on to (14).]
(i-1) W hat was his nam e? ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- --------------------------
Don't Remember ------------
(i-2) How did you find out about this lawyer?
[Remember: We want to know how he found out
about this lawyer the first time.
Write down the respondent's exact words, if possible.
If he should give you a proper name, ask: "Who is
this person?" When you have determined the rela-
tionship of his contact(s), check the appropriate
box(es).
If he mentions more than one contact, ask: "Which
one was most important in choosing this lawyer?" and
circle the appropriate box.]
.... a) knew the lawyer
----- ---.b) co-worker
----.-------c) union; Who? - ; What position? ------------
..........-d) employer
.. . e) social worker
------------ f) friend or relative (other than co-worker)
------------ g) phone book
------------ h) lawyer reference plan of the Shreveport Bar
Association
---..-.--- i) another lawyer
--------.-.- j) o th e r (sp e c ify ) ------------- . -- ----------------...... ......... ......... . .
[If the respondent has given more than one contact, and you
have not already determined the most important contact, ask:
"Which one was most important in choosing this lawyer?"
and circle the appropriate box above.]
(14) For this problem, if you had to make the choice over again,
would you go to the same lawyer?
Yes ----------- Skip (15) and go on to (16) No ------------ Ask (15)
(15) Would you take this problem to a different lawyer?
Yes ------ Ask (a) No Ask (b)
(a) Why would you take it to a different lawyer?
(b) Why not?
(16) Are there any other problems that you've taken to a lawyer
or a free legal service?
Yes ----------- Continue with the supplemental sets provided for
question 3. Label the extra sets used (C), (D), etc. until you
have exhausted the respondent's legal experiences. Also
write the interview number on each supplemental set.
Attach the extra sets to the back of the questionnaire after
they have been properly labeled and indicate the letter
of the last problem reported here: ----------------------------------------------
No ----------- Probe to be sure you've exhausted their legal
problems: "You took no other problems to a lawyer?" If
their answer is still "no," go on to Q. 5.
[Note: Q. 4 is to be asked only of those who did not report tak-
ing any problems to a lawyer - that is, those who answered "no"
to Q.1.]
4(A). Do you know a lawyer you could go to if you needed one?
Yes ------------ Skip 4(B), and go on to Q .5
No -------- Ask 4(B)
4(B). How would you find a lawyer you could go to if you needed one?
5. Have you ever had a problem you thought at the time a lawyer
might be able to help with, but you didn't go to a lawyer?
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Yes ------------ Go on to Q.6(A)
No ............ Probe: "Haven't you ever thought of using a lawyer's
services, but didn't?"
[If the respondent's answer is still "no," skip Q. 6 and go on to
Q.7.]
6(A). (1) When was the last time you had a problem you thought at
the time a lawyer might help you with, but you didn't go to
a law yer? ---------.-.----- ...............-------------- - - - --------------------.. .... .
Standard probes: i) How long ago was that? -
ii) Was it within the last 12 months?
Y es ------------ N o -..........
(2) What was your problem at that time?
[Give a brief description of the nature of the problem, pref-
erably in the respondent's own words.]
Standard probes:
i) Was this because of a disagreement or a problem with
another person?
Yes ---...-.-- For non-criminal cases only, ask (ii); other-
wise go on to (3)
No ----------- Go on to (3)
ii) Did the other person have a lawyer?
Y es ------------ N o -------- D on't K now ------------
(3) Why didn't you take this problem to a lawyer?
(4) Do you still have this problem?
Y es -.......... N o ...........
(5) Are there any other problems you thought at the time a
lawyer might help you with, but you didn't go to a lawyer?
Yes ------ -Go on to 6(B)
No ------------ Skip 6(B) and go on to Q. 7.
6(B). (1) Think back to the next most recent problem that you
thought at the time a lawyer might help you with, but you
didn't take it to a lawyer.
Standard probes:
i) H ow long ago w as that? ----------------------------- ------...................
ii) Was it within the last 12 months?
Yes ------------ Continue with 6(B)
No -.......... Skip the rest of the 6(B), and go on to Q. 7.
[We are interested in the details only of those additional
problems that fell within the last 12 months. We want the
details of the most recent problem regardless of when it
occurred, but additional problems should be recorded only
if they happened within the last year.]
(2) What was your problem at that time?
[Give a brief description of the nature of the problem, pref-
erably in the respondent's own words.]
Standard probes:
i) Was this because of a disagreement or a problem with
another person?
Yes ----------- For non-criminal cases only, ask (ii); other-
wise go on to (3)
No ----------- Go on to (3)
ii) Did the other person have a lawyer?
Y es ---.-.-.---. N o ............ D on't K now ------------
(3) Why didn't you take this problem to a lawyer?
(4) Do you still have this problem?
Y es ------------ N o --------
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(5) Are there any other problems you thought at the time a
lawyer might help you with, but you didn't go to a lawyer?
Yes -------- Continue with the supplemental sets provided for
question 6. Label the extra sets used (C), (D), etc. until you
have exhausted the respondent's memory. Also write the
interview number on each supplemental set. Attach the
extra sheets to the back of the questionnaire after they
have been properly labeled and indicate the letter of the
last problem reported here: ---------------------------------------------- -- -- -
No ------------ Go on to Q. 7
7. I'm going to read some statements about lawyers. For each
statement, please tell me whether you agree or disagree.
[Note: If the respondent's answer is anything other than a
clear "agree" or "disagree," check the "No Answer" category and
record the respondent's statement. Don't press him to make up
his mind.]
a) Most of the time, lawyers charge too much.
Agree -........ Disagree ------------ No Answer ..........
b) Lawyers usually can't be trusted.
A gree ----------- Disagree ------------ No A nsw er ----------
c) It's hard to understand lawyers.
A gree ------------ D isagree ------------ N o A nsw er ------------
[In (d), use the word "black" only for black respondents.]
d) Most lawyers wouldn't want a (black) laborer as a client.
Agree -........... Disagree ------------- No Answer ------------
e) It's hard to find a lawyer when you need one.
A gree ----------- D isagree ............ N o A nsw er ------------
f) A lawyer wouldn't be able to understand you.
Agree ------------ Disagree ------------ No Answer ------------
8. How much do you think it would cost just to talk over a prob-
lem with a lawyer for half an hour?
[Record the respondent's first response to this question, word
for word if possible.]
[Where his answer does not fit into one of these ranges, hand
him the card with the ranges on it, and ask him to decide which
one range is closest to his original estimate. Read the categories
to him as he looks at the card, and record his final answer
below.]
N othing ......... $11-$15 ----------- $26-$30 ------------ Over $50 -------
$1 - $5 ........... $16-$20 -.---------- $31-$40 .-----------
$6 -$10 ------- $21-$25 ------------ $41-$50 ------------
9. How much do you think it should cost just to talk over a prob-
with a lawyer for half an hour?
[Record the respondent's first response to this question, word
for word if possible.]
[Where his answer does not fit into one of these ranges, ask
him to look at the card with the ranges on it again and decide
which one range is closest to his original estimate. Read the
categories to him as he looks at he card, and record his final
answer below.]
N othing ---------- $11-$15 --------- $26-$30 ------------- O ver $50 --------
$1 - $5 ------------ $16 $20 ----------- $31-$40 ------------
$6 -$10 ...........-$21-$25 ............ $41-$50 ............
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10. I'm going to read some situations people are faced with. We
would like to know when you think lawyers can be helpful.
We'd also like to know when you think other people can be
helpful. Please understand that since different people have
different views, there are no correct answers.
(1) A person is going to buy a house.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ------ -Ask B No ----------- Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ----------- Ask C
Only a Lawyer- ........... Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful -someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else ----------- Lawyer ------------
(2) A person is unhappy with his marriage, and he wants to
talk it over with someone else to see whether or not he
should give his marriage another try.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ------------ Ask B No ........... Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ........... Ask C
Only a Lawyer ------------ Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful-someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else --------- Lawyer ------------
(3) A person has some belongings that he wants to leave to
his family and friends when he dies.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ------------ Ask B No ...........-Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ----- Ask C
Only a Lawyer ...........- Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful-someone else or a
lawyer?
Som eone Else ------------ Lawyer ------------
(4) A person has been threatened with eviction because he has
been complaining to the landlord about dangerous electrical
wiring.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ------------ Ask B No ------------ Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ........... Ask C
Only a Lawyer ------------ Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful-someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else ------------ Lawyer ------------
(5) A person has loaned his car to a friend, and the friend now
refuses to return it.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes .......... Ask B No ------------ Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ------------ Ask C
Only a Lawyer ------------ Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful-someone else or a
lawyer?
Som eone Else ........... Lawyer ------------
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(6) The unemployment office has turned down an application
for unemployment compensation which a person has a
right to receive.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes -........... Ask B No --- ------- Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ......... Ask C
Only a Lawyer .---------- Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful-someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else ............. Lawyer -----------
(7) A person has lost his wallet.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ----------.. Ask B No........ Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too. ---------- Ask C
Only a Lawyer ----------- Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful- someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else ------------ Lawyer ------------
(8) A divorced woman who has kept the children for a year has
now been told by her ex-husband that he wants the
children.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ----------.... Ask B No............ Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too...----- Ask C
Only a Lawyer .......... Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful- someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else ------------ Lawyer ---------
(9) A person's child has been suspended from school because
of his haircut.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ------------ Ask B No. ... Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ......... Ask C
Only a Lawyer ------------ Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful-someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else ------------ Lawyer ---------
(10) A person's new car breaks down two days after he buys it,
and the dealer refuses to fix it.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ............ Ask B No ---. Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ............ Ask C
Only a Lawyer ------------ Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful-someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else-.-..- Lawyer ------------
(11) Because of his race, a person has not gotten a job he
applied for.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ............ Ask B No ............ Go on to the next situation
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B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ------------ Ask C
Only a Lawyer ------------ Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful- someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else -------..... Lawyer ------------
(12) A person has borrowed money and is asked by the lender
to pay more than he owes, beyond the original amount and
interest.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ----------- Ask B No ---..... Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ----------- Ask C
Only a Lawyer ------- Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful-someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else ----------- Lawyer .-----------
(13) The person who borrowed the money in the last situation
is now being sued for the amount claimed by the lender,
even though he doesn't owe that much.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ..--------- Ask B No ...... -... Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ----------- Ask C
Only a Lawyer ............ Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful-someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else . ...... Lawyer ............
(14) A person has been arrested for driving while drunk.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ------------ Ask B No ----------- Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too ............ Ask C
Only a Lawyer ------------ Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful-someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else .. ......... Lawyer ..........
(15) A person lives on a street where heavy, fast traffic is a
danger to his children.
A. Can a lawyer be of any help?
Yes ------------ Ask B No ------------ Go on to the next situation
B. Can someone else help, too, or only a lawyer?
Someone Else Too -.......... Ask C
Only a Lawyer .---------- Go on to the next situation
C. Who would be the most helpful -someone else or a
lawyer?
Someone Else ----------- Lawyer ...........
11. I'm going to read a list of problems and I'd like you to tell me
whether or not you've ever had these problems.
[Don't fill in the last two columns - whether or not the problem
was within the last 12 months and whether or not the respondent
went to a lawyer about that problem - until you have gone
through the 14 problems to determine whether or not the
respondent has had any of these problems. Then go back for all






Had In Last Used A
Problem? 12 Mo.? Lawyer?
Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) Have you ever had an automobile
accident?
[If yes, ask (A):]
A. Were you covered by insurance
at the time?
Y es ........... ; N o ------------
(2) Have you ever had a serious prob-
with your landlord?
(3) Has your employer ever withheld
part of your wages for debts you
hadn't paid to others?
(4) While working on your job, have you
ever had an injury that needed a
doctor's care?
(5) Has anything that you have bought
on a time purchase installment plan
ever been repossessed?
[If yes, ask (A):]
A. Rightfully or wrongfully?
Rightfully ............
W rongfully ..........
(6) Have you made a will?
(7) Have you ever bought anything new
that was in bad condition or wouldn't
work when you got it home, and the
seller refused to repair or replace it?
(8) Have you ever bought anything on
time purchase where the amount that
you were told you owed was greater
than the amount you thought you
owed?
(9) Have you ever bought a house or
land?
(10) Have you ever inherited any money
or property?
(11) Have you or anyone in your immedi-
ate family ever been arrested?
[If yes, briefly describe the most
serious situation.]
(12) Because of your race, have you ever
had trouble in getting a job or find-
ing a place to live?
(13) Have you ever had a hard time col-
lecting money that was owed to you?
(14) Have you ever been denied money or
other benefits by a government
agency when you felt you were en-
titled to them?
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[Wherever the respondent said "yes" above, go back and ask these two
questions: 1) "Was that within the last 12 months?"; and 2) "Did a
lawyer help you with that problem?" Then check the appropriate boxes
for each question. If you find any problems a lawyer helped him with
you haven't already covered in Q.3, use additional supplemental sets
for each newly discovered problem, and indicate the number of supple-
mental sets you used here: -------------------- Cross out the "3( )" on the sup-
plemental sets and label them ll(A), 11(B), etc. Also write the inter-
view number on each supplmental set.]
[Note: Please fill in the respondent's race and sex by observ-
ation.]
12. Sex: Male ------------ Female ------------
13. Race: W hite ------------ Black --- ---------
[If the respondent is a female, substitute the word or words in
parentheses in the following questions.]
Statement to Respondent: I'm now going to ask you some ques-
tions about your personal history.
14. How old are you? ---------.--.......
15. What was the last grade in school you completed? .......................
16. Are you married?
Yes ------------ Ask Q. 17
No ------------ Skip Q. 17 and go on to Q. 18
17. A. How old is your wife (husband)?
B. Are you living with your wife (husband)? ------------------------
Yes ............ Skip (C) and (D) and go to to (E)
No ------------ Ask (C) and (D)
C. Are you legally separated?
Y es ------------ N o - --........
D. Do you give her (Does he give you) any money?
Y es ..-- ----- N o -----------
E. Have you ever been married before?
Yes ------------ Go on to (F)
No ---------- Skip (F) and Q. 18 and go on to Q. 19
F. (i) How many times were you married before this present
marriage?
(ii) How did each of your prior marriages end?
[Record as divorced, separated, widowed, etc. We don't
want any long stories.]
1. -.-. ---------.. ---.. . ... . .... 4- ------------
2 . .-- - - - - -- - -- - - ------ - - - ------.-... .. . .. 5 -. ...................... ..........
3 - - - - - --. ----------------------------------- 6 . .........................................
(iii) Do you pay (receive) alimony or child support?
[Ask this question for each marriage. If "yes" for any
marriage, ask: "Did a court order you (him) to?" and
check the appropriate space below.]
Alimony or Support By Court Order
Yes No Yes No
1 -.-- .... ..-... ......-- 
2 - ..------ . .-- ..--------.. . .
5 ------------ --. .
6 - ..-- .-- .. . .
[Skip Q. 18 and go on to Q. 19.1
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18. Have you ever been married?
Yes ------ - Continue with this question
No --.- -- Skip the rest of this question and go on to Q. 19
(i) How many times were you married? ----------------------------------------
(ii) How did each marriage end?
[Record as divorced, separated, widowed, etc. We don't
want any long stories.]
1. 4. ___  -------------------------
2. ~~5 ---------------------- -----
3 -------------------- ---- 6. -
(iii) Do you pay (receive) alimony or child support?
[Ask his question for each marriage. If "yes" for any mar-
riage, ask: "Did a court order you (him) to?" and check the
appropriate spaces below.]
Alimony or Support By Court Order
Yes No Yes No
1. - - -----
4.
19. Do you have any children?
Yes ------- Continue with the rest of this question
No ------- Skip the rest of this question and go on to Q. 20
i) How many children do you have? --
(ii) How old are they?
1- . .------- 3 - ........--------- 5 . ................ 7 ................ 9 -...  . ...
2 ................ 4 . ................ 6 -....- - ----... 8 . ..--------- 1 0 .................
[If any of the children fall between the ages of 19 through
23, ask for each of those children: "Are they now attending
high school or college?" If "yes," put a "Y" by that child's
age above. If "no," put a "! " by that child's age.]
20. How many people other than your wife (husband) and children
live in your household and depend on you (or your husband)
for their support? ---------------------------- .  ..............................-------------------
21. H ow m uch did you earn in 1969? ..................................................
22. Does your wife (husband) work?
Yes ----------- Ask (A) No -----------. Ask (A)
A. How much did she (he) earn in 1969? --
23. Did you have income from any other source in 1969, such as
farming, disability benefits, or unemployment compensation?
Yes -----.-.---..Ask (A) No ------------ Go on to Q. 24
A . H o w m u ch in 19 69 ? -------------------------------------------------------  
24. Do you own your own home or do you rent?
[Even if they are still paying on it, consider it "own."]
O w n ------------ R en t ............ O th er -------------- -- -- -------------- ------ (sp ecify )
25. Do you own any motor vehicles, such as cars, motorcycles,
tractors, trucks, etc.?
Yes ........... Describe each-for instance, make and model of cars-
below. No------
26. Do you have a savings account?
Yes ------------ No .........
TIM E END : ------------------- --------------------- ..
NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: Do you have any comments? If so, write
them in the space below.
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INTRODUCTION
T HE processing of criminal cases involves the complex in-
teraction of many offices and persons. These include police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, witnesses, grand juries,
clerks, and correctional personnel, just to list a few. In turn,
all of these actors operate within a system that has constraints
placed on it by such forces as legislation, precedent, and system-
developed rules and procedures. Obviously, to obtain a com-
plete understanding of how the criminal justice system operates,
what causes delays, and why outcomes differ within and be-
tween jurisdictions, the entire system must be examined and
the effect of all the factors at each stage of the process de-
termined. Such a study would necessarily be time-consuming
and costly. The approach of this study is to begin by examining
in detail a certain part of the system. It analyzes the role of
defense counsel in the processing of felony defendants and de-
termines generalized findings about the performance of various
types of counsel in that role. Further analyses of the other
system functions must be completed and the interactions de-
trmined to obtain a full system analysis. It should be noted
that the thrust of the analyses is on the felony trial court
level, however the authors do treat the preliminary processing
at the Municipal Court. This was made possible because of a
Pilot Project instituted in San Diego Municipal Court in 1971
by the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics. Thus, the analy-
ses of defense counsel in the Municipal Court and the combined
Municipal and Superior Court, are probably unique.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Right to Counsel
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court decided the case
of Powell v. Alabama1 which held, inter alia, that the states
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were required to provide counsel to indigent defendants in all
capital cases. Through a series of decisions which includes
Gideon v. Wainright,2 Douglas v. California,3 Escobedo v. Illi-
nois,4 Miranda v. Arizona,5 and most recently, Argersinger v.
Hamlin,6 the scope of the right to counsel has been extended
and more clearly defined. These decisions and the associated
questions regarding counsel have been the subjects of exten-
sive scholarly discussion 7 and therefore will be not reexamined.
The major interest here is the system used for representa-
tion of the indigent in felony cases and the comparison of this
representation with that provided by retained counsel. Before
the Gideon decision, it was not uncommon for the defendant
to represent himself. Today, however, he is usually represented
by a public defender or a court-appointed counsel either from
the bar or from a volunteer organization.8 Probably the most
widely used system is that of assigned-counsel where the
judge appoints counsel for the indigent defendant. This may
be done on a random or a rotating basis from the bar as a
whole. A young lawyer seeking experience may be appointed,
or the appointment may be from a small group of lawyers who
make their livelihood from the fees paid for representing indi-
gents. In some jurisdictions this is combined with a voluntary
public defender system that is privately controlled and financed.'
Basically, there is no uniformity of systems for the repre-
sentation of indigents among states. Even within a state, sys-
tems vary from county to county, and from city to city. 10 In
1 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
4 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
5 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972).
7 See, e.g., Craig, The Right to Adequate Representation in the Criminal
Process, 22 Sw. L.J. 260 (1968); Katz, Gideon's Trumpet: Mournful
and Muffled, 55 IOWA L. REv. 523 (1970); Siegal, Gideon and Beyond:
Achieving an Adequate Defense for the Indigent, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 73 (1968); Note, Judicial Safeguards of the Rights of Indigent
Defendants, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 982 (1966); Note, The Right to
Effective Counsel in Criminal Cases, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1920 (1965).
8 3 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN
STATE CoURTS (1965); O'Brien, Implementing Justice: The National
Defender Project, 1 VALP. U.L. REV. 320 (1967); Advantage and Dis-
advantages of Different Methods of Defense, 26 BRIEFCASE 105 (1968)
(panel discussion); The Public Defender and Other Suggested Systems
for the Defense of Indigents, 53 JUDICATURE 242 (1970) (Remarks of L.
Anderson, V. Warner, and D. Foster).
9 An example of a privately controlled and financed voluntary public
defender system is the San Diego professional corporation known as
Defenders, Inc., which is described in section I.D. infra.
10 NATIONAL DEFENDER PROJECT, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE NA-
TIONAL DEFENDER CONFERENCE (May 1969); NATIONAL DEFENDER PROJECT,
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENDER CONFERENCE (May 1969).
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rural areas, court-appointed counsel is generally used unless
there is a state public defender system. Even in urban areas
the public defender may be supplemented by appointed counsel.
All systems for representation of the indigent have been
subjected to much criticism when compared to the defense
available to persons who are financially able to retain counsel.
It is frequently stated that retained counsel essentially manipu-
late the system in order to minimize the effect of the system
on their clients, whereas court-appointed counsel provide in-
ferior defense for the indigent because of such things as inex-
perience, high case loads, and inadequate investigative services.
These criticisms are usually based either on the personal ex-
periences of those who have acted as defense counsel" or on
observations of the system in operation.12  Since inferences
about performance of counsel can be supported by the selective
use of cases, samples, observations, and opinions of participants
in the system, potential error arises from observation of the
system with a predilection for or against defense counsel, either
in their appointed or retained role.
A better approach is to examine statistically the result of
the representation of criminal defendants, both the indigent
and those capable of retaining private attorneys. In those studies
where data have been collected on case dispositions, it is gen-
erally concluded that defendants represented by public defender
or appointed counsel more often receive adverse dispositions
than those represented by retained counsel. The following state-
ment, an editorial note to a Cook County study of continuances,
is typical:
[Indications of injustice appear when one examines the data
on representation of indigents. The non-guilty disposition rate
for defendants with retained counsel is more than twice as
large as the rates for defendants with public defenders. Plea
reductions occur less often among public defender cases than
among retained cases. Finally, while clients of the public de-
fender are accused of somewhat more serious offenses, the sen-
tences imposed on public defender clients seem more harsh than
the differences in crime type would warrant. Unfortunately
data on sentencing by crime was not tabulated, so no definitive
judgment can be made about the level of justice obtained by the
various types of lawyers. But the possibilities of unfairness are,
to say the least, disturbing.'
3
11 Seegal, Some Procedural and Strategic Inequities in Defending the In-
digent, 51 A.B.A.J. 1165 (1965).
12 Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a
Public Defender Office, 12 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 255 (1965).
13 Banfield & Anderson, Continuances in the Cook County Criminal Courts,
35 U. Cm. L. REv. 256-57 (1968).
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The differential dispositions for counsel are reported in studies
in Maine,1 4 Oregon,1 5 and Massachusetts. 16
On the other hand, the type of disposition does not differ
for appointed and retained counsel according to recent studies
in Ohio17 and the District of Columbia.' 8 In the D.C. study,
cases of defendants charged with robbery and assault were ex-
amined separately by type of counsel. In summary, it is stated:
The original hypotheses concerning defense counsel were these:
1. The criminal bar members generally perform better
than other attorneys, and
2. there is a significant difference between the effective-
ness of counsel when appointed and retained.
At this point, both of these hypotheses have been rejected by
the data. In many instances, rates of success for the groups of
attorneys have been extremely similar; at other times one or an-
other group was superior, but no clear pattern emerges. Accord-
ingly, the evidence presented here suggests that, generally
speaking, an accused in the District of Columbia courts receives
equal representation whether he retains his own attorney or has
one assigned . ... 19
There are two studies, one done in 193520 and the other as
recent as 1970,21 that reach conclusions similar to that of the
D.C. study. Both deal with California and the public defender
system. In both of these studies the conviction rate is high
regardless of counsel, although the public defender does have
a higher rate than retained. The interesting result is that
when the sentence is examined as a function of the offense
22
or offense and prior record,23 both studies conclude that the
public defender is almost as effective as retained counsel and
14 INSTITUTE OF JUDICAL ADMINISTRATION, SUPREME JUDICAL COURT AND THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF MAINE (Jan. 1971; app., Feb. ;1971).
'5 S. Zamsky, Effects of Ball and Other Pre-Trial Procedures on Outcome,
Plea and Speedy Trial (University of Oregon School of Law).
16 S. BING & S. ROSENFELD, A REPORT BY THE LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR
CIVL RIGHTS UNDER LAW TO THE GOVERNOR'S COMMIVrEE ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE QUALITY OF JUS-
TICE IN THE LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS OF METROPOLITAN BOSTON (1970).
17 L. KATZ, L. LITEWIN, & R. BAIVIBERGER, A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL IN-
STITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE LEAA,
JUSTICE IS THE CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES (Sept. 1971).
18 J. Feinman, Effective Counsel and Criminal Justice: A Statistical Study
of Defense Counsel in the Criminal Courts of the District of Columbia,
Feb. 1, 1971 (unpublished paper submitted to the School of Govern-
ment and Public Administration, The American University).
19 Id. at 41-42.
20 R. BEATTIE, The Public Defender and Private Defense Attorneys (Studies
in the Administration of Criminal Justice, No. 1, Bureau of Public Ad-
ministration, University of California, Berkeley, July 1, 1935).
21 G. SMITH, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC DEFENDER AcTnvTmS (Ohio
State University Research Foundation, June 1970).
22 R. BEATrIE, supra note 20.
23 G. SMITH, supra note 21.
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Thus, although there is evidence which suggests that the
dispositions differ with the type of counsel, there is other evi-
dence which suggests that the dispositions are similar. The
present study was undertaken to examine further this question
using a number of defendant-related and system-related vari-
"the differences which the data reveal in no way justify beliefs
about the public defender being ineffective counsel.
'24
ables. Comparisons are made between the varying types of
counsel representing the indigent and counsel retained by those
who can afford to pay.
B. Study Objective
Specifically, the objective of this study is to examine the
processing of felony defendants by appointed and retained
counsel in order to:
(1) develop a quantitative description and com-
parison of defense counsel in the processing
of criminal cases, and a quantitative measure
of the interaction of defense counsel with the
felony defendant and the criminal justice
system;
(2) measure time between steps in the process-
ing of cases and determine how these vary
with type of counsel; and
(3) develop models of felony processing that take
account of the type of defense counsel and
other revelant factors and which may be use-
ful components of a study of the total crimi-
nal justice system.
C. Description of Methodology and Analyses
Three major areas in the processing of felony defendants
are examined in the study: (1) type of disposition of the de-
fendant, (2) the sentence of a convicted defendant, and (3) time
for processing. The approach systematically investigates the
relationship of type of defense counsel in each of these areas
and takes into account a set of defendant-related and system-
related factors. These are shown in Table 1. As can be seen,
most of the variables are qualitative in nature.
Recently developed statistical techniques 25 permit analyses
24 Id. at 81.
25 Goodman, The Analysis of Multidimensional Contingency Tables: Step-
wise Procedure and direct Estimation Methods for Building Models for
Multiple Classifications, 13 TECHNOMETRICS 33, 61 (1971); Goodman, The
Multivariate Analysis of Qualitative Data: Interactions Among Multiple
Classifications, 65 J. OF AMER. STAT. ASS'N. 226, 256 (1970).
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of the interaction between these qualitative variables and an
assessment of the statistical significance of the interactions. (In
this study the .95 and .99 confidence levels are used unless other-
wise specified.26) The techniques also permit the testing of
various hypotheses.
As an illustration, consider the analyses undertaken to
investigate the relationship between the two variables-type
TABLE 1 Factors or Characteristics Examined
Major Areas of Type of Defendant- System-
Examination Counsel Related Related
Variables Variables
Type of Appointed Offense Motions
Disposition and Prior Record Continuances
Retained Bail Status Type of







Sentence Appointed Offense Level of
and Prior Record Conviction
Retained Bail Status Type of
used in Proceeding
all Manner of Guilty
analyses Disposition
Time Appointed Offense Continuances





of disposition and type of counsel. To determine if there is a
statistically significant difference between types of counsel, two
methods are employed. The first technique provides an estima-
tion of the interaction between variables; the other provides
for the testing of the null hypothesis, i.e., that the two variables
are independent. If there is a large enough disproportion of
defendants represented by one type of counsel for a particular
disposition, the corresponding measure of the interaction will
be statistically significant. Also the hypothesis that defense
counsel and type of disposition are independent of each other
will be rejected. The significant interactions lead to the follow-
ing observations based on the data: there is a significant rela-
tionship between high dismissal rates and retained counsel;
and there is a significant relationship between high conviction
26 Confidence level refers to the probability that the results obtained were
not due to chance. In this case, there is only a 5 percent probability at
the .95 level, or a 1 percent probability at the .99 level that the findings
are due to factors other than those postulated.
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rates and appointed counsel. (Note that the use of the term
"relationship" does not necessarily denote cause and effect, just
as cause and effect is not established when there are significant
correlations between quantitative variables.)
The next step is to examine an additional characteristic of
the defendant or of the criminal justice system (as set out in
Table 1) as a possible explanation for the interaction between
defense counsel and type of disposition. For example, consider
the offense charged. This variable is classified according to
crimes against person, property, and public health and safety.
Three techniques are used to interpret the relationships between
the variables. First, the interaction between the three variables
are calculated and the statistical significance is assessed as be-
fore. For example, the relationship between counsel and type
of disposition, (which is significant when viewed in a two-way
table) becomes statistically insignificant when this relationship
is examined using the third variable - offense. Second, a vari-
ety of hypotheses are tested concerning possible relationships
between the variables.27 This technique contributes to under-
standing the relationship between the variables when hypoth-
eses concerning independence are supported by the data. Third,
a model is selected describing the relationship between the
three variables. Procedures are employed which choose from
a variety of hypothetical models a "best" fit model, i.e., one
in which the observed data are not significantly different from
that expected from the model. These techniques include sys-
tematically eliminating interactions that are not significant at
some given level.28 Thus, the model chosen best fits the data
in the sense that only the most significant relationships are in-
cluded, and those that are within statistical-fluctuation limits
are excluded. In the example where defense counsel, the type
of disposition, and offense are examined, all of the relationships
involving both defense counsel and type of disposition are
eliminated by these procedures. The best fit model is: disposi-
tion is independent of the type of counsel, given the offense
charged.
In this manner many other variables are examined in order
to better understand the relation between counsel and type of
disposition. These same procedures are used in examining the
defense counsel relationship with sentences and with time.
If the analysis does not lead to an explanation of the ob-
27 There are actually 18 possible hypotheses for 3 variables; this increases
to 166 for 4 variables.
28 These procedures are analogous to selecting systematically a best regres-
sion equation for quantitative variables.
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served interactions using three variables, four variables are
considered and the same statistical techniques are applied.
Higher-order tables describing the defendants by even more
variables can be analyzed. However, the theory on which the
methods are based requires a large sample size since the sig-
nificance of trends in the data is being assessed continually.
Generally, the data consisting of one to two thousand defend-
ants supported an analysis of the interaction between three to
four variables.
There are admitted limitations in the use of statistical
techniques in that results must still be explained and interpreted
upon the basis of a knowledge of the actual processing peculi-
arities of a jurisdiction and any other facts that can be deter-
mined. Also, some important effects or factors may simply be
omitted from systematic analysis. Possible omissions in the
present study are the variation of skills or experience within
categories of counsel, the characteristics of the prosecutor, and
the circumstances of the crime. However, regardless of poten-
tial limitations, the completed analysis reveals and confirms
some very significant relationships between type of defense
counsel and type of disposition, sentence, and time for proc-
essing.
D. Description of San Diego Felony Defense System
San Diego, California has a population of over 697,000 as
indicated in the 1970 census and ranks as the nation's fourteenth
largest city. Approximately 3,900 felony complaints were ter-
minated in the lower courts of San Diego County during 1970,
and about 3,700 felony defendants were terminated in the upper
courts of the county during that same year.29 In the City of
San Diego, felony defendants receive the usual pretrial process-
ing in the San Diego Municipal Court and then proceed to the
Superior Court of the County of San Diego for the trial level
proceedings.
Persons accused of a felony who are finincially unable to
retain counsel are represented in the felony proceedings at the
expense of the court by appointed counsel. Attorneys are gen-
erally appointed from the bar. There is no public defender in
the usual sense in San Diego. However, there is a private, non-
profit corporation, Defenders, Inc., which, since it handles only
criminal matters, is like a public defender's office. In some
respects though, it is similar to a large law firm specializing in
29 1970 Crime and Delinquency in California - Reference Tables - Felony
Defendants Disposed of in California Courts, Bureau of Criminal Statis-
tics, 1970.
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criminal practice since it is independent of the state or local
authorities. About two-thirds of the defendants terminated in
the superior court have appointed legal counsel from either De-
fenders, Inc., or practicing attorneys. In the municipal court
it is estimated that about 57 percent of the terminated defend-
ants are indigent and have appointed counsel.
The appointment of counsel to represent a defendant
charged with a felony is made at the felony arraignment court
in the municipal court after a determination of indigency. The
same appointed counsel representing the indigent defendant in
the lower court proceedings will generally represent him in the
superior court. The judges of the superior court routinely re-
view the appointments at the time of arraignment in superior
court and usually re-appoint the lower court counsel. However,
if the judges feel that a more experienced defense attorney is
indicated, they are free to appoint a new attorney.
Counsel appointed by the court are paid on an appearance
basis. The fee for arraignments or for motions is about $25;
for probation proceedings, it is about $35. The fee for a full
day or more than a half day in a trial or a preliminary hearing
is $100; for a half day or less, it is $75. Some of these figures
may be larger for capital cases. Out-of-court time is generally
not reimbursed.
To illustrate the disparity in fees paid to attorneys acting
under court appointment as contrasted with operating on a
retained basis, the following typical example is given. An at-
torney could charge a client $500-$600 for a routine case on a
retained basis. While acting under court appointment the fee
would be about $75. For a murder case the retained attorney
could charge over $3,000, while the court-appointed counsel
would receive only $700. On the other hand, the attorneys
generally specializing in court appointments are more recent
law school graduates who have not yet built up reputations.
Some attorneys feel that court appointments offer very valu-
able experience. The attorneys with established reputations
only infrequently take appointments, and then usually at the
specific request of a judge who may feel that a particular case
requires a more experienced counsel.
The attorneys working with Defenders, Inc., are generally
recent law school graduates who spend a few years with De-
fenders, Inc., and then join a local law firm. In 1970, Defenders,
Inc., represented approximately 1,400 defendants in San Diego
County, excluding juvenile cases and drunk cases. The full staff
consists of about 20 attorneys with approximately 11 working
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in the City of San Diego (non-juvenile) and the remainder
servicing the rest of the county. These attorneys offer a slightly
different aspect in court appointments. They function very
much like a law firm in that the fees are assigned directly to
the corporation which in turn pays the attorneys a fixed salary
roughly equivalent to the pay of a deputy district attorney.
Since these attorneys are salaried, their behavior in handling
felony defendants is to some extent free from the financial
pressure of reimbursement on the basis of court appearance.
E. Data Sources
The findings of the study of defense counsel in the process-
ing of felony cases in San Diego are based on the following
data sources: 
30
(a) San Diego Municipal Court - all defendants
against whom felony charges were filed and who
were terminated in the municipal court in the
period January 1, 1971 through July 31, 1971.
(b) San Diego Superior Court3l - the defendants in
every third felony case filed in the superior court
during the calendar year 1970 who were termi-
nated in the superior court prior to April 30, 1971.
(c) Combined Municipal Court and Superior Court
for the City of San Diego- all felony defendants
against whom charges were both filed and termi-
nated in either the municipal or superior courts
in the period January 1, 1971, through June 30,
1971.
In addition to these data, the study group also observed the
practices and procedures in the jurisdiction and interviewed
judges, defense counsel, and prosecutors. Without these addi-
tional inputs, interpretation of the data would have been less
meaningful and certain analyses would have been overlooked.
Although a report could be based on these alone, they are in-
cluded in this study only when they provide insight about the
results. Even though it is acknowledged that the data is never
quite as complete as would be desired, the data bases for this
study offer a unique opportunity for an in-depth examination
of the role of the counsel for the defense.
30 Basic individual case data on Municipal and Superior Court cases were
obtained through the cooperation of the California Bureau of Criminal
Statistics. This was supplemented with additional information on de-
fense counsel, motions, countermeasures, bail status and other items
from case jackets with the assistance and cooperation of members of
the Clerk's Office of those Courts.
31Only defendants in the jurisdiction of the City of San Diego are
included.
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Ii. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
A. Defense Counsel in San Diego Municipal Court
The San Diego Municipal Court is responsible for prelim-
inary processing of felony defendants. The felony may be re-
solved as a misdemeanor 32 or the case dismissed and thus ter-
minated at the lower court level. This section examines de-
fendants terminated in the municipal court as a function of
defense counsel.
In the felony arraignment court of the municipal court, the
accused is arraigned and enters a plea, generally on the day
after his arrest or within 72 hours. At arraignment, bail is set,
and if indigency is determined, an attorney from the practicing
bar or an attorney from Defenders, Inc., is appointed to repre-
sent the defendant at the expense of the court. If the defendant
pleads guilty to the felony charge, he is certified to the superior
court for sentencing. If the defendant pleads not guilty, a pre-
liminary hearing date is set which usually is within 10 court
days of arraignment. Prior to the preliminary hearing a de-
fendant may change his plea. A pre-preliminary hearing (simi-
lar to the readiness or pretrial conference in the superior court),
is held to detemine the "negotiability" of such a case under
terms mutually acceptable to the defendant and to the prose-
cution. After the preliminary hearing the case may be dis-
missed. If probable cause has been determined, the defendant
is bound over for arraignment in the superior court. The ar-
raignment in superior court generally occurs 2 to 3 weeks after
the preliminary hearing.







Plea Not Guilty 37
(Bound Over)
Total 100
32 CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (5) (West 1970) provides for the reduction of
a felony charge to a misdemeanor charge in certain circumstances:
(b) When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the
court, by imprisonment in the state prison or by fine or im-
prisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all pur-
poses under the following circumstances:
(5) When, at or before the preliminary examination and
with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the defendant,
the magistrate determines that the offense is a misdeameanor,
in which event the case shall proceed as if the defendant had
been arraigned on a misdeameanor complaint.
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Since this section deals only with lower court dispositions,
(dismissals, transfers, misdemeanor convictions) it is of interest
to determine the percentage that these represent of the munici-
pal court activity relative to defendants charged with felonies.
The activity is indicated in Table 2. This is based on data taken
from court records covering the first half of 1971 and also from
supplementary data obtained from the California Bureau of
Criminal Statistics. These figures indicate that approximately
half of the defendants charged with a felony terminate in the
lower court with the remaining proceeding to the superior
court on either a certification or an information. Thus, it is
acknowledged that an examination of the defendants ter-
minated in the lower court does not afford a complete picture
of the felony processing in the lower court.
1. Defense Counsel and Dispositions
Table 3 shows the disposition of defendants as a function
of defense counsel representation. Three levels are shown for
the disposition--dismissal as a result of a transfer to juvenile
court, other dismissals, and conviction on a plea of guilty to a
misdemeanor.
TABLE 3 San Diego Municipal Court Counsel Versus Disposition
TYPE OF COUNSEL
Pro- Per-
No Counsel Def. Inc. Court Appl. Retained pria sona Total
Disposition No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Dismissed a 5 26.3 7 5.9 8 1.6 34 7.0 0 0.0 54 4.8
(%) (9.2) (13.0) (14.8) (63.0) (0.0) (100.0)
Dismissedb 8 42.1 48 40.7 162 32.1 160 33.2 0 0.0 378 33.6
(%) (2.1) (12.7) (42.9) (42.3) (0.0) (100.0)
Convicted 6 31.6 63 53.4 334 66.3 288 59.8 2 100.0 693 61.6
(%) (0.9) ( 9.1) (48.2) (41.5) (0.3) (100.0)
Total 19 100.0 118 100.0 504 100.0 482 100.0 2 100.0 1125 100.0
(%) (1.7) (10.5) (44.8) (42.8) (0.2) (100.0)
aDismissed: Most frequent reason is transferal to juvenile court.
bDismissed: Most frequent reason is interest of justice and motion of
D.A., including lack of evidence, no jurisdiction.
The results indicate that disposition and counsel are related.
The strongest associations are between guilty pleas (high) for
appointed counsel, and transfer dismissals (low) for appointed
counsel. For retained counsel the frequency of juvenile trans-
fers is significantly high, while the proportion of dismissals is
significantly low. Also, the number of convictions for Defend-
ers, Inc., is significantly low.
It is of interest to attempt to explain this interaction be-
tween types of dispositions in municipal court and defense
counsel in terms of some of the other variables or factors avail-
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able. It is possible that the relationship between disposition
and defense counsel can be "explained" by a mutual association
with the offense. When the distribution of defendants by of-
fense and counsel is in turn examined according to disposition,
the data support the hypothesis that the nature of the offense
is independent of both the defense counsel and the disposition
in the San Diego Municipal Court. Therefore the offense does
not explain the association between disposition and counsel.
None of the characteristics of the defendant available to
the study explain the differences in conviction rate in a satis-
factory manner. Distinctions between counsel remain when the
defendant's prior record, his parole or probation status, his race
or age, and his defendant status (i.e., individual defendant or
co-defendant) are taken into account. It might be mentioned
that the race of the defendant was not significantly associated
with the type of disposition, but that his age provided some
explanation because of the juvenile transfers.
2. Defense Counsel and Time
There is an association between disposition time and defense
counsel. The two types of appointed counsel have about the
same disposition times, while their median time is about 1.2
weeks shorter than retained counsel. Table 4 shows the rela-
tionship.
TABLE 4 Disposition Time for Defenders, Inc., Court Appointed
Counsel, and Retained Counsel -Defendants Shown
Cumulatively
0-2 Weeks 2-4 Weeks 4-6 Weeks 6-8 Weeks 8-10 Weeks
Defenders, Inc. 42 84 103 113 115
(37%) (73%) (90%) (97%) (100%)
Court Appointed
Counsel 179 359 445 470 486
(37%) (74%) (92%) (97%) (100%)
Retained Counsel 92 228 345 418 444
(21%) (51%) (78%) (94%) (100%)
Although the lag of retained counsel is related to some
extent to the difference in counsels' disposition rates, similar
differences in disposition times appear when dismissals or con-
victions are considered separately. These differences remain
when the offense charged, the defendant's race, and his defend-
ant status are considered. There is no information readily avail-
able on formal proceedings involved in the lower court termina-
tions. The defendants are terminated by dismissal or guilty
plea at any time from the arraignment through the preliminary
hearing. Without more detailed information about when the
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actual guilty pleas or dismissals were elicited, the role of
counsel on this level cannot be explored further.
B. Defense Counsel in San Diego Superior Court
The Superior Court of San Diego County is the trial court
for the processing of felonies. Sixty-six percent of superior
court felony defendants are defendants who have been bound
over from the municipal court after a preliminary hearing. Ten
percent of the defendants are those who are held to an-
swer for the felony as a result of a grand jury indictment.
The final 24 percent are those who have already pleaded guilty
to a felony charge in the municipal court and have been certi-
fied to the upper court for sentencing. A trial date is set for
approximately 50 days after the arraignment in superior court.
(California has a maximum statutory time limit of 60 days to
trial unless waived by the defendant.) Two weeks prior to the
trial date, a pretrial or readiness conference is held where the
results of any plea bargaining in the interim are formalized.
At these conferences, the defendant may change his plea to
guilty, or, more frequently, to either a lesser charge or to one
count among several listed in the charges. Most of the superior
court dispositions (73 percent) are guilty pleas. Only about
12 percent of the defendants go to trial.
The distribution of defense counsel in the superior court
is expectedly different from that for the municipal court. About
33 percent of the defendants had privately retained counsel,
nearly 56 percent were represented by court-appointed counsel,
and about 12 percent were represented by attorneys from De-
fenders, Inc. These figures are based on a 1970 sample of su-
perior court filings. An examination of the superior court dis-
positions for the first half of 1971 indicates that these figures
may vary somewhat from year to year. The approximately
one-third retained counsel figure is constant, but the ratio of
court-appointed counsel to counsel from Defenders, Inc., seems
to vary depending on the available manpower of the latter.
The role that defense counsel plays in the processing of
felony defendants in the superior court will be examined from
several points of view. The first question to be addressed is
whether there is or is not a relationship between the disposition
of the charges against the defendants and type of defense
counsel. Next, the sentencing and probation terms for the de-
fendants who have been convicted are examined to determine
if the type of defense counsel makes a difference. Finally, the
time to the disposition is examined by defense counsel with
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both the court-appointed counsel and Defenders, Inc., to make
the sample size sufficiently large to examine four variables.




Defense Guilty Guilty Total
Counsel No. % No. % No. %
Appointed Counsel 108 60.0 494 68.5 602 66.8
(%) (17.9) (82.1) (100.0)
Retained Counsel 72 40.0 222 31.5 299 33.2
(%) (24.1) (75.9) (100.0)
Total 180 100.0 721 100.0 901 100.0
(%) (20.0) (80.0) (100.0)
A statistical analysis of Table 5 shows an association be-
tween disposition and type of defense counsel. For example,
the chances that a defendant represented by retained counsel
will have a not guilty disposition are significantly higher than
the chances that a defendant represented by appointed counsel
will have a not guilty disposition.
This relationship between the disposition and defense coun-
sel may be due to the types of defendants that he represents
or to the types of offenses which his clients are charged with
committing.
Table 6 is a three-variable contingency table giving the
type of defense counsel, the guilty/not guilty disposition, and
the type of offense charged against the defendant. The rela-
tionships between these three variables may be presented in a
variety of ways. The approach chosen shows the distribution
of defense counsel among the defendants found guilty and
among those found not guilty for each of the offense categories.
Three categories of offense are indicated: crimes against per-
sons (e.g., murder, robbery, and rape); crimes against property
(e.g., burglary, theft, and forgery); and crimes against health
and safety (principally the possession or sale of narcotics).
The multiple dimensional contingency table analysis as
applied to Table 6 yields the following results: In the superior
court the disposition of the charges and defense counsel are
independent, given the nature of the offense. The type of of-
fense is related to the type of defense counsel and the type of
offense is related to disposition. However, the relationship be-
tween the disposition and defense counsel in the presence of
the third variable, offense, is negligible in general.
The independence of disposition and counsel, given the
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particular regard to the use of continuances and motions for
the purpose of delay or for the purpose of affecting a particular
disposition.
1. Defense Counsel and Guilty/Not Guilty Disposition
The guilty/not guilty dispositions of charges against de-
fendants are shown in Table 5 as a function of court-appointed
and retained counsel. The appointed counsel category combines
nature of the offense charged, is demonstrated graphically in
Figure 1. Note first the top sub-graph of the figure showing
the difference in the distribution of the defense counsel for the
not guilty and the guilty dispositions. As indicated previously,
for the number of defendants involved (over 900), this differ-
ence is statistically significant. Shown beneath the proportion
for the defendants found guilty and not guilty are the distribu-
tions of counsel for the three offense categories. Note that the
proportions for health and safety offenses and for the crimes
against persons, which together account for about two-thirds
of the defendants in this analysis, are virtually identical when
the defendants found guilty are contrasted with the not guilty.
For the defendants accused of crimes against property there is
TABLE 6 Dispositions Versus Type of Counsel for Crimes




























No. % No. % No. %
Crimes Against Persons
7 7.8 2 5.0 6 33.3
(46.7) (13.3) (40.0)
4 4.4 4 10.0 1 5.6
(44.4) (44.4) (11.1)
79 87.8 34 85.0 11 61.1
(63.7) (27.4) (8.9)
90 100.0 40 100.0 18 100.0
(60.8) (27.0) (12.1)
Crimes Against Property
12 5.1 2 2.8 5 10.6
(63.2) (10.5) (26.3)
10 4.3 12 17.1 0 0.0
(45.5) (54.5) (0.0)
212 90.6 56 80.0 42 89.4
(68.3) (18.1) (13.5)
234 100.0 70 100.0 47 100.0
(66.7) (19.9) (13.4)
Crimes Against Public Health and Safety
54 19.8 59 26.0 19 29.2
(40.9) (44.7) (14.4)
16 5.9 5 2.2 2 3.1
(69.6) (21.7) (8.7)
203 74.4 163 71.8 44 67.7
(49.5) (39.8) (10.7)
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FIGURE 1 San Diego Superior Court-Distribution of Defense
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a deviation indicating (among other things) that a larger pro-
portion of the defendants found guilty had appointed counsel.
This trend may be significant in itself and certainly worthy
of further examination. However, this deviation is within the
limits of an overall model for the observed data which states
that given the offense, dispostion and defense counsel are in-
dependent.
Therefore the association between disposition and defense
counsel as previously discussed may actually be due to the com-
position of the charges against the defendants rather than to
the type of defense counsel. Offenses have different guilty/not
guilty disposition ratios and different distributions of counsel
for the defendants found guilty and for those found not guilty.
Since the two types of counsel represent individuals from gen-
erally different economic backgrounds, the types of offenses
which the defense counsel routinely handles will differ in com-
position. About 64 percent of the defendants with retained
counsel are accused of crimes against health and safety, whereas
about 43 percent of the defendants of the appointed counsel fall
into this crime category. On the other hand, over 15 percent of
the defendants with appointed counsel are accused of crimes
against persons, whereas the comparable figure for retained
counsel is less than 10 percent. Since the odds of being con-
victed of a health and safety offense are less than 57 percent
compared to over 75 percent for a crime against a person, the
retained counsel "looks better" in the two-way table of defense
counsel versus disposition (Table 5). Thus, the nature of the
offense offers an "explanation" for the association between dis-
position and defense counsel.
Having established that the relationship between defense
counsel and disposition may be attributed to the type of offense
charged against the defendant, it is natural to explore this re-
lationship further in light of some of the characteristics of the
defendants. The techniques employed in the analysis of con-
tingency tables extend in a straightforward manner to consider
the variables in a higher order table. Several characteristics of
the defendant were selected to analyze separately as the fourth
variable in a four-way contingency table that already included
the type of defense counsel, the guilty/not guilty disposition
of the felony charges, and the nature of the offense. These four
characteristics or qualitative variables are (1) the prior record
of the defendant, (2) his bail or jail status at the time of ar-
raignment in superior court, (3) his criminal status or commit-
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ment at the time the felony was committed (i.e., no commit-
ment, a parole commitment, or a probation commitment), and
(4) the defendant's race. Although there are other variables
available, the ones chosen illustrate the types of defendant-re-
lated variables that can be considered relative to the association
between disposition and defense counsel.
a. Prior Record
An examination of this variable reveals interactions which
confirm some fairly intuitive relationships involving the de-
fendant's prior record. The interaction between retained counsel
and defendants with a minor prior record is significantly high.
On the other hand, the interaction between appointed counsel
and defendants with a major prior record is high, and between
retained counsel and the same defendants it is low. For defend-
ants charged with property crimes, the interactions are signifi-
cantly high for a major prior record. There is also a relation-
ship, although not as strong, between prior record and disposi-
tion, specifically, high guilty dispositions for defendants with
major prior records.
Perhaps the most interesting interactions involving the
prior record of the defendant also involve the defense counsel
and the disposition variables. These are three-factor interac-
tions in the four-variable breakdown of defendants by counsel,
disposition, offense, and prior record. These interactions indi-
cate that for defendants with a major prior record who are
represented by retained counsel there were more not guilty
dispositions or less guilty ones than with appointed counsel.
These interactions are substantial and cannot be explained away
by chance sampling fluctuations. Taken together, this means
that defendants with major prior records usually are involved
with property-related crimes, are represented by appointed
counsel, and are likely to be found guilty. However, if they are
among the few who can afford retained counsel, they have a
far better chance of being found not guilty.
As a caution, it should be noted that the prior record of
the defendant certainly is not a good explanation of the dif-
ferent disposition record of counsel because, for the defendants
with a minor prior record, the disposition proportions of the
two types of counsel are identical.
b. Criminal Status
The criminal status variable is a measure of whether the
defendant at the time of the commission of the offense did or
did not have a commitment to the criminal justice system, such
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as being on parole or probation or even being a prisoner in an
institution (e.g., as would be the case if the offense is assaulting
a prison guard).
An examination of this defendant-related variable in the
four-way contingency table relating the criminal status to de-
fense counsel, disposition, and offense leads to some fairly
simple and interesting results. Defendants with no criminal
commitment at the time the offense was committed have a
strong positive interaction with retained counsel. The opposite
is true for defendants with a criminal commitment. It is in-
teresting to note that even though this criminal status is related
to defense counsel, it is not significantly related to either the
disposition or to the offense. The guilty/not guilty disposition
and defense counsel are independent of each other, given the
nature of the offense. Furthermore, given the type of defense
counsel, the criminal status is independent of the disposition
and the offense. Thus, whether a defendant was on probation,
parole, or in prison when the offense was committed has no
relation to the disposition or to the type of offense. It can only
be said that the defendant with a commitment will most likely
have appointed defense counsel.
c. Race
An examination of the race of the defendant in relation to
his defense counsel, the nature of the offense, and the disposi-
tion of the charges against him is quite revealing. The race
variable has three levels or categories: white, black, and other,
the latter containing mostly Mexican-Americans and Indian-
Americans.
This variable is of interest because it is a personal variable
or characteristic of the defendant available in the criminal
records that is not directly related to the criminal justice sys-
tem. Also, the socio-economic implications of this characteristic
offer an opportunity to examine the defendant in relation to
the system, apart from the defense counsel.
The strongest relationships or interactions involving the
defendant's race are those between race and defense counsel.
The most significant interactions are those indicating the dis-
proportion of the types of defense counsel among black de-
fendants. Although appointed counsel defend only about two-
thirds of all defendants, they defend almost 85 percent of the
black defendants. Also significant are the interactions between
white defendants and the type of counsel. Retained counsel are
significantly associated with white defendants. Eighty-one per-
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cent of the defendants of retained counsel are white, whereas
only about 71 percent of all the defendants are white.
The relationship of race to the offense charged is equally
interesting. Whites have a disproportionately high share of the
health and safety offenses and a disproportionately low share
of the crimes against persons. For blacks just the opposite is
true: there are significant interactions indicating a dispropor-
tionately high share of the crimes against persons and a dis-
proportionately low share of the drug offense category.
The relationship between the race of the defendant and the
guilty/not guilty disposition of the charges is of interest in
that it is essentially nil. The data indicate no significant asso-
ciation between the defendant's race and the disposition of the
charges against him when viewed in a contingency that takes
into account the four variables of counsel, disposition, offense,
and race.
d. Bail Status
The bail status of the defendant is, to some degree, an indi-
cator of his economic status and probably also of the offense
committed. A defendant in custody may be financially unable
to make even a moderate amount of bail or, if the offense is a
capital offense, bail may not be set. Three categories are used
for this bail variable: in custody, free on bail, or released on
personal recognizance.
Since the ability to make bond and the type of defense
counsel are economically related, it should be expected that
the interactions would show some strong relationship between
the bail status and the defense counsel. In fact, an extremely
strong relationship between defendants in custody and ap-
pointed counsel is indicated. The relationship is just the oppo-
site for the defendants on bond or released on their own re-
cognizance.
This bail status variable is also significantly related to the
offense categories. In particular, defendants in custody tend
to be charged with crimes against persons rather than health
and safety offenses. The opposite is true for defendants re-
leased on bail or personal recognizance.
The bail status is also related to the guilty/not guilty dis-
position variable. Although the associations are not as strong
as those previously discussed, there is an association between
being in custody and conviction and between being on bond
and lack of conviction.
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2. Defense Counsel and Detailed Disposition
The previous section examined the role of counsel for the
defense as it related to a guilty or not guilty disposition of the
charges against the defendant. It was seen that the marginally
significant relationships indicated that defendants with ap-
pointed counsel had a higher conviction rate than with retained
counsel, but that this difference effectively disappeared when
the offense was taken into account.
However, much information or detail is overlooked when
this simple guilty/not guilty approach is taken. There is no
indication as to whether the defendant did or did not go to
trial; there is no indication whether a defendant found not
guilty was dismissed or acquitted; and, there is no indication
that if the defendant was convicted, that he was convicted of
the felony as charged or of a lesser charge. It is frequently
stated that the effectiveness of defense counsel is indicated on
this level rather than at the guilty/not guilty level. Therefore,
this section addresses the defense counsel in relation to the
more detailed dispositions.
In the prior discussion, the distinction between the two
types of appointed counsel had to be ignored in order to be able
to examine the higher order interactions involving the defense
counsel, disposition, the offense committed, and the fourth de-
fendant-related variable. Several of the latter were examined.
This limitation was imposed because of the sample size in order
to maintain the validity of the statistical methods for four
variables. In this section the three types of counsel are ex-





Inc. Counsel Counsel Total
Disposition No. % No. % No. % No. %
Dismissed 20 20.4 56,, 11.1 55 18.4 131 14.5
(%) (15.3) (42.7) (42.0) (100.0)
Acquitted 3 3.1 29 5.8 17 5.7 49 5.4
(%) (6.1) (59.2) (34.7) (100.0)
Guilty/ 55 56.1 277 55.0 132 , 44.1 464 51.5
Felony
as Charged
(%) (11.9) (59.7) (28.4) (100.0)
Guilty/ 9,. 9.2 100 19.8 67 22.4 176 19.5
Lesser
Felony
(%) (5.1) (56.8) (38.1) (100.0)
Guilty/ 11 11.2 42 8.3 28 9.4 81 9.1
Misdemeanor
(%) (13.6) (51.8) (34.6) (100.0)
Total 98 100.0 504 100.0 299 100.0 901 100.0
(%) (10.9) (55.9) (33.2) (100.0)
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sel (from the bar), and privately retained counsel. Since the
examination now proceeds with a more detailed breakdown of
both defense counsel and the disposition of the charges, the sam-
ple size limits the number of qualitative variables under consid-
an-lined: attorneys from Defenders, Inc., court-appointed coun-
eration to three; i.e., one more in addition to the defense counsel
and the detailed type of disposition.
In Table 7 the superior court defendants are presented by
the type of defense counsel and by the type of disposition. Five
categories appear in the disposition variable. Defendants found
not guilty are shown as being either dismissed or acquitted.
For the guilty defendants, it is indicated whether they were
convicted of the felony as charged, of a lesser felony, or of a
misdemeanor.
A statistical analysis of Table 7 reveals the following:
" The type of defense counsel and the detailed dis-
position of the charges are not independent clas-
sifications; instead they are strongly related vari-
ables.
" The strongest interactions indicate a significantly
low number of dismissals for court-appointed
counsel. Also, the number of defendants found
guilty of a felony as charged is significantly low
for privately retained counsel. In addition, the
number of defendants found guilty of a lesser
felony than the one(s) charged who were de-
fended by Defenders, Inc., is also significantly
low. (These are indicated by an arrow in the
appropriate cell of the table.)
* Other large contributors to the association be-
tween the detailed disposition and defense counsel
are the dismissals for Defenders, Inc., and re-
tained counsel. They are higher than expected.
Separating the two types of appointed counsel has revealed
differences between them. As Table 7 shows, the types of not
guilty dispositions vary between counsel. Court-appointed coun-
sel has disproportionately fewer dismissals than his counterpart.
But on the other hand, he has disproportionately higher acquit-
tals. This might reflect a lack of sound early appraisal of the
case or a desire on the part of the inexperienced attorney to
obtain trial experience. His counterparts, the retained counsel
and Defenders, Inc., dispose of their not guilty defendants pre-
dominately by dismissals.
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It was indicated previously that retained counsel has a
disproportionately (and significantly) low number of defend-
ants convicted of the felony as charged. For defendants found
guilty of a lesser felony, he has a disproportionately high
percentage. This may be an indication of retained counsel
"working harder" or "getting a better deal" for his defendants.
This will be examined further.
The number of defendants with attorneys from Defenders,
Inc., is disproportionately high for defendants found guilty of
the felony as charged, whereas it is disproportionately low for
the defendant found guilty of a lesser felony. This result is
largely due to the number of defendants who have already
pleaded guilty to the felony (as charged) in the lower court
and are certified to the superior court for sentencing. Defend-
ers, Inc., represents a disproportionately large share of these
superior court defendants, and this affects the above results.
a. Counsel, Disposition, and a Defendant-Related Vari-
able
In the analyses involving the defense counsel, the type of
disposition, and a defendant-related variable, not a great deal
of light is shed on the strong relationship between disposition
and counsel just discussed. The characteristics of the defendant
related in a fairly obvious way to counsel or to the disposition,
but the analyses did not result in the "explanation" of the
counsel-disposition relationship.
To illustrate, there was an interaction between the prior
record of the defendant and the defense counsel. The propor-
tion of defendants with counsel from Defenders, Inc., with
major prior records is significantly high. The opposite is true
for retained counsel. Similar results follow from analyses in-
volving counsel, disposition, and bail status of the defendant
and involving counsel, disposition, and the criminal (commit-
ment) status of the defendant. These defendant-related varia-
bles, as with the prior record, relate in a fairly obvious manner
to counsel and to the disposition. However, they do not offer
any explanation for the counsel-disposition association.
One of the defendant-related variables, the race of the
defendant, simplifies the three-way breakdown by counsel, dis-
position, and race, but it does not explain the relationship of
counsel and disposition. The race and disposition of the defend-
ant are independent, given the type of defense counsel. This is
similar to the result describing the four-way breakdown of
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defendants involving defense counsel, not guilty/guilty disposi-
tion, offense, and race.
b. Counsel, Disposition, and Offense
As was true with the not guilty/guilty disposition, the con-
sideration of the offense category offers an "explanation" of
the defense counsel detailed disposition relationship. Although
there are deviations within the limits of statistical. fluctuation,
the model chosen as a good fit for the observed data states that
the defense counsel is independent of the type of disposition
of the charges against the defendant, given the nature of the
offense charged. This explanation could not be achieved by any
of the characteristics of the defendant.
c. Nontrial Dispositions
The previous analyses, for defense counsel, type of disposi-
tion, and a third variable, have been repeated for a slightly
different set of defendants, where all dispositions as a result
of trial are omitted. This leaves only dismissals and the three
levels of guilty pleas (guilty of a felony as charged, guilty of
a lesser felony, and guilty of a misdemeanor).
The results of these analyses involving only nontrial dis-
positions are essentially identical with results obtained from
analyses involving all the defendants. In particular, the data
support the hypothesis that, given the nature of the offense, the
defense counsel and nontrial dispositions are indpendent.
Also, given the type of defense counsel, the race of the de-
fendant is independent of the nontrial disposition.
3. Defense Counsel and Disposition-Pretrial Motions and
Continuances
The popularized notion of retained counsel making many
pretrial motions or delaying court proceedings is a familiar one.
The San Diego Superior Court data are examined to determine
the extent to which these phenomena occur. Three variables,
types of counsel, type of disposition, and the number of con-
tinuances are examined. The disposition is divided into the
following levels: dismissed, acquitted, and convicted. The con-
tinuances are divided into categories: no continuance, one con-
tinuance, and more than one continuance. A continuance means
a formal delay of either trial or readiness conference pro-
ceedings.
The analysis of these variables shows that continuances do
not offer any explanation for defense counsel/disposition rela-
tionships. In fact, a good fit for the observed data indicates
that the number of continuances is independent of the counsel
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and the disposition. All types of counsel have about the same
distribution of number of continuances. Thus it is seen that
the three types of counsel are similar in their use of continu-
ances, and that continuances are not related to either counsel
or disposition.
A similar result is obtained for the three variables: defense
counsel, disposition, and the use of a motion to suppress evi-
dence. The analysis shows that the hypothesis best describing
the three-variable breakdown of defendants states that the use
of the motion to suppress is independent of defense counsel and
disposition.
To an extent, an explanation is provided for the counsel-
disposition relationship by an analysis of defense counsel, dis-
position, and the use of a motion to quash or set aside an infor-
mation or indictment. Retained counsel uses this motion for
about 18 percent of his clients, whereas for either type of ap-
pointed counsel, the comparable figure is about 10 percent. The
best fit hypothesis states that the type of defense counsel is
independent of the disposition, given the use of a motion to
quash.
4. Defense Counsel and Sentencing
Another critical point at which the type of defense counsel
may have an impact is at sentencing. It seems to be commonly
believed that the defendants of retained counsel get a better
sentence through the efforts of their defense attorney. In Table
8, the defendants found guilty are classified according to coun-
sel and sentence (prison, probation, or jail). The arrow indicates
a significant interaction for that particular frequency.




Defense (state) Probation (county) Total
Counsel No. % No. % No. % No. %
Defenders, 16 12.3 25 , 7.9 41 12.9 82 10.8
Inc.
(%) (19.5) (30.5) (50.0) (100.0)
Court- 961' 73.8 1384, 43.8 200 63.1 434 57.0
Appointed
Counsel
(%) (22.1) (31.8) (46.1) (100.0)
Retained 18, 13.8 1521" 48.3 76 24.0 246 32.3
Counsel
(%) (7.3) (61.8) (30.9) (100.0)
Total 130 100.0 315 100.0 317 100.0 762 100.0
(%) (17.1) (41.3) (41.6) (100.0)
* The strongest interaction appears for defendants with
retained counsel who received probation sentences.
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Almost half of the defendants placed on probation are
represented by retained counsel whereas only about
a third of the defendants convicted are represented
by retained counsel. Opposite trends are seen for
both types of appointed counsel. Also significant are
the frequencies for prison sentences. Again, the ad-
vantage is in favor of retained counsel-he has sig-
nificantly fewer defendants who receive prison sen-
tences, whereas the court-appointed counsel has sig-
nificantly more.
The hypothesis that the sentence and the type of
counsel are independent is rejected at greater than
the 99.5 percent confidence level.
a. Defense Counsel, Sentence, and Criminal Justice
System Variables
Before examining the strong relationship between counsel
and sentence using defendant-related variables, characteristics
of the criminal justice system are considered. These are the
offense charged, the level of the conviction, and the manner of
the guilty disposition (i.e., an original plea of guilty to a felony
in the lower court, a change of plea in the upper court, or
guilty as the result of a trial). Simply stated, the nature of
the offense charged has little to do with the strong counsel/
sentence interaction. It was determined previously that offense
did offer an explanation of the disposition of the charges. How-
ever, once a defendant is convicted, the offense does not ex-
plain the differences between types of counsel and sentence.
The other system variable, i.e., the level and manner of the
disposition, also sheds no light on the strong counsel/sentence
interaction.
b. Defense Counsel, Sentence, and Defendant-Related
Variables
Interestingly enough, the usual defendant-related variables
also do not offer a good explanation of the counsel/sentence
relationship. Neither prior record nor the criminal commitment
of the defendant explain any of the associations. However, the
bail status of the defendant does shed some light on the inter-
actions, although the explanation is not at the usual levels of
significance. A different view of sentencing, which follows,
brings out these trends more sharply.
c. Defense Counsel and Sentence Weights
A more precise and uniform look at sentencing is possible
through the use of sentence weights. The California Bureau
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of Criminal Statistics has devised a numerical scale which
allows so many points or sentence weights for the various
types and combinations of sentences; e.g., 12 months in jail
has a sentence weight of 12, 3 years on probation has a sen-
tence weight of 6, a fine of up to $500 has a sentence weight
of 1. These weights are treated cumulatively for a combined
sentence. Thus, 3 years on probation and jail term of 12
months has a sentence weight of 18. There are also adjust-
ments to take into consideration the defendant's prior record.
Use of this quantitative scale provides a more uniform
treatment of the sentencing than does the qualitative scale
of prison, probation, or jail used in the preceding analysis.
Now, rather than considering the categories of the qualitative
scale as alternatives, the numerical sums of the sentence
weight scale reflect the degree of the sentence.
Table 9 shows the convicted defendants for whom sentence
weights were available cross-classified with defense counsel.
As before, the arrow indicates the frequencies which give rise
to significant (at least at the 5-percent level) interactions. It is
noted that the significant associations occur at the smallest





Sentence Inc. Counsel Counsel Total
Weights No. % No. % No. % No. %
0-6 23, 33.3 124,1 36.7 110" 60.8 257 43.7
M (8.9) (48.2) (42.8) (100.0)
7-12 22 31.9 89 26.3 41 22.7 152 25.9
(%) (14.5) (58.6) (27.0) (100.0)
13-18 9 13.0 54 16.0 16 8.8 79 13.4
M (11.4) (68.4) (20.3) (100.0)
19-24 5 7.2 24 7.1 5 2.7 34 5.8
(%) (14.7) (70.6) (14.7) (100.0)
25-30 4 5.8 13 3.8 3 1.7 20 3.4
(%) (20.0) (65.0) (15.0) (100.0)
31-36 1 1.4 9 2.7 3 1.7 13 2.2
(%) (7.7) (69.2) (23.1) (100.0)
Greater 5 7.2 25 7.4 3 1.7 33 5.6
Than
36
M (15.1) (75.8) (9.1) (100.0)
Total 69 100.0 338 100.0 181 100.0 588 100.0
(%) (11.7) (57.5) (30.8) (100.0)
sentence weight level. Note that retained counsel has about
61 percent of his convicted defendants in this category, whereas
the other two types of counsel had only about a third. The
sentence weight and the defense counsel are significantly
related.
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(1) Defense Counsel, Sentence Weight, and Crimi-
nal Justice System-Related Variables
Briefly, the criminal justice system variables- the offense,
the level of conviction, and the manner of disposition previ-
ously described - do not yield simple results explaining the
defense counsel interactions with sentence weight. They indi-
cate fairly obvious relationships but these do not offer any
simple interpretation.
(2) Defense Counsel, Sentence Weight, and De-
fendant-Related Variables
When the characteristics of the defendant are taken into
consideration, some simplification of the association between
defense counsel and the sentence occurs. Briefly, neither prior
record of the defendant nor his criminal status explain this
relationship. However, the bail/jail status does. Thus, the
hypothesis that defense counsel and sentences of convicted
defendants measured by sentence weight are independent, given
the bail status of the defendant, is the model that best fits the
data. This is illustrated by Figure 2. The results indicate that
the relationship between counsel and sentence weight dis-
appears when the bail status is taken into account.
5. Defense Counsel and Time to Disposition
The data indicate that the time to disposition is strongly
related to the type of defense counsel. The time to disposition
is the time from the filing of the charges in superior court to
the day on which the defendant was discharged (if found not
guilty) or was sentenced (if found guilty). This definition will
be modified somewhat in the following.
An analysis of the interactions shows a strong association
of defendant-clients of Defenders, Inc., counsel with termina-
tion in the first month. This trend is even indicated as being
significant in the second month. The strongest interaction
found, was a significantly low association of defendants-clients
of retained counsel with termination in the first month. A
plausible explanation for these trends is the proportion of
guilty pleas certified from the lower court. Defenders, Inc.,
represented a large share of these defendants whereas the
retained counsel did not.
a. Defense Counsel, Time to Disposition, and Criminal
Justice System-Related Variables
The relationship between defense counsel and disposition
time is examined as a function of the disposition (dismissed,
1972
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FIGURE 2 San Diego Superior Court-Defense Counsel versus
Sentence Weight versus Bail Status
1n Total Defendants: 100.0%
Defenders, Inc. Court Appointed Retained Counsel
Defendants in Custody: 38.5%
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Defenders, Inc. Court Appointed Retained Counsel
Defendants Released on Bond or Recognizance: 61.5%
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acquitted, or convicted) and also as a function of the level of
conviction for the defendants found guilty. Although neither
of these variables offers an explanation for the counsel/time
interactions, they do present some interesting hypotheses sup-
ported by the observed data.
The results for each variable are essentially the same. An
analysis of defense counsel, disposition time, and disposition
yields the following model: the type of defense counsel is
independent of the disposition, given the disposition time; i.e.,
for defendants in the system for the same length of time, the
type of counsel and the disposition are independent. Just as the
offense offered an explanation of the counsel/disposition rela-
tionship, so does the disposition time. This may be confusing,
but it should be realized that time may be viewed either as a
cause in bringing about a particular disposition or as an effect
of the manner of the disposition. It may be a cause if one
equates delay with a particular disposition such as not guilty.
On the other hand, it can be considered an effect of the manner
of disposition, i.e., a result of the fact that it takes longer to
get a trial verdict than it does to plead guilty. The statistical
methods are not dependent on the interpretation of time. If
time is viewed as an effect in the above sense, the model sug-
gests that the counsel is related to time through the choice
of proceedings and that the proceedings are related to the dis-
positions; however, counsel is not directly related to the dis-
position. This is not delay, but rather the choice of different
proceedings (guilty plea, change of plea, or trial) which give
rise to differences in time, insofar as one is free to choose.
As indicated above, a similar result holds for the analysis
involving defense counsel disposition time and level of con-
viction (guilty of the felony as charged, guilty of a lesser
felony, and guilty of a lesser misdemeanor). The best fit of the
observed data is the following hypothesis: the type of defense
counsel is independent of the level of the conviction, given the
disposition time. The level of conviction is related to the pro-
ceedings. It may be said that the relation between defense coun-
sel and the level of conviction is "explained" by the disposition
time, which is related to the proceedings, i.e., a guilty plea cer-
tification is handled promptly, but signifies a conviction of the
felony as charged.
b. Defense Counsel and Time to Dispostion-Motions
and Continuances
The relationship between counsel and disposition time is
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intimately related to the nature of the proceedings involved.
This makes it difficult to analyze this relationship with the
usual techniques of statistical analysis. In other words, the
various proceedings take place on different time scales and,
as such, it is impossible to apply the usual techniques to all
the defendants in the same contingency table. To illustrate, all
of the guilty plea certifications are referred to probation during
the first 2 weeks, while some of the trial dispositions take
longer than 3 months. This creates fundamental problems for
the statistical techniques. Thus, it will not be possible to
demonstrate with these methods that the proceedings account
for the time distribution. Simply stated, the events or proceed-
ings determine the time to disposition on a large scale. The
role of counsel in attempting to affect time on a smaller scale
for specific proceedings can occur through the use of motions
and continuances.
The following discussion examines defense counsel in re-
lation to time for selected proceedings (i.e., dismissals, change
of plea, and trials) with particular regard to the use of mo-
tions and continuances by counsel. These particular proceed-
ings are chosen since they are directly related to certain types
of continuances or motions. The time to disposition for these
proceedings is generally more precise than the one discussed
previously. For dismissals it is the same; i.e., the time from
the filing of the charges to the actual dismissal. For the
changes of plea it is the time from filing to roughly the day
on which the change of plea was made - not the day of sen-
tencing which may be weeks later. Similarly, for the defend-
ants going to trial, if they are found not guilty, the day of
acquittal is used; if found guilty, that day of guilty verdict is
used rather than the sentencing day. It is thought (and veri-
fied) that such a definition involving the actual time to the
determination of guilt would offer a purer reflection of pos-
sible counsel delay or activity, which may be hidden when the
time to sentence is included.
The data clearly reveal a spread in the time to disposition
for the various types of defense counsel. But the statistical
techniques indicate that for each of these proceedings, defense
counsel and the time to disposition are independent. In other
words, this spread is within the statistical fluctuation and
hence negligible. It should be noted that the dismissal times,
the change of plea times, and the trial times are essentially
different, but that for each of these proceedings, the variation
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with defense counsel is within bounds. Actually, we may stop
here with the statement that the counsel and disposition time
are not related for the selected proceedings. However, the role
of motions and continuances is still of interest.
A statistical analysis of the data on the effect of continu-
ances on the various proceedings indicates that although the
use of continuances clearly delays the time to disposition for
each of the proceedings, it is not associated with a specific
type of defense counsel. Thus, the observed data does not
support the popular notion that certain counsel use continu-
ances for the purpose of delay.
Analyzing the use of pretrial motions, i.e., the motion to
suppress or the motion to quash an indictment or an informa-
tion, yields slightly different results. The statistical methods
show that for both dismissals and trials, the defense counsel,
the time to the particular disposition, and whether or not there
were pretrial motions are independent to the limits of statisti-
cal fluctuations. Thus, there is no significant time shift if
motions are involved. This should be clear since most motions
are filed and heard within the time allotted between arraign-
ment and the trial. Also, there is no significant relationship
between motions and defense counsel.
For defendants who changed their plea, the result is
somewhat different. In these cases, the motions are related to
time, i.e., there is a statistically significant shift in time de-
pending on whether or not a motion was made. However, the
methods indicate that this has nothing significant to do with
the type of defense counsel and that the fluctuations are within
bounds.
C. A Combined Look at Defense Counsel in San Diego Munici-
pal and Superior Courts
In the two previous sections, II A and B, defense counsel
were examined separately on a lower court basis and then on an
upper court basis. This section is not a recapitulation of the
results of these respective sections, but rather a new examina-
tion of the interaction of defense counsel with a set of felony
defendants whose cases were filed and terminated in either the
upper or lower courts during the same period of time.
Whether a defendant is or is not terminated in upper or lower
courts is treated here as another variable. The period under
investigation is the first half of the calendar year 1971.
Before beginning the discussion, it may be beneficial to
examine the differences in the distribution of counsel and of
1972
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offenses disposed of between the respective courts. The dis-
tribution of defense counsel for defendants filed and termi-
nated during the first half of 1971 is given in Table 10.3 3 It
is observed that there is a larger proportion of the retained
counsel in the municipal court than in the superior court.
Court-appointed counsel was about the same fraction of each
sample. Defenders, Inc., on the other hand, had a larger per-
centage represented in the superior court, counter to the trend
for retained counsel.
TABLE 10 Distribution of Defense Counsel--San Diego Munici-
pal and Superior Courts 1971
COURT LEVEL
San Diego San Diego
Type Municipal Couri Superior Court
of Counsel Percent Percent
Defenders, Inc. 11 18
Court-Appointed Counsel 46 47
Retained Counsel 44 35
The distribution of offenses, as would be expected, is dif-
ferent between the two courts. This is shown in Table 11.
TABLE 11 Distribution of Offenses-San Diego Municipal and
Superior Courts 1971
COURT LEVEL
San Diego San Diego
Offense Municipal Court Superior Court
Crimes Against Percent Percent
Persons 5 11
Property 18 35
Health & Safety 75 49
Other 2 4
The dominance of health and safety offenses (essentially pos-
session or sale of narcotics) in both jurisdictions is apparent.
Almost half of the superior court terminations and three-
fourths of the municipal court terminations fall into this cate-
gory. Note also that in the lower court the proportion of crimes
against persons or property is about half that of the upper
court.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of defense counsel at each
of the possible terminations. The trend for retained counsel
to dispose of more of his defendants in the lower court than
the upper court, and the opposite trend for Defenders, Inc.,
is apparent.
A most interesting result occurs when the statistical tech-
331t should be noted that the distribution of appointed counsel shifted
between 1970 and 1971.
VOL. 49
SAN DIEGO DEFENSE COUNSEL
niques of contingency table analysis are applied to a three-way
table involving defense counsel, a simple guilty/not guilty
disposition, and whether the defendant was terminated in the
upper or lower court. The results of the analysis indicate that:
e Guilty/not guilty disposition is independent of the
defense counsel, given the court level (to a level of
confidence of 97.5 percent).
FIGURE 3 Combined Municipal and Superior Court Felony Proc-
essing for the City of San Diego (excluding other jurisdictions
in San Diego County) -Defendants Charged and Disposed Jan-




Not Guilty Superior Court
CA-40.91% Dispositions:








Filings: CA-47.8% Information RC-34.5%
RC-33.9% o DI-18.7%o








aCA=court-appointed; RC=retained counsel; DI=Defenders, Inc.
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creased. Even so, it is interesting to note that for the defend-
ants terminated in the upper and lower courts during the first
half of 1971, the guilty/not guilty rate varied between court
levels. There is an association between the type of defense
counsel and the court level, but the relation between counsel
and disposition is not significant to the adjusted level.
III. SUMMARY OF FIDINGS
A. San Diego Municipal Court
Defenders, Inc., has the lowest conviction rate (53 percent)
for its defendants, followed in order by privately retained coun-
sel (60 percent), and by the court-appointed counsel (66 per-
cent). This difference is due in part to the higher proportion
of both Defenders, Inc., and retained counsel defendants trans-
ferred to juvenile court. Furthermore, Defenders, Inc., has a
larger proportion of dismissals than the other two types of
counsel. These differences remain when the nature of the
charged offense-crimes against persons, property, or public
health and safety-is considered. This is in contrast to the
dispositions in the superior court. Additionally, none of the
characteristics of the defendant available to the study explain
the differences in conviction rate in a satisfactory manner. It
should be noted that the lower court terminations are either
dismissals or convictions on pleas of guilty to felony charges
reduced to or treated as misdemeanors.
There is also a distinction between types of counsel with
regard to the time to disposition. The median time to disposi-
tion for both types of appointed counsel is about 1.2 weeks
shorter than the median time for retained counsel. Differences
in disposition time remain when the offense charged, the
defendant's race, and his defendant status (i.e., individual de-
fendant or co-defendant), are taken into account, and also when
dismissals and convictions are considered separately.
It is impossible to draw clear conclusions about defense
counsel from the examination of municipal court terminations
of defendants charged with felonies. The distinctions between
counsel remain and neither the nature of the offense nor the
available characteristics of the defendant offer a satisfactory
explanation. But it must be noticed that certain items of
information that aid in explaining the differences between
defense counsel dispositions in the superior court, i.e., the bail
or jail status of the defendant, and the precise timing of the
actual proceedings, were not in the data base for the defend-
ants in the municipal court sample.
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B. San Diego Superior Court
1. Dispositions
The conviction rate for defendants represented by retained
counsel in the superior court is about 76 percent; for Defenders,
Inc., about 77 percent; and for court-appointed counsel, 83
percent. The lower conviction rate for retained counsel and
Defenders, Inc., results from a larger proportion of their de-
fendants being dismissed in the interests of justice or on motion
of the prosecution. About 72 percent of the defendants repre-
sented by retained counsel plead guilty to the charge or to an
amended or lesser charge, about 71 percent for Defenders, Inc.,
and about 74 percent for the court-appointed counsel.
Differences in the respective conviction rates for counsel
largely disappear when the offense is taken into consideration.
Within each of the offense categories, (crimes against persons,
property, and public health and safety) the conviction rate is
approximately the same for each type of counsel. Therefore,
the difference in conviction rate can be attributed to the un-
equal share of the types of offenses handled by the various
types of counsel. The data support the hypothesis that given
the type of offense, disposition and type of counsel are in-
dependent of each other.
A more detailed look at the disposition is possible. Instead
of a not guilty/guilty approach, the defendants may be classi-
fied as to whether they are dismissed, acquitted, convicted of
the felony as charged, convicted of a lesser felony, or convicted
of a misdemeanor. Using this classification of dispositions,
differences in defense counsel are more apparent; however, the
unequal composition of offenses for defense counsel again offers
an explanation for the differences in disposition. As before,
the observed data support the hypothesis that the disposition
is independent of the type of defense counsel, given the type
of offense. The results hold even when restricted to nontrial
dispositions.
In addition to offense, characteristics of the defendant
(prior record, bail/jail status,34 parole or probation status at
the time of arrest, and race) are alternatively considered.
However, none of these defendant-related variables provide
an explanation of the relationship between defense counsel and
the disposition. As a matter of fact, the data support the
specific hypotheses that disposition is independent of the race
34 The bail/jail status of the defendants may also be a characteristic of the
offense.
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of the defendant, given the type of defense counsel, and that
disposition is also independent of the parole or probation status
of the defendant, given the type of defense counsel.
The use of continuances and pretrial motions by the vari-
ous types of defense counsel as it directly relates to the dis-
position yields some interesting results. The dispositions are
viewed as dismissals, acquittals, or conviction. For resettings
or continuances of various proceedings, the data support the
hypothesis that the number of resettings is independent of
both the defense counsel and the disposition. The motion to
suppress is related to the disposition, but it is independent of
the type of counsel. The use of the motion to quash, on the
other hand, is related to counsel- retained counsel use this
motion more often. When the use of this motion is taken into
consideration, disposition is independent of defense counsel.
2. Sentencing
For the large fraction of the defendants who are convicted,
it is important to examine sentences as a function of type of
counsel representing defendents. When alternative sentences
are considered, it is clear that a large proportion of the con-
victed defendants represented by retained counsel receive sus-
pended sentences and probation instead of prison or jail sen-
tences. Characteristics of the defendant (prior record, bail/
jail status, parole or probation status at the time of arrest, and
race) do not offer a satisfactory explanation of the differences
in sentence as a function of counsel, although the bail/jail
status does offer a marginal explanation. Similarly, the offense
does not explain these differences.
Other characteristics may be termed criminal justice sys-
tem-related variables or more simply system-related variables.
Two particular system-related variables are examined: manner
of conviction (i.e., whether a defendant is convicted on an
original plea of guilty, a change of plea to guilty, or as a
result of a trial) and a level of conviction (i.e., whether a de-
fendant is convicted of a felony as charged, of a lesser felony,
or of a misdemeanor).
The California Bureau of Criminal Statistics assigns a nu-
merical measure to the imposed sentences, called sentence
weights. These sentence weights compare on the same numeri-
cal scale the lengths of prison or jail sentences, the terms of
probation, the amount of fines, and other special sentences.
Thus, the sentence weight is more than an indicator of alterna-
tive sentences- it is a measure of the degree of the sentence.
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When the sentence weights are examined by defense counsel,
a disproportionately large number of defendants represented
by retained counsel receive light sentence weights.-
If sentence weights and defense counsel are examined with
defendant-related and system-related variables, the results are
different from the preceding. Although the system-related
variables, the offense, the defendant's prior record, and his
parole or probation status do not offer an explanation of the
counsel-sentence relationship, the bail/jail status of the de-
fendant does. The data support the hypothesis that the sen-
tence weight is independent of the type of defense counsel,
given the bail/jail status of the defendant. This result may be
put in perspective when it is realized that the bail/jail status
is in part an indication of the economic status of the defendant,
but may also be an indication of the seriousness of the offense.
The distribution of sentence weights for the defendants
free on bail is about the same for each type of counsel. There
is a different distribution of sentence weights for defendants
in custody, but this distribution is about the same for each
type of counsel. This analysis fully acknowledges the strong
relationship between defense counsel and the bail/jail status
of the defendants. However, the data indicate that once the
bail/jail status of the defendant is determined, the distribution
of sentence weights is independent of the type of defense
counsel.
3. Timing
Defendants represented by the Defenders, Inc., have the
shortest median time to disposition (1.7 months) followed by
court-appointed counsel (2.2 months) and by retained counsel
(2.4 months). For the convicted defendants this disposition
time includes the time between the resolution of the charges
and the sentencing, i.e., the period during which a full proba-
tion report is prepared.
The differences between counsel disappear when the type
of proceeding involved in the resolution of the charges is con-
sidered. For the defendants who had charges against them dis-
missed, for those who changed their plea to guilty in the supe-
rior court, and for the defendants going to trial, there is no
significant difference in disposition time by counsel. (This dis-
position time ends at the resolution of the charges rather than
at the sentencing.) Although there are differences between
these groups of defendants (e.g., it takes longer for a trial dis-
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position than for a guilty plea), there are no significant time
differences by counsel.
When continuances or resettings of the proceedings are con-
sidered, there is also no time difference by counsel. In those
cases where continuances were granted, the time to disposition
is understandably longer. However, the use of continuances is
the same for each type of counsel. The data support the hy-
pothesis that the time to disposition is independent of the type
of counsel. Whether there were or were not continuances is
independent of counsel for each of the groups of defendants
considered.
The results are somewhat different when the pretrial mo-
tions to suppress or to quash are considered as they relate to
time. For the defendants who are dismissed and for the de-
fendants who go to trial, whether or not pretrial motions were
made is independent of defense counsel and even independent
of the time to disposition. This is understandable since time is
allotted for hearing these motions within the time set for trial.
However, for the defendants who change their pleas, whether
or not a motion is made (more particularly whether the motion
is granted or denied), may well be a factor in the decision to
change the plea. The data support the hypothesis that whether
or not a motion is made is related to the disposition time for
the defendants who change their pleas, but that this is inde-
pendent of the type of defense counsel.
C. Combined Municipal Court and Superior Court
In a brief look at the role of defense counsel on a com-
bined upper and lower court basis, some revealing trends ap-
pear. About 75 percent of the municipal court terminations
are health and safety (i.e., drug) violations. In the superior
court, about 50 percent of the terminations are in this category.
The proportion of defendants charged with offenses against
persons or against property in the upper court is twice that of
the lower court. About the same proportion, 46 percent, of the
upper and lower court terminations are defendants with court-
appointed counsel. However, there is a very clear trend for
the retained counsel to terminate his defendants at the lower
leve- court. The opposite is true for Defenders, Inc. This
tendency of Defenders, Inc., to terminate defendants in the
upper court is due in large part to their disproportionate share
of the defendants who plead guilty to a felony in the lower
court and consequently must proceed to the superior court for
final disposition and sentencing.
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A final note of interest is the conviction rate considered
for all defendants terminated in the upper and lower courts
with the court level being considered as a factor. (Since ter-
minations in the upper and lower courts are being considered
as alternatives here, the defendants entering the superior court
directly on grand jury indictments were deleted.) The hy-
pothesis that the guilty/not guilty disposition is independent of
counsel, given the court level is marginally supported by the
data. However, the relationship between counsel and the court
level at which the charges were disposed of is not fully ex-
plained by consideration of the offense charged.
CONCLUSION
As stated at the beginning of this article, there are many
views on the quality of defense counsel for the indigent.
Through numerous analyses of interrelations between defend-
ant-related and system-related factors, this study has presented
a meaningful information base for destroying myths about dif-
fering kinds of counsel. For example, where at first blush it ap-
peared that retained counsel was obviously superior, analysis
often revealed some other differentiating factor, such as of-
fense. Where a cursory review of the case dispositions would
lead to one conclusion on counsel effectiveness, the study could
pinpoint something such as a procedural requirement which in
effect dictated the differential results. Sometimes, however,
variations in result could be related only to type of counsel.
No other factor could be found to explain the distinctions.
Although in some parts of the system, data were unavailable
for thorough analysis, occasionally one kind of counsel simply
had better performance. Without prejudice or passion, one
could say that for those instances, type of counsel made the
difference.
Overall, however, the basic findings indicate only slight
variations in performance by the types of defense counsel found
in San Diego. Generally, the article has been cautious about
drawing inferences beyond the obvious. The data and the com-
parisons are there; it is hoped that they will assist in further
careful analyses and will dispel facile criticisms and condemna-
tions. It has not been the purpose of this article to draw con-
clusions about or suggest alternatives to the various methods
of providing counsel to indigent defendants. Societal needs
will demand other studies with these purposes- the findings
of this study should help.

COMMENT
A MISINTERPRETATION OF FACTS: Wyman v. James
INTRODUCTION
N January of 1971, the United States Supreme Court handed
down Wyman v. James,' a now infamous decision. Quite sim-
ply, James held that a benficiary of Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) may not refuse a home visit by a
caseworker without risking the termination of program benefits.
The decision has already been criticized in many journals
for its failure to follow precedent or to defend a welfare client's
constitutional right to privacy.2 In contrast to these articles,
this note attempts to prove the Court's decision erroneous by
illustrating the opinion's faulty analysis of the facts involved.
Regardless of the validity of the legal arguments, it is evident
from the opinion that the Court had little actual knowledge
of the caseworker-client relationship or the coercive nature of
the visit with which the case was concerned. In a complex
socio-legal problem such as this case presented, legal precedent
must be complemented with informed sociological opinion. Such
material will be the basis for this short note and will illustrate
that the Court's refusal to consider this information strongly
contributed to the faulty legal reasoning found in James.
THE MISINTERPRETATION
A. The Holding
Justice Blackmun in writing for the Court held that: (1)
the visit requested was not properly a "search;" (2) that even
if it were, it was not unreasonable and therefore not violative
of the fourth amendment; (3) and that Mrs. James' loss was
due to a "choice .. .entirely hers, and nothing of constitutional
magnitude [was] involved."'
This opinion minimized the investigative aspects of the
visit and emphasized the government's contention that the pur-
l400 U.S. 309 (1971).
2 See generally Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents:
The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259 (1971); Note,
The Implications of Wyman v. James: The Burger Court, The Fourth
Amendment and the Privacy of the Home, 48 DENVER L.J. 87 (1971);
Note, Wyman v. James: Is a Man's Home Still His Castle?, 10 J. FAM. L.
460 (1971); Comment, Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - New
York State Mandated Home Visit is Not an Unreasonable Search-
Public Assistance Recipients Must Submit-Wyman v. James, 35 AL-
BANY L. REV. 809 (1971); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 258 (1971).
3 400 U.S. at 324.
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pose was primarily a beneficent one. The decision was predi-
cated upon the premise that since there was no criminal
investigation or prosecution involved, there was no true search;
and, if the visit was not a "search," it was not an intrusion
coming within the prohibition of the fourth amendment. This
premise illustrates a misunderstanding of the subject before
the Court.
B. The Caseworker-Client Relationship
Justice Blackmun, in holding the home visit in question
not to be a search in the traditional criminal law context, noted
it is "not one by police or uniformed authority. '4 The primary
objective of the visit, according to the majority, is the welfare
of the child and the rehabilitation of the client. In other words,
"[t]he caseworker is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a
friend .. . in need."5
Justice Blackmun and his concurring Justices have glossed
'too glibly over the investigative aspects of the caseworker-
recipient relationship and have vastly overemphasized the be-
neficence and amicability of that same relationship. It is un-
fortunate that the Court's decision depends on conclusions
drawn as a result of this overemphasis, since careful research
would have revealed that the average caseworker-recipient
relationship is a far more adversary one than envisioned in
the opinion.
First, the welfare regulation upon which the rationale for
the visit was originally grounded places an apparently higher
priority on fraud control than on the extension of services
which Blackmun lauds.
[The visit is] for the purpose of determining if there are any
changes in her situation that might affect her eligibility to con-
tinue to receive Public Assistance, or that might affect the
amount of such assistance, and to see if there are any social
services which the Department of Social Services can provide
to the family. 6
Even a casual reading of this statement leads to the con-
clusion that the drafters' concern for social services occupied a
lower rung on the legislative ladder than did the possibility
of paring the undeserving from the welfare rolls. This emphasis
reappears at the lower administrative levels, where many
caseworkers "enter the department as 'guardians of the public
purse.' They are adversaries of the people on relief"7 and are
4 Id. at 322.
5 Id. at 323.
6 Id. at 314.
7 E. MAY, THE WASTED AMERICANS 106 (1964).
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more interested in keeping public expenditures to a minimum
than in achieving a maximization of benefits of their clients.
Combined with the adversary nature of the eligibility
determination visit is the basic feeling of distrust between the
worker and client which creates a competitive climate:
[A]gency personnel are sometimes inadequate because their com-
mitment is to a narrow psychoanalytic framework, one that leads
them to condemn and censor the client for his presumed per-
sonal faults. The poor, Irving Kristol reminds us, are "entitled
to have every possible opportunity to move upward on our
socio-economic scale, if they wish to. But they are also entitled
not to be hectored, badgered, sermonized, psychoanalyzed, fin-
gerprinted, Rorschached, and generally bossed around by a self-
appointed body of self-anointed redeemers .... ,
8
In fact, neither Mrs. James, nor the National Welfare Rights
Organization 9 placed much credence in the friendly intentions
of the welfare department in the instant case.
C. Effectiveness of the Service Function
Even disregarding the adversary approach which many
caseworkers apparently bring to the job, it is hard to find much
of an effective rehabilitative or service function in the avail-
able statistics. This may be true because "caseworkers, what-
ever their theoretical framework, seldom have adequate time
and energy to spend with all their clients. A social worker in
New York state . . . must fill out 24 separate pieces of paper
before a client gets his first welfare check. . . . Little indi-
vidual attention is possible; little real aid is given." 10  Fur-
thermore, case loads are commonly well over practical limits,
the result being that "casework becomes a fiction and public
welfare becomes a function of the check-writing and adding
machine."11
An analysis of this failing relationship appeared in 1969
when the Institute for Research on Poverty released an ex-
haustive study on the extension of social services within the
public welfare scheme and the reaction of AFDC recipients to
those "services. '12 The study's results point strongly to the
conclusion that very little of a tangible and specific nature
is offered to the welfare client in general.
What emerges from the data is that, in the main, social serv-
ice activity is little more than a relatively infrequent, pleasant
s Shostak, The Poverty of Welfare in America, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
POVERTY 97 (W. Gromberg & A. Shostak eds. 1965).
9 N.W.R.O. filed an amicus curiae brief on Mrs. James' behalf.
10 Shostak, supra note 8, at 97.
11 E. MAY, supra note 7, at 112.
12 Handler & Hollingsworth, The Administration of Social Services and
the Structure of Dependency: The Views of AFDC Recipients, 43 SOCIAL
SERv. REV. 406 (1969).
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chat. It is somewhat supportive. It is rarely threatening but also
not too meaningful in the sense of either helping poor people get
things they need or of changing their lives, and it seems to bear
little resemblance to the legislative goals of the Social Security
Act amendments.13
Some critics, particularly the National Welfare Rights Organi-
zation, might quarrel with the conclusion that such activity
is "rarely threatening," but the other findings have been widely
supported. The joint study went on to recommend specifically,
among other things, that there be no caseworker visits in the
home, unless the client has requested the service.
Oddly enough, this view is evidently shared by many of
the caseworkers whose duty is to provide in-home service and
conduct eligibility checks. Shortly after the district court's
decision, and before the Supreme Court had heard arguments,
the Social Service Review commented in this regard:
In the James case one wonders what the experience of the
client had been during the two years which she received AFDC.
Obviously, she had not found the previous home visits of much
value, financially or otherwise. Certainly there was little feeling
of trust between client and agency. Under such circumstances
what could be achieved by another visit?
14
This view was supported in an amicus curiae brief on be-
half of Mrs. James filed by the New York Social Service
Employees Union. Lack of training, lack of time, ineffective-
ness of visits, and hostility which the visits created were all
cited by the Union to favor the proposition that the case-
worker be spared such administrative responsibility. Let them
go to the homes where their aid was requested, and let in-
vestigative functions be carred out separately on the basis of
warrant and probable cause, not under the umbrella of service
extension. Service effectiveness would be enhanced from the
time gained thereby, and the chilling effect of such visits
would be avoided. The Court, in ignoring this plea, chose to
grant the Union's members even broader discretionary powers,
the exact opposite of what they requested.
It is clear that the jargon used by New York in pleading
its case, and by Justice Blackmun in finding for them, is de-
signed to downplay the real purpose of the visit: to find wel-
fare cheats. It is unfortunate again, that neither had looked
more closely into the effectiveness of such eligibility investi-
gations. Most of the studies on the problem have indicated
that such efforts turn up only negligible amounts of fraud in
13 Id. at 413-14 (emphasis added).
14 Comment, Is the Home Visit Obsolete?, 43 SOCIAL SERV. REV. 463 (1969).
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relation to the total case load I5 and cost more than the amounts
trimmed by finding ineligible recipients.1 Indeed, this was
a crucial point emphasized in the arguments:
The Social Service Employees Union, which represents the
caseworkers, told the Supreme Court in a friend-of-court brief
that home visits are ineffective to discover fraud, and the chil-
dren are usually at home and aren't even seen.
17
However, the Court again chose to overlook the facts.
In sum, the "welfare of the child" plus the assistance- and
rehabilitative functions which Justice Blackmun uses to ra-
tionalize entrance to the James home turn out to be paper jus-
tifications only. In point of fact, they serve more often than
not as a cloak for the real purpose of the visit: investigation.
That the investigation is not one by "uniformed authority"
affords the client little comfort. If, as Justice Blackmun says,
the fedral emphasis is upon "maximum self-support and per-
sonal independence consistent with the maintenance of con-
tinuing parental care and protection,""' it is hard to imagine
how that sense of independence and pride is helped by
official intrusions into the home under the threat of benefit
termination. Rehabilitation implies, among other things, a sense
of dignity and pride in oneself -a willingness to face the
world on its own terms. Even the mere acceptance of welfare
benefits is, to many individuals, a blow to this pride and self-
respect, an acknowledgement of defeat. In itself, "[w]elfare
assistance in its present form tends to encourage dependence,
withdrawal, diffused hostility, indifference, ennui."19 It con-
currently supplies support only while undermining self-re-
liance.
20
D. The Nature of In-Home Visits: Coercive v. Voluntary
The Court also held that, since the home visit is not a
criminal investigation, and no criminal penalty is the result
of refusal to allow the visit, the visitation "in itself is not
forced or compelled."'21 Without that necessary force or com-
pulsion, the Court felt that there was no sufficient official
intrusion upon the James family's privacy.
15 E. MAY, supra note 7, at 38-39.
16 NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8, 1971, at 24-25.
17 N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1971, at 8E, col. 1.
18 400 U.S. at 319, Justice Blackmun quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
19 Miller, Some Thoughts on Reform, in BLUE-COLLAR WORLD 302 (W.
Gromberg & A. Shostak eds. 1964).
20 R. O'NEILL, THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCY: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WELFARE
STATE 292 (1970).
21 400 U.S. at 317.
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To say, as Justice Blackmun does, that the visit is not
forced or compelled is specious reasoning. Submission to coer-
cion is not "consent" in either the legal or the lay sense of
the term. If forcing a dependent client to choose between as-
sistance termination and opening the door is not coercion, it
is hard to imagine what might qualify. Justice Blackmun in-
sists that the choice is entirely Mrs. James'. This ignores one
of the basic facts of welfare: most people are recipients not
by choice, but because of the lack of an alternative choice. 22
"For most such individuals, access to the benefit is as essen-
tial as the monthly paycheck of an employee in private in-
dustry. '23 The choice for Mrs. James is to feed and clothe her
children, or not to do so. Basic subsistence is hardly a mere
option.
On this point of freedom of choice, Robert O'Neill's study
on conditioned benefits in the welfare state concludes that the
general benefactor-recipient relationship can be considered vol-
untary only in the most technical sense; and that the unique
relationship between welfare client and caseworker in par-
ticular is by nature subtly coercive. 24 Justice Blackmun and
the majority, however, in recognizing no coercion, found no
deprivation of a magnitude sufficient to warrant protection un-
der the Constitution. Actually, the crucial importance of welfare
payments to the recipients "would seem . . . to point to the
conclusion that welfare is entitled to special protection under
the equal protection clause.' 25 Unfortunately, however,
[W]hile many such benefits are as substantial and important in
the life of the beneficiary as, for example, freedom from crimi-
nal conviction, they are granted or withheld on conditions and
through procedures that offer far less protection for individual
rights and liberties.
20
Despite the pains to which Justice Blackmun goes to dis-
tinguish the visitation in James from those considered by the
Court in prior cases, the facts simply do not lend themselves
to his conclusions. His interpretation of the background and
actions in the instant case is sound only if one accepts some
initially faulty presumptions about caseworker-recipient rela-
tionships, the effectiveness of the service function, and the
voluntary nature of welfare benefit receipt. Having shown
22 COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING THE PUBLIC WEL-
FARE SYSTEM 31 (1970).
23 Pemberton, Book Review, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1961 (1971).
24 R. O'NEILL, supra note 20, at 276.
25 The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REV. 32, 68 (1970).
26 Pemberton, supra note 23, at 1961.
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those assumptions to be based on less than solid evidence, we
have shown part of the fault with the decision as a whole.
CONCLUSION
One must conclude that Justice Blackmun has not ade-
quately done his research in James, at least at the factual
level. Since service functions on the part of welfare depart-
ments are clearly ineffective, there is no rational point in
intruding on an individual's privacy to enforce them. In the
case at bar, as in so many thousands of everyday similar situa-
tions, an appointment outside the home would do far more
to preserve the dignity and pride necessary for eventual self-
support without sacrificing any of the benefits which the present
system realistically accomplishes.
Recent surveys indicate a general resentment among wel-
fare recipients towards both the system and those who admin-
ister it.27 If the welfare system itself gives rise to such self-
defeating effects, how much will the type of administrative
behavior countenanced in James aggravate the problem? In
Brinegar v. United States,28 Justice Jackson eloquently stated:
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing
a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting
terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of
the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every
arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt
and worked among a people possessed of many admirable quali-
ties but deprived of these rights to know that the human per-
sonality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear
where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour
to unheralded search and seizure by the police.
29
Although Jackson's dissent was directed to warrantless searches
by uniformed officers, his observance of the psychological ef-
fects on the human spirit is equally applicable to cases such
as James.
There will undoubtedly be mixed reactions from the mem-
bership of the welfare community itself to this opinion. The
impact of the decision on the individual recipient must clearly
be negative in terms of self-image, pride, and self-reliance. As
several attorneys were quick to note, the decision has unmis-
takably relegated public welfare recipients to the status of
"second-class citizens." In so doing, it reinforces the self-de-
feating aspects of welfare noted earlier and contributes to the
cyclical aspects of dependency which have created second and
27 R. O'NEILL, supra note 20, at 253.
28 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
29 Id. at 180 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
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third generations of public aid dependents. Thus, while the
Court purports to be looking out for the interests of the public
in the distribution of its largesse, the ultimate effect is to
ensure that those expenditures are largely wasted.
Finally, the greatest damage may well have been to the
keepers of the system. Worker morale has long been a problem
in the field of public welfare.30 High caseloads and mountains
of paper work which combine to abort the effective service
function have done nothing to attract qualified persons to the
social services: "It is still unusual for a social worker employed
in a direct service position in either private or public welfare
to have had graduate education in social work, but it is more
unusual in the public assistance field than anywhere else."
'3 1
Indeed, it has had the opposite effect:
In 1968, more than 110,000 persons were employed in the
nation's public welfare programs; a little over 80,000 of these
worked in the federally-aided programs. The annual turnover
averaged close to 30 per cent; some states had as high as 40 per
cent, while one or two went as high as 60 per cent. Less than
2,000 of the 110,000 had a degree in social work or the equiva-
lent. This professional group had a job turnover in excess of 20
per cent a year.
32
Turnover rates have subsequently climbed even higher.
3
One of the causes has been the nature of the investigative
procedures for recipient qualification, which are "repressive
and demeaning to the recipients of welfare, as well as being
one of the chief sources of the very widespread inefficiency and
waste of manpower that afflicts the entire system. ' '34 Frus-
tration at that inefficiency was one of the motives which im-
pelled the social worker's union in New York to file its brief
on behalf of Mrs. James. If, as we noted earlier, the states
are increasingly resorting again to investigations and spot-
checks to pare the burgeoning rolls, this caseworker frustration
must similarly increase. The result must be an even higher
exodus of the dedicated to occupations where they can exercise
their training instead of playing at form-filling and police work.
The Court's failure to restrict the permissible types of admin-
istrative behavior may thus indirectly be a blow at those whose
responsibility it is to see that the system functions.
Gregory F. Long
3o E. MAY, supra note 7, at 118.
31 G. STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURITY: THE POLITICS OF WELFARE 183 (1966).
32 COMMITTEE, supra note 22, at 51.
33 NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8, 1971, at 26.
34 COMMITTEE, supra note 22, at 11.
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TRUSTS - TOTTEN TRUSTS IN COLORADO - Estate of Hall v. Father
Flanagan's Boys' Home, 491 P.2d 614 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
N Estate of Hall v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home," Colorado
joined the growing list of jurisdictions which recognizes the
validity of revocable or tentative savings account trusts, com-
monly known as "Totten" trusts.2 Such trusts have two im-
portant attributes. First, the settlor retains an unlimited power
of control over the subject matter.3 Second, it represents an
effective form of testamentary disposition for which compliance
with the Statute of Wills is not necessary. As a result of these
benefits, a majority of the states presently concede the enforce-
ability of either private4 or charitable5 Totten trusts.
Totten trusts were first upheld in the case of In re Totten,6
wherein the New York Court of Appeals ruled that a person
who deposits a sum in his own name in trust for another can
intend to create: (1) an irrevocable trust, (2) no trust at all,
or (3) a revocable trust. The court then established a set of
rules which still govern revocable Totten trusts:
A deposit by one person of his own money in his own name
as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an
irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a
tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies
or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act
or declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or notice to
the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the bene-
ficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration
of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust
was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the
depositor.
7
In the instant case the Colorado Court of Appeals chose
an unusual fact situation in which to validate Totten trusts
in Colorado. Mrs. Hall, the creator of the trust, opened a savings
account in 1965 naming herself as the trustee and Father Flana-
gan's Boys' Home as the beneficiary.' The signature card bore
1 491 P.2d 614 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
2 See generally 3 P-H 1967 EsT. PLAN. T 3604 et seq.
3 1 A. ScoTr, LAW OF TRUSTS § 57.6 (3d ed. 1967).
4 Id. § 58.
5 Id. § 361.
6 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
7 Id. at 125-26, 71 N.E. at 752.
8 One of appellant's contentions rejected by the court of appeals was
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for
appellee where the "Discretionary Revocable Trust Agreement" stated
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the printed caption "Discretionary Revocable Trust Agreement"
and set forth the terms of the trust agreement on the reverse
side. Following Mrs. Hall's death, her executor filed a petition
in district court to have the trust declared invalid. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Father Flanagan's
Boys' Home, and Mrs. Hall's executor appealed.
In its decision, the court of appeals relied directly on the
Totten trust theory. It seems possible, as urged by the appellee,
that the trust in Estate of Hall could have been upheld as a
valid inter vivos trust without resorting to the Totten theory. 9
Nevertheless, when the appellants challenged the validity of the
trust on the grounds that the creator had too much control over
the corpus, the court responded by stating: "Although we find
no Colorado cases directly on point, the great weight of modern
authority has upheld the validity of savings account trusts
(often referred to as 'Totten Trusts') as against these objec-
tions."'10 There can, therefore, be no question as to the court's
acceptance of the Totten trust theory as the basis for its
decision.
the account was in trust for "Boys Town (A Nebraska Non-profit
Organization) ," the bankbook bore the legend "Boys Town of
Nebraska," and it was agreed that no entity existed in Nebraska under
either of these names. Three other Nebraska organizations with the
words "Boys Town" appearing in their names disclaimed in favor of
appellee, and the court held no issue of material fact was raised by
the pleadings, affidavits, and admissions. 491 P.2d at 616-17.
9Both parties agreed it was unnecessary for the court to rule on the
validity of a Totten trust in Colorado in the case. Appellant urged
reversal on the grounds that the attempt to create the trust failed.
Appellee urged the ruling of the district court be affirmed on the
grounds that a valid discretionary, revocable trust had been created.
Brief for Appellant at 25-26, Brief for Appellee at 8, Estate of Hall v.
Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 491 P.2d 614 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971). A
second rationale upon which the trust could possibly have been up-
held was not argued. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122-3-15(2) (1963)
provides:
Every [savings and loan] association shall have power to issue
stock or shares to any person on a revocable trust for another
person, who is either named in writing as beneficiary thereof
or who is unnamed. At any time during the lifetime of the
trustee, the stock or shares together with dividends, if any,
shall be withdrawn only by the trustee. On the death of the
trustee . . . the stock or shares together with dividends, if
any, shall be paid to the person for whom the stock or shares
were issued as designated beneficiary even though he or she
not be of full legal capacity ....
Whether or not one who deposits money in an account has "stock or
shares" in the association within the meaning of the words of the
statute is not certain, but at least one decision has held that a person
who deposited money in a savings and loan association, and was
issued certificates of deposit in return, was a shareholder in the asso-
ciation and not entitled to the priority of a creditor over other mem-
bers of the association, even though no actual shares were issued.
Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Receivers of the City Say., Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 95 Colo. 498, 37 P.2d 394 (1934).
10491 P.2d at 616.
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This type of trust is of special significance because it per-
mits unlimited control to be retained by the depositor.1 The
Colorado Supreme Court confronted the issue of control in
Denver National Bank v. Von Brecht 2 and held that "a settlor
may reserve a life income for himself, together with the right
to revoke the trust, and he may reserve additional powers if he
does not go too far."'13 Although a limit to this control has yet
to be precisely defined, it is now accurate to say that the
degree of control allowed by a Totten trust does not exceed the
Von Brecht definition.
Of equal significance is the fact that the Totten trust per-
mits the inter vivos distribution of property outside of one's
estate.14 This planning device is not violative of public policy
since the supreme court held in Von Brecht that:
[I]f an owner of property can dispose of it inter vivos and
thereby render a will unnecessary for accomplishment of his
practical purposes, he has a right to do so. The motive in mak-
ing such a transfer may be to obtain the practical advantages
of a will without the necessity of making one, but the motive
is immaterial.15
The decision in Estate of Hall is, therefore, significant for
two reasons. First, Colorado has joined the majority of juris-
dictions in upholding the validity of Totten trusts. Second, al-
though the subject of the trust was a savings account, it appears
that the court of appeals has gone one step further than the
supreme court did in Von Brecht16 by permitting the settlor to
retain even more control over the corpus.
17
Rodney D. Knutson
11 Where a person makes a deposit in a savings account in a bank or other
savings organization in his own name as trustee for another person
intending to reserve a power to withdraw the whole or any part of
the deposit at any time during his lifetime and to use as his own
whatever he may withdraw, or otherwise revoke the trust, the in-
tended trust is enforceable by the beneficiary upon the death of the
depositor as to any part remaining on deposit on his death if he has
not revoked the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1959).
12 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958).
13 Id. at 102, 322 P.2d at 674 (emphasis added). However, where the
motive for creating the trust or the effect of its creation is to impair
or defeat the spouse's right to elect against the will, the outcome of
an attack on the validity of any revocable, inter vivos trust in Colorado
in uncertain. See Huff, An Aspect of Estate Planning in Colorado: The
Revocable Inter Vivos Trust, 43 DENVER L.J. 296 (1966).
14 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 3, § 58.3.
15 137 COLO. 88, 99, 322 P.2d 667, 672.
16 Id. at 88, 322 P.2d at 667.
17 For a general history of revocable trusts in Colorado see Huff, supra
note 13. The Colorado position concerning retention of control is
treated at pages 305-09.
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BOOKS RECEIVED
IN THE NAME OF PROFIT. Robert L. Heilbroner & Others. Garden
City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1972. Pp. xi, 273. $6.95. This
book approaches a familiar subject (corporate social amorality)
in a novel fashion (via personalized accounts of actual events).
Through a series of profiles in corporate irresponsibility writ-
ten by investigative journalists, the work attempts to drama-
tize and bring to life for the reader the ubiquity of moral bank-
ruptcy in the modern corporate structure. No punches are
pulled in the process. Actual events are detailed, and respon-
sible executives are identified by name. The work concludes
with a thoughtful and provocative essay on the corporate insti-
tution by the distinguished economist, Robert L. Heilbroner.
The book is very readable, and obviously intended for a wide
audience which it should gain; the questions which it raises
deserve the thoughtful attention of all concerned citizens.
Is LAW DEAD? Edited by Eugene V. Rostow. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1971. Pp. 415. $8.95. This symposium addresses
itself to two issues: first, the citizen's moral relation to the law
in a society of consent; and, second, the capacity of the Ameri-
can legal and political order to meet the felt needs of our
people for social justice. Eugene V. Rostow has collected a
formidable group of legal scholars to discuss this important
and thought-provoking topic. Representative authors include
Patricia Roberts Harris, Robert L. Heilbroner, and William H.
Riker. These scholarly articles discuss law and government as
they function under the modern pressures of civil disobedience,
urbanization, demand for higher education, and preservation
of civil rights. Contemporary America, perhaps now more than
in recent history, presents an exciting arena for examination
of our basic institutions. This book is a valuable reference for
any student of the American political system, and provides a
thoughful analysis of the respective roles of citizens and
government.
JUDICAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD. Mauro Cappelletti.
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1971. Pp. xv, 117. (price
not set). This small, readable book provides a current assess-
ment of judicial review as it exists in nations other than the
United States. The historical development of inflexible consti-
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tutions is noted as an outgrowth of a search for higher values
against which legislation may be measured. The comparative
method is used as an instrument of deriving internationally
accepted values in the law. Types of judicial review are ana-
lyzed by their functional organs and techniques of control.
The effects of political control are briefly noted. The author
has included extensive references and an adequate index. This
book is recommended for legal scholars in search of an effec-
tive comparative discussion of judicial review.
LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND
THE COURTS. Edited by Robert Lefcourt. New York: Random
House, 1971. Pp. viii, 347. $10.00. This book is an anthology of
radical views on law by both lawyers and non-lawyers, includ-
ing William Kunstler, Gerald Lefcourt, George Jackson, Robert
Lefcourt, Diane Schulder, and Kenneth Cloke. The collection
of essays compiled herein is primarily concerned with aspects
of the law which relate to the rights of individuals, the pres-
sures and movements for social change, and the roles of the
lawyer and citizen in confronting the law and its institutions.
The editor has collected these writings in the attempt to pre-
sent to the reader the law as seen both by those who practice
it and those who suffer by it. These essays and the compre-
hensive bibliography are a valuable asset to the reader who
wishes to understand the necessity for demystification of the
law.
THE LoGic OF LAW. Gordon Tullock. New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1971. Pp. 268. $7.95. This book presents both a suggestion
-that the foundations of law need restructuring- and an
answer-that the most efficient legal system is one based on
modern welfare economics rather than ethics. Analogizing to
the fundamental economic principle that market-related changes
should be such that substantially everyone benefits, the author
would similarly structure law on logic. After making certain
basic assumptions about men and scientific procedures, Tullock
presents his concept of civil and criminal law, which he sees to
be grounded in a system of behavioral norms. While under-
standably enthusiastic about his innovative application of the
tools of social science to develop a logical legal structure, the
author also compels the reader into his own reconsideration of
the foundation and justification of law. This book is recom-
mended for legal practitioners and academicians alike.
THE MONEY GIVERs. Joseph C. Goulden. New York: Random
House, 1971. Pp. 341. $8.95. The charitable foundation and its
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status and function in modern American life, is the subject of
this extremely interesting book. Goulden recounts the history
of the endowment while giving the reader a quick look into
the colorful lives of many of the philanthropists who created
them. The author then proceeds with a careful analysis of the
nature and function of the foundation today. A detailed dis-
cussion of who spends these charitable moneys, on what, raises
several interesting questions as to the freedom allowed tax-
exempt entities to meddle in the public sector of society.
The author suggests that only public participation in the opera-
tion of foundations can keep their purpose essentially charit-
able. The work is an excellent guide to the possible uses and
misuses of this very important institution in today's society.
PRESIDENTIAL PowER: How MUCH is Too MUCH? Robert A. Liston.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. Pp. 160. $4.95. Robert Liston
has taken a timely but complex subject and presented it in a
brief and interestingly understandable form. The book traces
the development of the vast presidential war powers and then
compares them to the relatively limited presidential domestic
powers. Liston's emphasis is on the war powers exercised by
all presidents since 1940 in various international crises. He sug-
gests that the differing combinations of restraints upon the exec-
utive power in the domestic and international arenas produce a
national need for a strong, willful man in the domestic area and
a strong, restrained man in foreign matters. Such a chief execu-
tive is very difficult to find. In short, this book is particularly
suitable for those interested in a brief appraisal and analysis of
the power of the Presidency and the differing limitations upon
that power.
THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS. Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Phillip
E. Hammond. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971.
Pp. xi, 164. $6.50. This book presents an empirical study of the
American socio-political life, with a specific focus on the impact
of the Supreme Court's "School Prayer Decisions" of 1962 and
1963. The authors conducted extensive research in the fictitious
midwestern state of "Midway" by means of mailed question-
naires and personal interviews, examining issues such as: How
can decisions be rendered at the national level and be without
effect at the local level? What factors determine the reception
given by a local government to a policy handed to it from
above? How can decisions of the United States Supreme Court
be systematically controverted? The book is a product of socio-
logical research and statistical analysis, and, therefore, is some-
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what technical in nature. However, it is within the grasp of the
average layman who might be interested in the subject matter.
The book is an interesting examination of social reaction to the
law.
To ENACT A LAW: CONGRESS AND CAMPAIGN FINANcING. Robert L.
Peabody, Jeffrey M. Berry, William G. Frasure & Jerry Gold-
man. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 217. (price
not given). Using the attempted Congressional enactment of
the Political Broadcast Act of 1970 as a model the author guides
the reader through the intricacies of the legislative process.
Robert Peabody, professor of political science at Johns Hopkins,
has joined with three doctoral candidates in this effort to
make the subject of "how a bill becomes a law" more realis-
tic and interesting. The discussion begins with an examination
of the problem of mounting campaign expenditures which led
to the drafting and introduction of the bill, and traces the bill's
course through committees, veto by the President, and final
demise when it failed in the Senate by 4 votes to override the
presidential veto. The methods employed by various interest
groups are considered and their success or failure is examined.
The authors' orderly approach and careful analysis combine to
produce a work which should be of interest to a wide audience.
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ABSTRACTS OF
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL PUBLICATIONS*
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
FEDERAL DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: MOBILE DRIVER LICENSE TESTING
UNIT. Colorado State Dept. of Revenue, Denver Research and
Statistics Section, Nov. 1970. Pp. 160. The present driver license
testing system in Colorado consists of 74 state offices and 15
county offices. In over 40 rural areas, the system incorpo-
rates the use of traveling examiners covering a schedule
of several towns during a week's period and generally carrying
the necessary equipment. It was thought that a mobile unit
had a potential use in larger towns. Data on a demonstration
project in this field are presented. Order Number PB-205 011.
$3.00.
ECONOMICS
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY: AN EVALUA-
TION OF A STRATEGY FOR CHANGE IN THE COMMUNITY ACTION PRO-
GRAM. National Opinion Research Center, Chicago, Ill., Aug.
1970. Pp. 174. The final report is made of an evaluation of
urban Community Action Programs (CAP) in two cities. The
first phase includes a probability sample of 50 cities with popu-
lations of 50,000 or more. The second phase is a probability sam-
ple of 50 additional cities. The final report extends the anal-
ysis of previous reports by utilizing the full sample of cities
and includes detailed multi-variate analysis. Order Number
PB-206 874. $3.00.
HIGHWAY STATISTICS, 1970. Federal Highway Administration,
Washington, D.C., 1970. Pp. 210. The publication presents the
1970 statistical and analytical tables of general interest on motor
fuel, motor vehicles, driver licensing, highway-user taxation,
state highway finance, highway mileage, and federal aid for
highways; and 1969 highway finance data for municipalities,
counties, townships, and other units of local government. The
"Highway Statistics" series has been published annually begin-
ning with 1945. Order Number PB-206 547. $0.95.
* These abstracts are reprinted from GOVERNMENT REPORTS ANNOUNCE-
MENTS and UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
REPORTS. Unless otherwise indicated, the studies abstracted may be
obtained in their entirety by ordering from the National Technical
Information Service, Springfield, Va. 22151. Payment must be enclosed
with the order, and orders must include the "order number" given after
each abstract.
ABSTRACTS
MANUAL FOR EVALUATING DAY CARE CENTERS. Central New York
Regional Planning and Development Board, Syracuse, June
1971. Pp. 56. The report describes procedures for evaluating
day care centers. The procedures were formulated specifically
with regard to the information available through, and plan-
ning requirements of, the Syracuse Model City Agency. Six
chapters comprise the body of the report. The first discusses
some problems involved in providing adequate day care serv-
ices on the national level, the city level, and within the Syra-
cuse model city area. The second describes rationale for the
assessment of day care centers and presents a brief history of
their role in the American economy; chapters three and four on
data collection describe recommended evaluation procedures
with instruments and suggestions on how to use these proced-
ures. The fifth chapter deals with the application of these
procedures. (Order Number and price not given).
PROJECT OUTREACH, PHASE III. National Business League, Wash-
ington, D.C., Dec. 1970. Pp. 46. The report describes results of
technical assistance to help minority entrepreneurs participate
in the economic growth of the Nation through programs in 10
major cities. Emphasis is on participation rather than on a sep-
arate black economy. Assistance described includes help in
securing loans for individual businessmen and firms as well as
for local development companies; information on marketing and
site location; guidance regarding management problems; contract
and bonding assistance. The report says the project created 1,352
jobs through establishment of new business or expansion of
existing business. Photographs and case histories of businesses
helped by Outreach are included. Order Number COM-72-10239.
$3.00.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF WATER. Utah
State University, Logan. Dept. of Economics, Oct. 1971. Pp. 356.
The report provides a three-part conceptual analysis of the ef-
fectiveness of water resources development as a means of in-
ducing economic development in sub-national regions. The first
part covers the economic rationale for using public works to
achieve economic growth, regional delineation issues, theoreti-
cal growth models, and growth measures. The second part
provides a state-of-the-art analysis of the effects of alterna-
tive water development programs on economic development in
various types of regions. Irrigation, navigation, hydropower,
flood prevention, water supply, water quality, and recreation
projects are considered. In the third part, several estimating
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techniques are reviewed for possible use in assessing impacts
from water investments. Included are: input-output, program-
ming models, econometric models, and simulation. Order Num-
ber PB-206 372. $9.00.
EDUCATION
ENROLLMENT AND FINANCIAL MODELS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION. Mathe-
matica, Inc., Bethesda, Md., Aug. 1971. Pp. 139. In the report
are formulated several models which forecast the enrollment
and financial needs of students in higher education. There are
four models altogether: the undergraduate enrollment model,
post-baccalaureate enrollment model, undergraduate student aid
model, and post-baccalaureate student aid model. Models were
developed separately for undergraduate and post-baccalaureate
students because the student characteristics and available data
are different for these two groups. Order Number PB-204 649.
$3.00.
EVALUATION OF PROJECT LATE START IN FOUR CITIES. M.E. Paul.
Washington, D.C., Aug. 1971. Pp. 97. The report evaluates a
demonstration project which sought to improve living condi-
tions of the elderly by familiarizing them with available serv-
ices and increasing their participation in community affairs.
Order Number PB-203 462. $3.00.
INTERNS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: SECOND YEAR. E.R. Cole
and J.N. Haltiwanger. Columbia, S.C., Aug. 1971. Pp. 84. This
is a review of the developments giving rise to the South Caro-
lina Interns for Community Development program, the 1970
summary report of which is reproduced in the Appendix. The
internship has proven highly beneficial to students and state
agencies. The body of the report is a statement of the value of
the program in manpower development in local government.
The internship is an integral part of manpower development
which is in turn a component of the community development
process. Participants are listed. Order Number PB-204 276.
$3.00.
INVENTORY OF STUDENT FINANCIAL AID PROGRAMS. Mathematica,
Inc., Bethesda, Md., Feb. 1971. Pp. 133. The report represents an
attempt to delineate the major sources of revenue which are
directed towards assisting students in their pursuit of higher
education. It summarizes information collected in Phase I of
a study entitled "The Development of a Model to Study Al-
ternative Student Aid Programs." Data dealing with the major
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public and private student financial aid systems were collected
by socioeconomic and aptitude classes and other categories
relevant to the determination of probability factors for the
refined enrollment-student aid project model. Order Number
PB-204 648. $3.00.
QUALrrY OF RESEARCH ON EDUCATION: AN EMPiRICAL STUDY OF RE-
sEARcBERs AND THEm WORK. A.H. Persell. Columbia University,
New York, May 1971. Pp. 424. The study concerns itself with
measuring and explaining the quality of recent research in
education. A 12-page questionnaire was mailed to 1,100 authors
to collect data on their training, career lines, research involve-
ment and selection of the topic on which they did their re-
search. A stratified sample of these research works was evalu-
ated for quality by a national panel of judges to enable the
author to relate quality to the researchers' background. Order
Number PB-204 247. $6.00.
TrrLE I EVALUATION AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: ASSESSMENT AND
PROJECTS. Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., Oct. 1970. Pp. 152.
The report is the result of a 7-month Urban Institute study on
improvement of federal and state evaluation and technical
assistance related to education of disadvantaged children. Dur-
ing the study, site visits were made to five representative state
departments of education, reports on which have been made
available to the Office of Education. The Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act of 1965 was the first major piece of edu-
cation legislation to require annual evaluation of program effec-
tiveness. Federal, state, and local educational agencies are all
involved in assessing the project effectiveness and in attempts
to improve program operations. This report emphasizes the
need for the Office of Education to strengthen evaluation and
technical assistance in order to improve the education of dis-
advantaged children - and the need for the Office of Education
to develop and test evaluation and technical assistance models
that are appropriate to different educational settings. Order
Number PB-204 972. $3.00.
EMPLOYMENT
CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: 1970. EMPLOYMENT PROFILES
OF SELECTED Low-INCOME AREAS. Bureau of the Census, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1971-72. The reports present socioeconomic data
on employment related problems from selected low-income
areas. Statistics are presented on the demographic characteris-
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tics of the population by the most important labor force and
socioeconomic factors for each race and Spanish origin group.
Detailed characteristics tables present data on current labor
force and employment statistics by demographic categories and
work experience of the population in the last 12 months. Statis-
tics are presented on employment and unemployment, educa-
tion, vocational training, job history, income, residential migra-
tion, and factors which are problems in job holding or job
seeking for the residents of these areas. Order Number COM-
71-80008. $0.95.
HIGHWAY SAFETY OCCUPATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES. Highway Users
Federation for Safety and Mobility, Washington, D.C., Dec.
1970. Pp. 82. The report is a highway safety occupational op-
portunities manual. The manual was intended to fill the com-
munications void existing between highway safety agencies (em-
ployers) and prospective highway safety workers. Order Number
PB-204 864. $3.00.
THE IMPACT OF EXTENDING MINIMUM WAGES TO PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS. J.P. Mattila, Columbus, Ohio, Oct. 1971. Pp. 45. This
report analyzes the potential impact of an extension of mini-
mum wage legislation to cover household maids and servants.
Empirical analysis was done of a labor market survey on
women aged 14 to 24 and 30 to 44, and of a consumer price
survey. This data noted that the hourly earnings of approxi-
mately one-half of all maids amounted to less than $1.40, and
a prediction was made regarding legislation enacted to raise
their minimum wage to $1.60 and the impact on the demands
for domestic helpers. The report indicated that domestics'
wages have risen rapidly, with the result that there has been
a substantial decline in domestic employment; in 1970, for ex-
ample, there were only one-fifth as many maids per household
as in 1900. Order Number PB-204 585. $3.00.
ENVIRONMENT
THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF NOISE. National Bureau of Standards,
Washington, D.C., Dec. 1971. The World Health Organization
defines health as a state of physical, mental, and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. Using
this definition it is evident that noise can be considered as hav-
ing an important influence on the health of man. Because of
its pervasive influence in all settings, activities, and walks of
life it has been often cited as a major source of annoyance as
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well as a threat to physical and mental health. For most people
the usual consequences of noise are associated with interference
with listening to speech or other sounds, distraction at home
and on the job, disturbance of rest and sleep, and disruption
of recreational pursuits. All of the foregoing can be considered
components of the quality of life. In dealing with the social
impact of noise, this report is divided into several sections:
Overview: Extent of Problem - changing scope of problem:
Effects of noise- medical, psychological, social. Order Number
PB-206 724. $3.00.
A STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE
ON THE ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION. Education Systems Resources
Corp., Arlington, Va., July 1971. Pp. 121. This is a compre-
hensive statement of the probable impact of the pipeline
on Alaska's native population. The areas investigated include
current economic and cultural lives of the population and
the problems that may result, such as the loss or modification
of subsistence resources, the alteration of traditional life styles,
economic absorption, and cultural assimilation. There is also in-
cluded information on the profile of the Alaska Native Com-
munity; population, living conditions, housing and sanitation,
health, education, sources of livelihood. In addition, there is a
significant bibliography. Order Number PB-204 441. $3.00.
HEALTH
AMBULATORY CARE: PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION. Health and Hos-
pital Planning Council of Southern New York, Inc., New York,
Sept. 1970. Pp. 569. The study documents and analyzes the
origins of planning, organization, and administration of ambu-
latory care facilities and services. It is based on literature
reviewing medical care and other fields of public health, and
on observation of various selected programs, with particular
emphasis on statistical systems. Order Number PB-204-925.
$6.00.
STUDY OF THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL MEDICAL
DIAL ACCESS INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SYSTEM. T.C. Meyer, Wis-
consin University, Madison, Wisconsin, Feb. 1970. Pp. 140. This
study examines the costs and operating problems associated
with a national center which in response to telephone calls
would provide any one of one thousand recorded messages on
patient-care problems. The number and cost of required Inward
Wide Area Telephone Service lines (INWATS) is computed. An
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automatic message selection unit is described. Guidelines for
data base development and promotion of service are also in-
cluded. Order Number PB-204 698. $3.00.
HOUSING
THE IMPACT OF HOUSING INSPECTIONAL SERVICES ON HOUSING MAINTE-
NANCE IN THE CITY OF BOSTON: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION. Boston
Urban Observatory, Mass., July 1971. Pp. 153. The study de-
scribed represents a preliminary evaluation of the impact of
municipal policies on the enforcement of housing codes and on
the upgrading of the housing stock in the city of Boston. The
purposes of the analyses are twofold: development of a frame-
work for continuing policy studies to establish strategies for
allocating resources among alternative approaches to code en-
forcement, and formulation of recommendations for reorgani-
zing existing code enforcement agencies and for more effec-
tively meeting municipal housing and building maintenance
responsibilities. Order Number PB-206 368. $5.45.
PRISON REFORM
THE ROLE OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES. Iowa University, Iowa
City, Center for Labor and Management, June-Aug. 1971. The
specific goals of the project are fivefold: to examine the cur-
rent status of prison industries in Iowa and six adjacent states
of Illinois, Missouri, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, and South
Dakota; to collect and analyze information obtained from prison
personnel in these seven states regarding the role of correc-
tional industries; to compare the attitudes of these prison per-
sonnel with those of a national sample of state correctional ad-
ministrators and key industry directors; to determine the recep-
tivity of influential groups (legislators, business leaders, union
officials, and employment specialists) in one state (Iowa) to
selected prison industry innovations; and to review the survey
findings with regional correctional representatives in terms of
their meaning for the future of state and interstate industries
programs. Order Number PB-206 877. $3.00.
PROPERTY
AN EVALUATION OF LEGAL THEORIES CURRENTLY EMPLOYED To DETER-
MINE WHICH LANDS ARE RIPARIAN. D.R. Levi, Missouri Water
Resources Research Center, Columbia, Mo., June 1970. Pp. 28.
This report illustrates the extent of riparian land under the
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chain and unity of title theories for a 10 mile strip of land
north of the Mississippi River. In addition, the costs of irrigat-
ing different tracts were calculated. It was concluded that the
unity of title theory - classifying all land as riparian which
adjoins a riparian source, is contiguous, and within the same
watershed-was the preferred legal theory because it pro-
vided the needed flexibility for facilitating water usage on those
tracts most productive at the margin. It was also concluded
that permitting water to be used on land other than that classi-
fied as riparian is economically feasible and in some cases the
minimum cost method of providing irrigation water. Order
Number PB-204 495. $3.00.
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN BOSTON. Boston Urban Ob-
servatory, Mass., Oct. 1971. Pp. 241. This report represents
contribution to a national research activity undertaken by all
cities participating in the urban observatory program during
its first year of operation. In accordance with the guidelines
on typology used by all urban observatories for this study, or-
ganized citizen participation groups were categorized as those
mandated by federal statute, those initiated by city government,
and voluntary or self-initiated groups with government as their
target. Order Number PB-206 369. $6.75.
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